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Abstract
This thesis presents a model of EU legislative politics. The model sees national political parties 
as actors, rather than institutions, countries or trans-national party groups. The empirical focus is 
on the Codecision procedure after the Amsterdam reform came into effect in 1999.
In essence, the thesis argues that governing parties dominate EU legislative politics. The 
governing parties’ advantage stems from two factors. First, they are represented in the Upper 
House, the Council of Ministers, while opposition parties are not. Second, the shifting majority 
requirements in the European Parliament (EP) mean that a qualified majority in the Council can 
impose its preferences on the EP if the Council has the support from a blocking minority in the 
EP. Nevertheless, the qualified majority requirement in the Council also means that most 
governing parties would like to see a larger change in policy than what the Council can agree to 
in their common position.
This has implications for the legislative strategy of both governing and opposition parties. Three 
hypotheses are tested. Hypothesis 1: Governing parties are more active as Codecision agenda- 
setters (rapporteurs) than opposition parties. Hypothesis 2: Rapporteurs from governing parties 
are more likely to see their initial legislative proposal being accepted by the Council of Ministers 
in the first reading. Hypothesis 3: The majority of governing parties and ideologically close 
opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than other parties.
The empirical evidence supports the hypotheses. Thus, there are empirical grounds for arguing 
that government and opposition exist in EU legislative politics. The governing coalition is the 
qualified majority of the governing parties and its ideologically close parties in the EP. The 
opposition is the losing minority in the Council and its ideologically close parties in the EP. The
2
opposition also includes those parties that are neither ideologically close to the minority nor close 
to the majority of the governing parties.
The evidence shows that behaviour differences are more evident between governing and 
opposition parties from adversarial member states. In non-adversarial states, which often have 
minority or oversized coalition government, the difference between governing and opposition 
parties is smaller.
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Introduction
EU directives and regulations influence the lives of millions of Europeans. It is thus important to 
understand legislative politics in the European Union. The nature of EU legislation is a result of 
the interaction between the preferences of actors and the institutional rules (Hinich and Munger 
1997; Hix 1999b). The collective actors in EU legislative politics are the Commission, the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP). The interaction and powers of these 
actors under the different institutional rules is well researched (e.g. Crombez 1996; 2000; 
Dowding 2000; Eamshaw and Judge 1997; Farrell and Heritier 2003; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; 
Konig and Poter 2001; Rittberger 2000; Scully 1997a; Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994; Tsebelis 
and Garrett 2000). However, inside these institutions political party affiliation influences 
behaviour and opinions of individual actors (e.g. Hix 1999a; 2002b; Hix, Noury, and Roland 
2004; Hooghe 2001; Mattila 2004; Scully 1998; Scully and Farrell 2003). All of the institutional 
actors in EU legislative politics are constituted of political parties, which are capable of 
coordinating behaviour amongst its members to a larger extent than any other organising unit, e.g. 
national delegations or party groups (Hix 2004; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 
2004; Noury 2002b). Hence, political parties should play a central role in a theory of EU politics 
(Lord 2002). Surprisingly, a model of the legislative process in the EU, which takes political 
parties as the key actors, is missing from the literature. The aim of this thesis is to develop and 
test such a theory. The scope is limited to the Codecision procedure, as reformed in the 
Amsterdam treaty, under which the EP and the Council as institutional actors are thought to be 
co-equal legislators (e.g. Crombez 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000).
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Argument of the thesis
The thesis argues that the equality between the institutional actors in the Codecision procedure 
does not translate into equality between the partisan actors. Governing parties have the advantage 
in EU legislative politics because they are, unlike opposition parties, represented both in the 
Council and in the EP. In addition, the shifting majority requirements imposed on the EP at the 
different stages of the Codecision procedure favours governing parties over the opposition. A 
qualified majority of governing parties in the Council and other ideologically close parties in the 
EP make up the legislative government, while the minority in the Council and ideologically close 
opposition parties make up the opposition in EU legislative politics together with anti EU parties 
and extremists from both the left and the right. The theory suggests that differences between 
government and opposition can be found in three areas. First, governing parties are more active 
as Codecision agenda-setters (rapporteurs) than opposition parties. Second, rapporteurs from 
governing parties are more likely to see their initial legislative proposal being accepted by the 
Council of Ministers in the first reading. Third, the majority of governing parties and 
ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than 
other parties. The theoretical argument is however limited to parties from adversarial member 
states. In non-adversarial states, which often have minority or oversized coalition government, 
the difference between governing and opposition parties is smaller.
Criticism of the argument
At least five arguments can be presented against the argument of this thesis. Some might say that 
there is no government and opposition at the EU level until the day when the Commission is 
chosen by the majority in the European Parliament. Others might argue that EU politics is all 
about ideology. Some might object that the Council and the EP are consensual institutions not
driven by competition between parties. Another possible critique is that the Commission, the sole 
actor to initiate EU legislation, is largely neglected in the model. Finally, some might say that 
there is nothing new in any analysis that emphasises the power of governments. These objections 
are addressed here in the introduction in order to make the reader aware of them at an early stage.
No government and opposition in the EU
This argument is presented by scholars comparing the EU with the parliamentary systems found 
in most of EU’s member states. In a parliamentary system, the formal powers to appoint and 
dismiss the executive as well as to initiate and adopt legislation lie with the Parliament. The 
Parliament also has the power to raise taxes and has the final say on the budget. As pointed out 
by cadres of scholars, it is not hard to argue that the Union fells short of the characteristics of a 
parliamentary democracy (see for example Decker 2002; Lodge 1994; Mather 2001). The key 
executive, the Commission, is appointed by the governments and only approved by the EP. It 
does not rely on day-to-day support in the Parliament. Along similar lines, “the EP does not exist 
in a majoritarian system -  there is no clear ‘government’ or ‘opposition’ in the EU ’ (Neunreither 
1998; quoted in 2003: 45)
However, parliamentary unitary systems where the executive is formed directly from the majority 
of the legislature, hence formally responsible to it, is not the only model of democracy the EU 
can be evaluated against. After all, it is a bicameral separation of power system, more comparable 
to the US and other presidential systems than the national political systems found Western 
Europe (e.g. Coultrap 1999; Katz 2001). As we will see in the first chapter, the labels of 
government and opposition are applied in presidential systems as well. One example is the debate 
over divided versus unified government, where unified government tend to mean that the same
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party controls the majority in all institutions whose support is necessary to introduce new 
legislation. The government is the legislative coalition that can change the policy in its preferred 
direction. This definition of government and opposition is also applicable in the EU context. As 
such, the argument presented here is an application of the insights from the study of legislative 
politics in the US to the similar, but far from identical, political system of the European Union 
(Hix 1999b:56-98).
EU politics is all about ideology
A second line of critique against this thesis could be that it just shows that EU politics is over 
some form of left-right issues. This is nothing new. It has been claimed by observers of 
legislative behaviour both inside the EP and in the Council (e.g. Attina 1990; Bardi 2002; Bell 
and Lord 1998; Brzinski 1995; Hix 1993; 1999a; 2001; Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003; Hix and 
Lord 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2003; 2004; Hooghe and Marks 1999; Kreppel 2000;
Kreppel and Hix 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Marks, Wilson, 
and Ray 2002; Mattila 2004; Noury 2002b; Raunio 1998).
While it is clear that ideology guides behaviour in EU legislative politics, just like in most other 
political systems, the thesis shows that a careful modelling and analysis of the institutional 
settings in which these coalitions form helps us not only to understand the coalitions, but also the 
strategic choices made by the actors. It is useful to know the coalitions, but it helps to be able to 
predict the action taken by these coalitions as well. For example, in chapter 6, where voting in the 
second reading is analysed, the results shows that location in the policy space can account for a 
significant proportion of the voting decisions. However, by investigating who supports 
amendments to the common position and who does not, new and surprising finding emerges.
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Governing parties, rather than opposition parties, are more likely to vote in favour of second 
reading amendments than opposition parties. The reason is linked to strategic opportunities 
arising from shifting majority requirements in the EP exploited by the majority of the governing 
parties. The full explanation of this phenomenon is given in chapter 2. This, as well as insights 
regarding distribution of agenda-setting power through the rapporteurships system, and 
differences regarding when legislation is adopted would be missed if the differences in strategic 
opportunities for governing and opposition parties are not properly modelled. The theory 
developed in this thesis shows the effect of ideology given the institutional rules.
The EU is a consensual, not a competitive, political system
Different behaviour by governing and opposition parties implies a competitive political system. 
Some argue that the EU is consensual political system. The argument arises from several sources. 
One of its origins is the oft-heard claim that there is a consensual culture in the Council (e.g. 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Lewis 1998). It could also be said that the EP is a consensual 
institution (Lord 1998). Others subscribes to this view as they see the EU primarily geared 
towards common problem solving and deliberation (e.g. Eriksen and Fossum 2000; 2002). Yet 
another line of presenting a similar objection is to argue that the EU is primarily concerned with 
regulation, through pareto efficient solutions, rather than redistribution (e.g. Majone 1994; 1996; 
2000).
Recent research has established that voting in the Council occurs (Mattila 2004; Mattila and Lane 
2001). Even when formal votes are not recorded, decisions are made ‘in the shadow of the 
vote’(Golub 1999). All actors know that it is possible to call a vote and behave accordingly.
There are winners and losers in EU decision-making (Stokman and Thomson 2004). While the
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winner-takes-all phenomena of the Westminster system, and the US Congress, is not present in 
the EP, partly due to the lack of a majority party, the spoils are tilted in favour of the larger, more 
centrist party groups (Kaeding 2004; Kreppel 2002; Mamadouh and Raunio 2001; 2003; Raunio 
1997).
Finally, even if the EU is geared towards regulation, not redistribution, the redistributive 
consequences of regulation should not be neglected. Regulative policies might be understood as 
being about the allocation of property rights. The allocation of property rights can be seen as one 
of the most fundamental issues to be resolved by the state (McNutt 2002: 164-207). The literature 
on rent-seeking has alerted us about the role interest groups may play in the decisions of both 
elected politicians as well as agencies (Becker 1983; Mitchell 1990; Mitchell and Munger 1991). 
The delegation to independent experts is a political move that needs to be justified from a 
democratic point of view. There are several reasons for delegating to agencies like time- 
consistency problems, reputation and the need for expertise (Drazen 2002). But agents might 
have their own agenda (Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1985). Thus, delegation must be 
followed by control (Banks and Weingast 1992; Weingast 1984; Weingast and Moran 1983). The 
decision of howto control the agency is in itself a political decision which may favour some 
actors at the expense of others (Epstein and O'Halloran 1996; Epstein and OHalloran 2003; 
McCubbins, Noll, and Schwartz 1984).
Neglecting the role of the Commission
It might be argued that this thesis neglects the role of the Commission in EU politics. The 
Commission has been seen by many as the engine of integration (Haaland Matlary 1997; Haas 
1968; Pollack 2003; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). The Commission is the sole initiator of
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EU legislation; surely it should be prominent in any analysis of EU legislative politics (Bums 
2004; Schmidt 2000; Stacey 2003). Some observers also argue that it is a legislator in its own 
right, in particular in “soft law” (e.g. Cini 2003).
While it is right that the Commission is the sole initiator, it is a general agreement amongst 
formal theorists of EU legislative politics that the Commission does not have significant agenda- 
setting powers under the reformed Codecision procedure (see for example Crombez 2000; 
Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). However, it is recognised that the Commission is elected by 
governing parties (Crombez 1997b; Crombez and Hix 2003). How parties view proposals from 
the Commission is very likely to be influenced by whether or not the Commission is composed 
by members of their parties or those with similar ideology. This has already been shown to be the 
case in executive polices in the EU (Jun and Hix 2004). However, incorporating the Commission 
in the model at this stage greatly complicates the analysis. Should the Commission be modelled 
as a unitary actor taking decisions by simple majority, or should one assume ministerial 
autonomy? Despite a large literature on the topic in national Western European settings, the issue 
remains unresolved (e.g. Dunleavy and Bastow 2001; Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and 
Shepsle 1996; 1999a; 1999b; Warwick 1999a; 1999b). Thus, at this stage of developing and 
testing the theory, the relationship between the Commission and governing and opposition parties 
is not modelled. The issue of modelling the Commission will be returned to in the conclusion, as 
it may be a fruitful line of enquiry for an extension of the research.
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The power of the governments all over again
A final line of critique is to argue that there is nothing new here. It shows that the governments 
run the show, just as intergovemmentalists have claimed since the 1960s (Hoffmann 1966; 
Milward 1993; Moravcsik 1991; 1993; 1998; 1999; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1998; 1999).
However, as Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) argue, it is necessary to understand the impact of the 
institutional rules on the legislative outcome in order the analyse the interaction of preferences in 
Intergovernmental Bargains. By focusing on parties, rather than the big member states, the 
analysis highlights the interaction across institutional barriers. While intergovemmentalists have 
shown how strong governments dominate IGCs, this theory shows how governing parties 
dominate day-to-day legislative politics in the EU. Rather than being a repetition of 
intergovemmentalism, it complements it by providing an understanding of the difference between 
governing and opposition parties in EU politics. As such, the theory might be better able to 
e>plain some of the decisions made by governments at IGCs, which are currently left only 
patially explained in the literature, such as the increase in Parliament’s powers (e.g. Hix 2002a; 
Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999). This will be returned to in the conclusion.
Fan of the thesis
Tie thesis is divided into two parts. Each part consists of three chapters. The first part presents 
tte background for the study through a literature review before presenting the theory. This is 
fdlowed by a chapter describing the research design. The second part consists of the empirical 
chapters testing the hypotheses derived from the theory.
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Chapter 1 shows that until recently the study of bicameralism neglected the role of political 
parties. Similarly, the study of legislative behaviour did not often adequately model the effect of 
bicameral arrangements on the behaviour incentives of actors. However, this is no longer the case, 
as several studies of both US legislative politics and comparative legislative politics have given 
the effects of bicameralism a prominent place. This state of affair does not prevail to the same 
extent in the area of EU legislative politics. Models of the legislative procedure tend to treat the 
European Parliament, in particular, as a unitary actor with a single ideal policy point, although it 
takes its decisions using two different preference aggregation rules, simple majority and absolute 
majority. The study of legislative behaviour tends to be confined to behaviour inside one 
institution only, often neglecting how the interaction between the institutions changes the 
behavioural incentives of actors. The review also establishes that national parties are better able 
to act as cohesive actors in EU legislative politics than trans-national party groups or national 
delegations.
Chapter 2 presents the theory. It starts by showing the effect on policy outcome of different 
preference aggregation rules, before moving on to identify the effects of changing majority 
requirements at different stages of a procedure. Then a model of the Codecision procedure is 
presented. Contrary to existing models, here the European Parliament is not a unitary actor with a 
unique ideal point, but a collective actor composed by two types of parties, governing parties and 
opposition parties. The former group of parties also makes up the Council of Ministers. An 
investigating of the procedure based on the assumptions that parties, rather than institutions and 
government are actors, offers new insights. The key argument is that governing parties have the 
upper hand in the Codecision procedure, in particular those governing parties that form the 
winning majority in the Council. Focusing on the difference between governing and opposition
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partties, three testable hypotheses are derived. First, governing parties are more active as 
Codecision rapporteurs than opposition parties. Second, rapporteurs from governing parties are 
moire likely to find their first reading proposal accepted by the Council. Third, governing parties 
and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to vote in favour of second reading 
amendments than opposition parties. Having presented the hypotheses, the scope of the theory is 
then limited to apply only to parties from member states with adversarial national political 
systems.
Chapter 3 ends the first part of the thesis. It presents the data used to test the hypotheses. The 
different variables are discussed in detail. Descriptive statistics are presented. The expected 
effects of the variables, as predicted by the theory and by the existing literature, are presented in a 
summary table.
Part II presents the empirical findings. Chapter 4 tests the first hypothesis, related to difference in 
allocation of Codecision reports to governing and opposition parties. The empirical evidence 
shows that governing parties write more Codecision reports than opposition parties. Agenda- 
setting power in the EP is in the hands of governing parties. Being represented in the Council, as 
well as in the EP, gives a party more incentive to assign reports to their members. No significant 
effect of ideological proximity is found. This seems to suggest that the uptake of report is linked 
to their status in the national political system. Governing parties stand to take the blame for all 
policy development during their time in office, and hence choose to be involved as often as 
possible. Opposition parties, on the other hand, do not stand to take the blame, and can thus 
choose their involvement more selectively. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the
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difference between governing and opposition parties do not seem to exist amongst parties from 
non-adversarial member states.
Chapter 5 tests the second hypothesis, related to differences in when legislation is adopted. The 
evidence shows that governing rapporteurs are more likely to see “their” legislation adopted by 
the Council in the first reading than rapporteurs from opposition parties. Therefore, control the 
agenda-setting power inside the Parliament has an impact on when Codecision legislation is 
adopted.
Chapter 6 test the third hypothesis, which is related to voting behaviour in second reading votes. 
The findings show that there exist two groups of parties in the EP’s second reading. The 
governing parties from the largest party group in the Council together with ideologically close 
parties are more active in supporting amendments than the other groups, composed of the 
minority party group in the Council and parties ideologically close to it. A coalition of Socialists, 
Liberals and Greens were more eager than right of centre parties to push for second reading 
amendments in a period when the majority in the Council came from the centre-left.
In the conclusion, the findings are summarised and the overall effect of government and 
opposition in EU legislative politics is discussed. It argues that government and opposition exist 
in the EU. The “legislative government” is made up by a qualified majority of the governing 
parties in the Council and ideologically closely affiliated opposition parties. The opposition is 
made up by those governing parties that make up the losing minority in the Council and 
ideologically closely affiliated opposition parties, as well as extremists and anti-Europeans. 
Having summarised the support for alternative explanations, topics for further study are presented.
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PARTI
Chapter 1: Bicameralism and legislative politics
This chapter reviews the literature on legislative politics in bicameral systems. A theoretical 
justification of bicameralism is given by Riker (1992) and the history of bicameralism can be 
found in Shell (2001). Nevertheless, the authoritative theoretical and empirical account of 
bicameralism is Tsebelis and Money (1997). They argue that bicameralism tends to bring the 
conflict down to one privileged dimension of conflict even in a multi-dimensional setting. This 
argument rests on two assumptions.
The first assumption is that the two institutions have separate legislative cores. If the current 
policy is located inside the core, there will be no majority in favour of changing the policy. They 
argue that this tend to be the case because of different electoral/selection systems, different 
constituencies, difference timing of elections, differences between who the two chambers 
represent, or between the ability of party leadership to control the behaviour of the party 
delegations to the two chambers. Tsebelis and Money (1997: 39) acknowledge that the two 
chambers may not have separate cores if controlled by the same veto-player or have identical 
preferences.
The second assumption in Tsebelis and Money’s argument is that the majority requirements in 
the two chambers are constant throughout the legislative procedure. While Tsebelis and Money 
clearly recognise the effect of different majority requirements, they stop short of discussing the 
effect of shifting majority requirements at different stages in the legislative process (see also 
Tsebelis 2002:136-60). This is of particular importance if the majority requirements are not 
symmetrical. An example is the Codecision procedure in the European Union. A qualified
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majority in the Council of Ministers is necessary to accept or amend in its first reading, and to 
accept in the second and in, and following, the Conciliation Committee. A simple majority in the 
European Parliament amend or accept the proposal from the Commission in the first reading. In 
the second reading, an absolute majority is required to reject or amend the common position of 
the Council. In, and following, the Conciliation Committee, a simple majority is necessary to 
accept (see Article 251).
To develop the argument that legislative politics needs to be analysed with a clear understanding 
of institutional rules, this chapter discusses two aspects of legislative politics. The first aspect is 
bicameralism. It is shown that political parties have not figured promptly in the analysis of 
bicameralism. The second aspect to be discussed is legislative partisan behaviour. Here it is 
shown that the full effect of institutional rules has, until recently been missing in the literature. 
The first section reviews the literature developed in the context of the US Congress. The second 
treats the topic from a comparative perspective. The third and fourth sections review the existing 
literature concerning the European Union, first concerning the bicameral rules, then legislative 
behaviour. This chapter is in no way meant as a complete review of legislative studies, neither in 
the US Congress, comparatively, nor in the case of the EU. Instead, the focus is on the role of 
parties in the literature on bicameralism and the role of the institutional setting in the literature on 
legislative politics.
Bicameralism and legislative politics in the US
Early accounts of bicameralism in the US emphasise institutional balance and policy stability.
The two institutions need to agree in order for policy to change (e.g. de Tocqueville [1835-40] 
1994). Although presented in a different language and with a different focus, most of the
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contemporary literature on bicameralism in the US still sees institutions, rather than political 
parties, as the key actors. Some authors show how the constitution increases the chances of 
policy stability compared with unicameral systems (e.g. Hammond and Miller 1987; Miller, 
Hammond, and Kile 1996). Others argue that the informational interaction between the two 
chambers can increase the objective quality of legislation, even if the two chambers have 
congruent preferences (Rogers 2001). These argument are however open to questioning (Cutrone 
and McCarty 2004). Investigating the use of Germaneness rules in the two institutions Back 
(1982) finds that the Senate has the upper hand in the final stage of the legislative process, the 
conference committee. The advantage is due to the more liberal approach to the use of the 
Germaneness rule in the Senate. In his view parties have neither the formal nor informal capacity 
to coordinate behaviour in the two institutions ( p. 342). As we will see below, scholars have 
recently started to question this view.
The relationship between partisan actors holding office in different institutions is often discussed 
in the context of unified versus divided government. Unified government means that the 
President, the House of Representatives, and the Senate are controlled by the same party. Divided 
government exists when the President does not come from the party holding the majority in at 
least one of the two houses. The literature focuses on four different aspects, the reasons for 
divided government (e.g. Ingberman and Vilani 1993; Nicholson and Segura 1999), the effect on 
policy and the economy (see for example Alesina and Rosenthal 1995), legislative output (see 
amongst others Coleman 1999; Edwards ID, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Mayhew 1991) and how it 
shapes actors behaviour. The focus here is on the latter aspect.
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Krehbiel (1998: 8-19) provides a useful overview of the literature on unified versus divided 
government in the US. His starting point is the traditional normative theory of responsible party 
government, where parties adopt policy platforms and a unified government is elected. The 
majority party then enacts the policy platform. No bi-partisan coalition formation exists. It is thus 
easy to identify who is responsible for which policy and vote them out next time if they do not 
deliver on their promises (Schattschneider 1942). Rohde and Aldrich (1995; Aldrich and Rohde 
1997-1998; Rohde 1991), present a theory of conditional party government. Party politics 
exclude the opposition in both chambers (Aldrich 1995). If parties have sufficiently different 
policy preferences and policy preferences are similar inside parties, the policy outcome will be 
non-centrist, skewed in the direction of the majority party (for applications, see Forgette and Sala 
1999; Weatherford 1993). The predictions are less clear when these conditions do not hold. A 
third strand argues that divided government leads to gridlock (Fiorina 1992; 1996). Theories 
drawing from the median voter theorem (Black 1958), suggest that the policy-outcome will be 
identical to the ideal policy of the median voter, irrespective of partisan composition. Policy 
changes as the location of the median voter changes. Extensions of the median voter theorem to 
multiple dimensions have shown that a stable median voter location may not exist, hence policy 
is likely to be subject to constant change, cycling between different alternatives, or chaos 
(McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1978). Against the prediction of chaos come the stability-inducing 
theories (e.g. Shepsle 1979). Here the focus is on institutional rules which prevent policy-cycling, 
like agenda-setting, gate-keeping powers, amendment rules and ex post veto-powers (Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987).
Building on the institutional rules, a last set of approaches employs non-cooperative game theory 
to model the sequential aspects of the legislative process (Baron 1989; Baron and Ferejohn 1989). 
The advantages of non-cooperative game theory are that it offers clear predictions and allows for
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an explicit modelling of majority requirements. Krehbiel (1998) relies on non-cooperatives game 
theory and spatial models to present his argument, which is that policy proposals do not form to 
obtain minimum winning coalitions in favour, instead oversized majorities form in order to be 
able to over-ride potential vetoes. As coalition formation is understood as a function of 
preference, coalitions are often bi-partisan. This is not in order to ensure that the legislation 
passes in each individual chamber, but to make sure that the policy is adopted (a similar argument 
is also presented in Brady and Volden 1998). Krehbiel’s model has been criticised for ignoring 
the role of parties by focusing exclusively on preferences and for being essentially unicameral. 
Cox and McCubbins argue that party leadership, rather than individual representatives are the key 
actors in US politics (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2004). Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) takes the 
opposite strategy of Krehbiel by explicitly modelling the two Congressional parties as unitary 
actors in a bicameral setting. They suggest that a model incorporating parties and a bicameral 
presidential institutional setting outperforms rival models. Legislative choices, they argue, can be 
explained by carefully modelling for the role of parties and their leadership, taking account of the 
institutional setting. Beyond roll-call votes, in the case of NAFTA agreement, it has been shown 
how Republican leaders signalled their position early on in an attempt to influence the behaviour 
of rank and file members of the party (Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold, and Zom 1997).
Focusing on the effect of separation of powers on congressional decision-making, Martin (2001) 
question the assumption of sincere voting behaviour. Members of both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate are constrained by the other legislative chamber and the Supreme 
Court in their voting behaviour. Members of Congress use roll call votes both to claim credit and 
to ensure that their preferred policies are adopted. The cause of legislative gridlock might be 
found in intra-branch conflict rather than inter-branch rivalry (Wilkerson 1999).
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In sum, the literature on bicameralism and legislative politics in the US has moved from studying 
the two phenomena separately toward an integrated approach, which aims to take into account the 
institutional rules influencing the choices made by actors. In the US literature, the role of parties 
is contested. Some argue that it is sufficient to model the ideal policy locations of the individual 
representatives, as there are some significant differences within the two parties. This debate has 
implications for the choice of actors in the theory developed in the next chapter. It will be argued 
when reviewing the literature on EU legislative politics that national parties rather than party 
groups are best understood as the central actors in EU politics. However, before the EU literature 
on bicameralism and legislative politics is reviewed, it is useful to consider how bicameralism 
and legislative politics have been dealt with from a comparative perspective.
Comparative bicameralism and legislative politics
One-third of the parliaments in the world are bi-cameral (Tsebelis 2002: 143). An overview is 
provided by Tsebelis and Money (Money and Tsebelis 1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997: 48-52). 
Lijphart (1984: 90-105) argues that “strong bicameralism”, meaning that the two houses are 
even-handed, leads to larger than minimum winning coalitions, i.e. a consensual model of 
democracy. Tsebelis and Rasch (1995) go more into details about the different institutional rules 
guiding bicameral negotiations. They find, in contrast to Lijphart, that even upper houses 
normally considered weak, “asymmetrical bicameralism”, have significant influence on policy 
outcomes. The influence of an upper house is a function of the number of negotiation rounds, 
stopping rules and the sequence of readings. However, beyond comparing the selection- 
procedures for the candidates in the second chambers, number of veto-players, and the possibility 
of an overlapping core, none of these works takes the role of parties into account. In general, the
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literature on comparative bicameralism has, until recently, confined itself to describing and 
comparing the upper houses and their powers (e.g. Baldwin and Shell 2001; Patterson and 
Mughan 1999; 2001).
There is a large literature on comparative legislative politics in parliamentary systems focusing 
on cabinet formation and termination (e.g. Dunleavy and Bastow 2001; Laver and Schofield 
1990; Laver and Shepsle 1990a; Laver and Shepsle 1990b; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Muller and 
Strom 2000/2003; Strom 1990b; Warwick 1999a). The literature on legislatures, on the other 
hand, tends to be devoted to describing individual institutions (Norton 1998a: xii) or classifying 
them in terms of their power vis-a-vis the executive (e.g. Mezey 1979; Norton 1998b). Doring 
(1995) provides a rational choice institutionalist account of how parliamentary structures 
influence legislative outcome. Nevertheless, when legislative politics is explained, it tends to be 
through the lenses of government and opposition (Elgie 2001; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001). 
Parties tend to be in the centre of this analysis (e.g. Blondel and Cotta 2000; Laver and Budge 
1992; Muller and Strom 1999). However, until recently full attention has not been paid to the 
influence of bicameralism versus unicameralism.
Political divisions in bicameral systems can take three forms, institutional, executive-legislative 
and partisan. Of these three Scully (2001: 96-7) argues that the latter is the most common. Hence, 
the relationship between the chambers is largely an effect of the composition and unity of the 
parties composing them. Konig (2001) builds on the Tsebelis and Money model but takes party 
politics into account by relaxing the assumption of unified chamber actors with homogeneous 
ideal points. He shows that when similar party majorities exist in both chambers bicameral
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checks-and-balances are by-passed allowing for significant policy change. However, when the 
chambers have opposite majorities, status quo prevails.
This might be in line with what voters want. On the basis of the Danish and Swedish 
parliamentary reform, Congleton (2002) argues that in partisan polities, bicameral legislatures do 
not only produce more predictable public policies, moreover these policies are closer in line with 
the long-term preferences of the voters than unicameral legislatures. Contrary to the ‘pork barrel’ 
budgetary inflating outcome of the bicameral US institutions, where election strategies to a 
certain extent are candidate focused rather than partisan (but see Cox and Magar 1999), bicameral 
parliamentary systems with strong parties seem to reduce spending levels (Heller 2001). While 
bicameralism does not seem to have a major effect on cabinet formation in parliamentary systems, 
it does influence the duration. Cabinet with upper chamber partisan support tend to stay 
substantively longer in office than those without (Druckman and Thies 2002).
The study of legislative politics in Latin America has, like its US counterpart focused on the 
effect of inter-branch conflicts, in particular between the president and the Congress (Horowitz 
1990; Linz 1990; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Mainwaring 1993; ODonnell 1994; Shugartand 
Carey 1992; Stepan and Skack 1993; Valenzuela 1993). Rather than focusing on legislative 
gridlock, this literature focuses on the effect of divided government on regime stability under 
conditions of presidentialism and multi-party legislatures (for a critique, see Cheibub 2002).
Recently, Latin American assemblies have changed from being studied as obstructions to 
presidential power, to a topic worth studying for their own merits. Morgenstem and Nacif (2002) 
investigate legislative politics in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. They look at legislative-
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executive relations, political parties and legislative structure, and on the impact of legislatures in 
the policy process. The study demonstrates how incentive structures drive legislative behaviour. 
For example, when investigating legislative politics in Brazil, a bicameral system, Samuels 
(2002: 330) finds that ‘[a] “government -  opposition” logic operating at the state level dominates 
the division of state delegation amendments, not a purely state-level partisan logic, and certainly 
not a national logic’. The reason, he notes, is that implementation is often state responsibility 
with some room of discretion to favour own supporters over the supporters of the opposition. 
Focusing on electoral incentives, candidates may cultivate direct personal ties with constituency 
groups, rather than develop responsible parties (Ames 1995a; Ames 1995b; Mainwaring 1999; 
Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). On the other hand, institutional rules of the legislature might 
have the opposite effect (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). The resulting legislative behaviour is a 
combination of personal and party strategy (Perreira and Mueller 2004; Samuels 2003). Using 
roll-call votes to investigate several Latin American countries as well as the US, Morgenstem 
(2004) finds that in addition to electoral system, it is necessary to consider ideology, cabinet 
membership and majority requirements in order to explain legislative coalitions. Investigating the 
relationship between the president and the Congress in Argentina, Mustapic finds an important 
difference between government and opposition parties: “ Being in opposition makes things easier, 
since unlike the governing parties, it can choose when to act” (Mustapic 2002: 39).
In sum, the study of bicameralism has focused on institutions as actors, thereby ignored the role 
of parties and mainly confined itself to descriptive work. The study of legislative behaviour from 
a comparative perspective has, just like its US counterpart seen a turn towards taking the 
institutional setting more seriously, including the bicameral nature of many legislatures, with its
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different majority requirements. It is now time to turn the focus to the existing literature on 
bicameralism in the EU.
Bicameralism in the European Union
This section takes a close look at how the legislative process in the EU is modelled. While the 
models do move beyond the institution-as-actor assumption concerning the Council of Minister, 
they fail to do so in the case of the European Parliament (and the Commission for that matter). 
This section first presents the “standard Tsebelis- Garrett model”. It moves on to reviews the 
criticism of the model. Then, the assumption of the EP as a unitary actor, shared by both Tsebelis 
and Garrett model and their rivals, is discussed.
The traditional debate in the EU literature between neo-functionalists, who focus on the role of 
societal actors and supranational institutions, and intergovemmentalists, who focus on the role 
state actors, has for a long time dominated research on the European Community and later the 
European Union (Haas 1968; Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
1998). A review of the debate can be found in Rosamond (2000). The key difference is over who 
control the level of integration. The EU can be understood as an instance of carefully delegated 
tasks by rational heads of state with complete information. Alternatively, the governments may 
be seen only to react to the actions taken by societal interests aided by supranational agents with 
their own interests and capabilities to foster further integration once created. The effect of the 
legislative procedures does not feature in these accounts. Four different legislative procedures 
have been used by the European Union, consultation, co-operation, Codecision and assent. The 
involvement of the EP differs across these procedures (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000;
Hix 1999b).
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Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) criticise the neo-functionalists and intergovemmentalists for 
neglecting the effect of the institutional design. They are particularly sceptical of power indices 
approaches in particular for focusing solely on veto-power and assuming coalitions are formed 
randomly (e.g. Brams and Affuso 1985; Hosli 1995; 1996). Instead, they argue for an approach 
that also takes the institutional design of the decision-making procedure into account. Winning 
coalitions tend to be connected in the policy space (Axelrod 1970). Their model builds on the 
insight from Tsebelis’ seminal paper on the European Parliament as a conditional agenda-setter, 
which argues that the EP has agenda-setting power under the Cooperation procedure under the 
conditions that an absolute majority in the EP can be found in favour of an amendment that the 
Commission and at least one member state support (Tsebelis 1994). It is then easier for the 
Council to accept EP’s amendments (qualified majority) than to reject them (unanimity).
Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) develop a one-dimensional spatial model with 7 actors. A two- 
dimensional model is presented for illustrative purposes, as a critique of the power-indices 
approach, but not elaborated on when analysing the legislative procedures. The decision-rule, 
qualified majority (QMV) is modelled as five out of the seven actors. Actors belonging to the 
Pareto-set cannot be excluded. Coalitions do not form randomly in the European Union, not even 
in the Council of Ministers. Garrett and Tsebelis challenge the focus on veto-power rather than 
agenda-setting power. By veto-power, they mean the power to accept or reject proposals. 
Agenda-setting power is the ability to make a proposal that is harder for the veto-players to 
amend or reject than to accept. To present what is by now the classical spatial model of EU 
policy-making they rely on the shared assumption by both neo-functionalists and inter- 
govemmentalist that the ordering policy dimension is the level of integration. They further
assume that all actors would like to increase the level of integration. The preferences of the 
Commission as well as the EP are extreme in favour of integration compared to any of the 
member states. Their focus is on the last stage of the procedure, assuming that all actors have 
complete information only at this stage in the process. They also assume that the actors do not 
believe it is feasible in the short run to reintroduce legislation in a policy area once it has been 
passed (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996: 279-81).
Given these assumptions, they enlighten the neo-functionalist-intergovemmentalist debate by 
showing that the Luxembourg compromise and the assent procedure produce lowest common 
denominator outcomes, while the Codecision I (Maastricht version) results in the level of 
integration moving to the ideal policy of the third least integrationist member state. Consultation 
and Cooperation lead to most integration, as the winning proposals are located at the ideal policy 
of the fifth least integrationist member state.
The predictions of the model is summarised in figure 1.1. On the basis of this model, Tsebelis 
and Garrett (2000) also model the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision 
II). Holding preferences constant (the supranational scenario), they argue that Codecision II 
results in policy outcomes that are less integrationist than Cooperation and consultation but more 
integrationist than Codecision I. They also find that the EP and the Council are “co-equal” 
legislators under the procedure, which they characterise as a bicameral system with a severe 
status quo bias because of the oversized majority requirements both in the Council and in the EP.
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Figure 1.1 The Garrett and Tsebelis model
Decision-making procedures and policy outcomes in the European Union, 
where 1 -7 = governments’ preferred positions
Outcome under 
The Luxembourg 
Compromise and assent
Winning proposal Winning proposal under
under Codecision I consultation and Cooperation
\ /
♦ *
SQ 2 3 4 5 6 7 *
Commission and 
European Parliament
Area of possible winning 
proposals under Codecision II
Less integration More integration
Adopted from Garrett and Tsebelis (1996:282) and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) The location of the outcome under 
Luxembourg compromise follows the logic of Tsebelis and Kreppel (1998).
Figure 1.1 shows that the outcome under assent and the Luxembourg compromise is at the ideal 
point of country 2. That point makes the pivotal country under unanimity, country 1 indifferent 
between the current policy SQ and the new proposal. The same is the outcome under assent, 
where unanimity is needed as well1. Under Codecision I, Tsebelis and Garrett argues that the 
outcome will be at the ideal location of country 3, the QMV pivot. As the actors are free to re­
contract if a better alternative comes along, country number 3 will be able to impose its ideal 
point. Since the common position is the reversion point should the Conciliation Committee fail, 
and since the EP is better off from the ideal point of country 3 compared to the SQ, the EP will 
accept the common position of the Council. However, under consultation and co-operation, the 
Council needs unanimity to amend but only a qualified majority to accept the proposal from the
1 In some areas where the Codecision procedure is used, unanimity is still required in the Council. In these areas, the 
predicted maximal change in the location of the status quo is to the point that makes the least integrationist member 
state indifferent between the new policy and the current status quo. In figure 1.1, it is the ideal point of member state 
2 .
Commission. This means that the Commission can successfully propose policy changes that 
make the pivotal country, country 3 indifferent between the SQ and the new policy. Hence, the 
Commission is able to move the policy closer to its ideal point. In figure 1.1, the Commission is 
able to move the policy to the ideal point of country 5. Following the introduction of the 
Cooperation procedure, Tsebelis (1994) argued that the EP was given conditional agenda-setting 
power, as it could subject to an absolute majority and support form the Commission, propose 
amendments that were easier for the Council to accept (QMV) than to reject or amend 
(unanimity). This argument relies on an assumption about incomplete information at the first 
stage of the procedure. With the reform from Codecision I to Codecision II in the treaty of 
Amsterdam, Tsebelis and Garret find that that the outcome will be located somewhere between 
the ideal point of country 3 and country 5, depending on how agenda-setting power is distributed 
in the Conciliation Committee (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000).
This model has not been left unchallenged. Focusing on the Cooperation procedure, Moser 
(1996; 1997) questions the assumptions behind the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP. It 
is in particular the incomplete information assumption that is questioned. Under complete 
information, there is no reason why the Commission cannot propose EP’s amendments 
themselves if the Commission prefers them to their own proposal. Instead, Moser suggest that the 
EP only has conditional veto power under Cooperation, as the Council needs unanimity to over­
ride an EP veto. Thus, on the condition that at least one member state supports the Parliament, the 
EP can block legislation under Cooperation. This interpretation is also shared by Crombez (1996) 
and Steunenberg (1994). Hence, they argue that under in a single-shot game with the preference- 
locations assumed by Tsebelis and Garrett, the EP is almost powerless. The EP would have to 
veto something that will make them better off than the current policy in order to make user of
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their veto power. However, the relevance of their veto-power increases as the preferences 
between the Commission and the EP diverge.
Garret and Tsebelis (1996; Tsebelis 1997) find that Codecision reduces the power of the EP, 
because it looses its conditional veto-agenda-setting power in exchange for unconditional veto- 
power, resulting in a policy outcome further away from its ideal policy location. The outcome of 
the procedure is located at the ideal point of country 3 under Codecision I, compared to the ideal 
point of country 5 under Cooperation. Crombez (1997a) and Steunenberg (1994) disagree. They 
argue that the Parliament is better off under Codecision I compared to Cooperation (see also 
Scully 1997a; 1997b). The conditional veto it had under Cooperation is exchanged with an 
unconditional veto. The EP is no longer dependent on the support from a member state in order to 
block legislation. Steunenberg find that the outcome of Cooperation and Codecision I is the 
identical under the preference distribution assumed by Garret and Tsebelis. In Crombez’s model, 
the policy outcome under Codecision I is closer to the EP than the outcome under Cooperation. 
Provided that at least one member of the QMV majority in the Council is made better of from the 
outcome of the Conciliation Committee, the Council will not be able to re-introduce its common 
position following a breakdown in the Conciliation Committee. According to Crombez’s logic, 
the policy outcome of Codecision I is somewhere between the ideal point of Country 3 and 
country 5. Steunenberg models the Conciliation Committee in Codecision I as a chance for the 
EP to accept or reject the common position of the Council by a two-thirds majority. According to 
the logic of his model, the outcome of Codecision I will be identical to the outcome under 
consultation and Cooperation when the ideal position of the Commission is located inside the 
core in the Council. It will be located at the ideal point of country 3 if the Commission and the 
EP are integrationist policy outliers, as in the Garrett and Tsebelis scenario. The debate is
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unresolved. Empirical comparisons of the power of the EP under the two procedures show mixed 
results (Hubschmid and Moser 1997; Konig and Poter 2001; Tsebelis et al. 2001; Tsebelis and 
Kalandrakis 1999).
When comparing Codecision I with Codecision II Tsebelis and Garret find that the power of the 
EP has increased. This is because the common position of the Council no longer is the reversion 
point if the Conciliation Committee tails to adopt a joint text. Under the new Codecision 
procedure, agenda setting is shared between the EP and the Council in the Conciliation 
Committee. As the Commission does not have a formal role in Conciliation, its’ powers are 
reduced compared to the other procedures. While being co-equal to the Council, they maintain 
that the EP was more powerful under Cooperation due to its conditional agenda-setting power. 
Crombez (2000; 2001) and Steunenberg (1997) take issue with this interpretation. Following 
their earlier analysis they maintain that the EP is more powerful under Codecision than under 
Cooperation. In Crombez model, the outcome under Codecision II is identical to the outcome 
under Codecision I, rather than strengthening the power of the EP, it makes the Commission 
powerless. As such, he argues that it may increase legislative gridlock in the EU. Crombez 
(1997b) also question too what extent the Commission is highly integrationist, given that it is 
selected by member state governments (until Nice by unanimity). Steunenberg assume that the 
EP has the sole agenda-setting power in the Conciliation Committee. The EP is able to make a 
take-it or leave it offer to the Council. Under the Tsebelis and Garrett supranational scenario, 
with the Commission and the EP as integrationist policy outliers, the policy outcome in 
Steunenberg’s scenario is hence located at the ideal point of country 5. This point makes the 
QMV pivotal for an integrationist change in policy, country 3, indifferent between the current 
policy and the proposal from the EP.
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The debate over formal rules neglects the effect of the internal rules of the institutions. For 
example, Rule 78 of Rules of Procedure in the EP. It stated that the EP would vote to reject if the 
Council re-introduced the Common Position following failure of the Conciliation Committee to 
agree on a text. The first time the Council tried to re-introduce its Common Position, on the draft 
directive on open network provision on voice telephony (ONP), the EP rejected by an absolute 
majority and the legislation fell (Rittberger 2000). It could however be argued that the ONP was a 
special case as the vote to reject was held in the first session of the fourth EP (Eamshaw and 
Judge 1995). The extent to which the EP would be able to produce an absolute majority another 
time should the Conciliation Committee fail again can be questioned. As such the Amsterdam 
reform of the Codecision procedure could be said to strengthen the EP by formalising the de facto 
operation of the procedure (Hix 2002a; Shackleton 2000), although the proportion of EP 
amendments being adopted may not have changed between Codecision I and II (Kasack 2004).
To sum up, there is a general consensus that the Council and the European Parliament are on 
equal footing in the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision II). The 
agenda-setting power is shared in the Conciliation procedure and both institutions have a mutual 
veto. However, the literature has not fully acknowledged the effect of the different majority 
requirements in the EP at the different stages of the procedure. The EP adopts and amends by 
simple majority in the first reading. It amends and rejects by an absolute majority in the second 
reading. In and following Conciliation, the EP accepts by a simple majority. If the simple 
majority is different from the absolute majority, modeling the EP as a unitary actor might result 
in misleading conclusions regarding the outcome of the procedure. The above sections, which 
reviewed the literature on bicameralism in other political systems, showed that parties, across
institutions, might significantly influence policy. Hence, the next section reviews the literature on 
legislative behaviour in the EU in order to investigate to what extent it is reasonable to treat the 
EP as a unitary actor, i.e. that the ideal policy of the pivotal voters under simple majority pivot 
and is identical or similar to that of absolute majority. Showing that the EP cannot adequately be 
treated as a unitary actor in the Codecision procedure, the section moves on to discuss to what 
extent national parties, rather than trans-national party groups or country delegations should be 
seen as the key actors in EU legislative politics.
EU legislative politics
This section argues that the existing literature on behaviour inside the European Parliament 
shows that it is misleading to model the EP as a unitary actor. It argues that the pivotal voter 
under simple majority is unlikely to be identical to the absolute majority pivot. It is unreasonable 
to assume that they share the same preferences. The literature on coalition formation in the EP 
shows that the success-rate of coalitions differs under the alternative voting requirements. While 
the literature on EU legislative politics considers the institutional rules, there is nevertheless a 
need to re-think EU legislative politics, carefully modelling the institutional rules that create the 
incentive structure that guides parties’ behaviour. Reviewing the literature on coalition formation 
inside the EP shows that national political parties, rather than trans-national party groups or 
nationalities are the key actors inside the EP.
Kreppel (1999) collected data on 24 legislative proposal passed under the Cooperation procedure 
between 1988 and 1996. These proposals contained 512 amendments. She finds that the Council 
adopts 44% of all EP amendments in the first reading and 24% of those proposed in the second. 
She also finds that the EP is more likely to be successful if it is not divided along party lines.
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Studying a sample of roll-call votes in the 1987-1996 period, Kreppel (2000) finds that the EP 
grand coalition (PES and EPP) forms in almost 61% of the cases in the first reading, where only a 
simple majority is needed, and 69% of the times in the second reading, where an absolute, and 
hence a grand coalition, is needed. She notes that the grand coalition tends to form on resolutions, 
which do not have any legislative impact This leads her to suggests that the reason for forming a 
grand coalition in this period was to strengthen the influence and power of the European 
Parliament vis-a-vis the Council and the Commission. In order for the EP to be able to see their 
amendments being adopted by the other institutions, it is necessary to present amendments, 
which enjoyed bipartisan support, given the partisan nature of the other institutions and the 
oversized majority requirement in the Council. She argues that ‘[t]his is particularly true when 
the ideological composition of the other institutions is internally divided (as it always has been) 
and / or leans towards the opposite ideological pole from the EP’(Kreppel 2000: 346).
Kreppel presents a spatial model of when we should expect the EPP and PES to compete, causing 
the first reading pivotal voter to differ from the second; and when we should expect them to 
collude, which implies that the behaviour of the first reading pivot is identical to that of the 
second reading pivot. The model is driven by the relative distance between the status quo and the 
position of the other institutions and the relative position of the two party groups. The two party 
groups will only collude in both the first and second reading if they are located on the same side 
of the other actors, in particular compared to the members in the Council. In the cases when the 
pivotal voter in the Council is located between the PES and the EPP, they will not compromise in 
the first round, but may or may not compromise in the second. Thus, the permissiveness of the 
“EP as a unitary actor” assumption rests on the relative location of the EPP and PES vis-a-vis the 
other actors. In her statistical analysis, she finds that the grand coalition is not more likely to form
in the second reading than in the first. Instead, it is more likely to form on final proposals rather 
than amendments. Thus, the EPP and PES compete on amendments in both the first and the 
second reading.
Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) find that different coalitions form at different stages of the 
Cooperation procedure. Studying a period where the PES was the biggest party group in the EP, 
they found that several coalitions were successful in the first reading. The Socialists and the 
Liberals, with or without the Christian Democrats were winning in the first reading, as was a 
purely leftist coalition between the PES, the Greens and the GUL/NGL. Only the grand coalition 
of the PES and the EPP was successful in the second reading. While the EPP could not block first 
reading legislation, it was capable of blocking second reading amendments. Their study show 
that all legislation that was not supported by the EPP in the second reading, fell. This indicates 
that the pivotal voter on first reading amendments, where a simple majority is needed, is not 
identical to the pivotal voter on second reading amendments, where an absolute majority is 
needed, at least not in the Cooperation procedure. Kreppel and Hix (2003) compare the behaviour 
in roll-call votes in 1996 and 1999. They find that the EPP and PES competed over amendments 
both years. While the absolute majority requirement made them less likely to cooperate in 1996, 
it had no significant effect in 1999. The two party groups competed more over amendments and 
internal matters in 1999 than in 1996, but cooperated over whole proposals. Hence, the pattern of 
competition holds for Codecision as well.
The average attendance level in the fifth parliament was just below 83%, as measured by signing 
the attendance record. The attendance in individual votes may be lower. If the simple majority 
pivot and the absolute majority pivot were to have the same preference, the preference of the
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median voter would have to, as a minimum, be similar to the preferences of the 60% majority 
voter. This might be the case if the 50% pivot and the 60% pivot belong to the same party group 
on the dominant dimension in the European Parliament. To investigate to what extent this is the 
case; it might be useful to look at voting records.
Hix et al (2004) collected all roll call votes between 1979 and 2001 and calculated Nominate 
scores. Under simple majority, the preference of the pivotal voter is on average equal to the 
median voter in the parliament, MEP number 314 in the fifth EP. Under the absolute majority 
requirement it would also be MEP number 314 if everybody showed up to vote. However only 
about 80% of MEPs show up to vote, the absolute majority pivots is located at the 60th percentile 
of the EP, which is MEP number 377. In the 1999-2001 period, the first dimension simple 
majority pivot was Colette Flesch, a Luxembourg sitting in the ELDR group. The absolute 
majority pivot from the left was Adriana Poli Bortone, an Italian sitting in for the right wing 
Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN). From the right, the absolute majority pivot was 
David W Martin from the British Labour party. On the second dimension, the simple majority 
pivot was Luigi Ciriaco De Mita, sitting in the Italian delegation to the EPP. The absolute 
majority pivot, going from negative to positive was Rainer Wieland, a German, also sitting in the 
EPP. Going from positive to negative, the absolute majority pivot was Herve Novelli, a French 
delegate to the ELDR. Thus only in the second dimension, counting from the negative side was 
the pivotal voter under simple and absolute majority from the same party group, although not 
from the same country. In all the other cases, the absolute majority pivot was different from the 
simple majority pivot, both with regard to party group and member state.
Finally, Shackleton and Raunio (2003) find that a significant proportion of Codecision legislation,
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25% by the end o f2000 was agreed between the EP and the Council in the first reading, thereby 
preventing the possibility that the absolute majority pivot could influence the legislation. They 
argue that a change in culture has made early conclusion more attractive. Surely, opening up for 
allowing early conclusion in the reform of the treaty might have made an impact as well.
There are several possible alternatives for how to model the EP once it has been established that 
the unitary actor assumption is not very satisfying. It can be modelled as composed by national 
delegations from the member states, similar to the Council except that the number of weighted 
votes is transformed in number of representative with one vote each. Another alternative is to 
model the EP as composed of transnational party groups. A third alternative is to argue that 
national parties dominate the EP. The remaining part of this section evaluates the support in the 
literature for the different alternatives. It argues that the EP is best modelled as made up by 
national parties forming transnational party groups to reduce coordination and informational 
costs as well as efficiently distribute benefits amongst the national parties within party groups.
The European Parliament is instead organised along partisan lines, unlike most other 
international assemblies tend to be organised along nationalities (Corbett 1998). Studies of roll- 
call votes are unison in pointing out the low voting cohesion of member states (Attina 1990; 
Brzinski 1995; Hix and Lord 1997; Noury 2002b). So, while the voting power of the different 
member states in the European Parliament might be of interest in terms of fair allocation of votes, 
it does not offer good predictions for coalition formation in the EP (Hosli 1997).
It might seem more useful to consider party groups as the relevant actors. Power indices based on 
the power of the party groups tend to predict outcomes similar to observed successful coalition
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formation, predicting the grand coalition to be successful in oversized majority votes while the 
liberals are pivotal in simple majority votes (Raunio and Wiberg 2002). Observers had high 
hopes for the transnational party groups following the first direct elections to the EP in 1979, 
hoping for a ‘Europe des partis’ (e.g. Marquand 1978). While the party groups might not have 
lived up to these expectations, they have nevertheless been able to structure behaviour better than 
nationalities. Internal cohesion in roll call votes compares well with other national parliaments 
(Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003).
A competitive party system has developed with the relationship between EPP and PES forming 
the dominant axis of competition (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2003). However, within party groups, 
national party delegations influence the behaviour of their MEPs to a larger extent than the party 
group leadership or their own stated preferences over policy (Hix 2002b). The autonomy from the 
national party enjoyed by MEPs seems to be related to the power of the national party to control 
the candidate selection process (Hix 2004). Kreppel (2002: 198-211) points out that the party 
group leadership lacks the tools to discipline their MEPs as the allocation of offices is dominated 
by the national delegations within the party groups, not by the party group leadership 
independently. Survey evidence also point towards a domination by national parties over party 
groups, as ‘53 per cent of MEPs considered voting against the group line as “acceptable or most 
acceptable” (Bowler and Farrell, 1999:216, quoted in Raunio and Wiberg 2002: 78). There is 
evidence pointing towards differences between national parties in office in their member state 
and those in opposition. Whittaker (2001) found that MEPs from governing parties seemed to be 
influenced more by their national party than opposition parties, in particular in the Codecision 
procedure. Studies of the selection of the Commission have also found a behaviour difference 
between government and opposition parties (Gabel and Hix 2002; Hix and Lord 1996; Jun and
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Hix 2004). Governing parties have been found to make party groups behave as more cohesive 
voting blocks (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). Ideological location seems to influence voting 
behaviour in the Council of Ministers (Mattila 2004). Thus, it seems to be reasonable to conclude 
that national parties, organized within party groups are the dominant actors in European Union 
politics. National party leaderships are capable of organizing their MEPs, making and breaking 
coalitions in day-to-day legislative politics in the European Union.
Summary
This chapter first surveyed the literature on bicameralism and legislative politics in the US setting 
and comparatively. It then discussed the main models of bicameralism in the EU and reviewed 
the literature on legislative behaviour inside the EP. The key insights is that studies of 
bicameralism have until recently neglected the role played by parties across institutions. Along 
similar lines, studies of legislative politics have until recently neglected how bicameralism shapes 
actors’ incentive structures, and thus their behaviour. The sections on EU legislative politics 
showed that models of bicameralism in the EU have treated the EP as a unitary actor. Given that 
recent literature on bicameralism in other settings has focused on the interaction between parties 
and institutional rules, it might be fruitful to go beyond the assumption of the EP as a unitary 
actor when modelling EU legislative politics. The question that then arose was over who the 
actors were. The literature on legislative behaviour in the EP suggests that national parties are 
better able to act as unitary actors than either national delegations, or trans-national parties.
The next chapter presents a theory of EU legislative politics. Focusing on the Codecision 
procedure, original behavioural predictions are derived by treating political parties as strategic 
actors, considering the institutional rules when calculating their optimal behaviour. Consistent
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with recent developments in US and comparative literature on legislative behaviour, the 
explanatory factors are whether a party is represented in the Council (Government or Opposition), 
location in the ideological policy space and majority requirements.
45
Chapter 2: A theory of Government and Opposition in EU 
Legislative Politics
The previous chapter has suggested that national parties are important actors in the EU, just as 
they are in national political systems (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001; Hix and Lord 1997; 
Schattschneider 1942). National parties sitting in government are represented in the Council 
while those in opposition are not. The EU is a separation of power system where the Council and 
the European Parliament are co-legislators under the Codecision procedure. This chapter presents 
a theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics. It argues that governing parties 
dominate day-to-day legislative politics in the EU.
The theory draws on the insights from non-cooperative game theory. The first section discusses 
to what extent its assumptions are appropriate in the case of EU legislative politics and to what 
extent national political parties can be modelled as cohesive actors in EU legislative politics. The 
second section shows that the expressed position of a collective actor is a function of the 
preferences of the individual actors and the decision rule. The third section derives the 
equilibrium outcomes in terms of policy location and preferred stage in of the game to adopt 
legislation in the case of the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision II).
This allows for predictions regarding national parties’ behaviour to be derived. The predictions 
are presented as testable hypotheses in the fourth section. The fifth section discuses the scope of 
the theory. This results in a limitation of the key claim regarding differences between governing 
and opposition parties in EU legislative politics only to apply to parties from adversarial member
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states. The final section summarises and compares the predictions with those in the existing 
literature.
Assumptions
Non-cooperative game theory is a standard tool in analytical politics (e.g. Baron 1989; Hinich 
and Munger 1997). Black (1958) introduced the median voter theorem. It proposes that an actor 
located in the centre on a single dimensional policy space will be a member of any winning 
coalition, and in effect be able to ensure that his preferred policy alternative will be final policy 
outcome, under simple majority voting with no monopoly on the agenda-setting power. It has 
however been shown that all collective decision rules, except simple majority decisions over only 
two alternatives are open to agenda-manipulation and vote cycling (Kelly 1987; May 1952; 
McKelvey 1976; Riker 1982; 1961; Schofield 1978; Sen 1982; Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and 
Bonchek 1997; Tullock 1981).
The analytical framework has been developed to cover the logical foundations of different 
decision-making rules (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). These insights have been applied to analyse 
coalition-formation (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Laver and Shepsle 1996), as well as to compare 
political systems (Tsebelis 2002). This section argues that national parties can be modelled as 
cohesive actors even when represented in multiple EU institutions. It then discusses to what 
extent the assumptions of non-cooperative game theory hold in EU legislative politics.
As we saw in chapter 1, the existing literature tends to either focus on relationships between 
different institutional actors, or partisan actors within particular institutions. A fundamental 
assumption behind the theory presented here is that parties are able to act as cohesive actors, not
47
only inside individual institutions, but across institutional boundaries as well. Rather than simply 
assuming that this is the case, it may be useful to consider the existing evidence of parties’ ability 
to coordinate the behaviour of their representatives across EU institutions.
Hix (2002b) found that in case of a conflict between the European party group and the national 
party MEPs vote with their national party. Studying the relationship between MEPs and national 
parties Raunio (2002) shows that while MEPs have a relative free role vis-a-vis their national 
party, the general tendency is one of institutionalisation of the contacts as a function of the 
growing importance of the EU and the EP in particular. He found that the issuing of voting 
instructions by national parties was not widespread. However, on the basis of interviews with 
MEPs from several member states, Whitaker (2001) found that governing parties issued voting 
instructions, in particular for Codecision votes. Noury (2002b) finds that membership in a trans­
national party group is a better predictor of voting behaviour than nationality. While not directly 
testing the effects of voting instructions from national parties, There is also evidence to suggest 
that a system of rewards and sanctions encouraging a close and disciplined relationship between 
national party leadership and MEPs is developing, at least in the case of the British Labour party 
(Messmer 2003). Furthermore, research on voting cohesion of party groups in the EP shows that 
the more members a party group has sitting in the Council, the more cohesive the party group 
becomes (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). In total, the national party’s monitoring of MEPs 
behaviour might not be as close as their monitoring of MPs behaviour. Overall, it is empirical 
support for assuming that parties are indeed sufficiently cohesive to be modelled as actors even 
across EU institutions.
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Having shown that the existing research support the notion that national parties are actors in EU 
legislative politics, it is necessary to evaluate the assumptions of non-cooperative game theory 
with respect to EU legislative politics with national parties as actors. Non-cooperative game 
theory rests on five assumptions. (1) Actors are fully rational. (2) Actors have well-defined 
preferences over alternatives. (3) They have perfect knowledge of preferences of other actors. (4) 
They have perfect knowledge of both their own and their opponents’ strategies. (5) Actors’ 
rationality is common knowledge.
National parties are fully rational in EU legislative politics
This assumption implies that national parties are purposeful actors. Their behaviour can be 
understood as attempts to secure policy outcome that is located as close as possible to their own 
ideal policy, while taking account of other considerations like office and votes (Hix, Raunio, and 
Scully 1999; Laver and Schofield 1990; Muller and Strom 1999; Strom 1990a). The theory 
proposes to model national parties as unitary actors even when their representatives sit in 
different institutions. Members of political parties share common goals. These common goals are 
pursued by all representatives regardless of the institution in which they are representing their 
party. If a party prefers alternative A to alternative B, it will pursue a common strategy to 
maximise the probability of realising the former alternative as the adopted policy of the EU. This 
does not imply that parties aim to bring the position of each of the institutions as closely as 
possible to their favourite position. Instead, their aim is to realise a policy outcome that is as 
close as possible to their ideal policy. This is in line with how parties are thought to behave in 
other political systems when understood as rational unitary actors (Huber 1996; Martin 2001).
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This assumption presupposes that parties have the necessary skills to evaluate all possible 
alternatives. The ability of organisations to compute such calculations has been questioned by 
organisational theorists (e.g. March and Olsen 1989; March and Simon 1958). While there might 
be some merit to these objections, there might be reasons for arguing that it would be better to 
model actors’ behaviour as if they were capable of making such calculations, rather than 
incapable. Only if the limitation to an organisation’s cognitive capabilities is so severe, that 
perfect randomness is a better prediction than perfect rationality does it makes really sense to 
reject the rationality assumption in our model (Tsebelis 1990:18-51).
National parties have well defined preferences over alternatives
This assumption implies that national parties know which policy alternative they want the EU to 
adopt on all legislative initiatives from the Commission. Parties act on the strategy that is most 
likely to produce the favoured alternative. This implies that they know which alternatives are 
possible and which are not. While they might change their expressed position at different stages 
of the procedure (e.g. Stokman and Thomson 2004), they do not change their preferences over 
the different alternatives. Alternative approaches to the study of EU politics have questioned this 
assumption. It is sometimes argued that policy-making in the EU is better understood as problem 
solving than hard bargaining. The actors then change their understanding of the problem through 
a deliberative process where both their information and understanding of the problem might be 
refined (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Risse-Kappen 1996). The possibility that deliberation may 
change actors’ preferences has been subject to both theoretical and experimental research. While 
deliberation might influence the probability that actors have single-peaked preferences, it is not at 
all certain that it may lead the actors to develop common preferences (Farrar et al. 2003).
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National parties have perfect knowledge o f the preferences o f other parties 
This assumption insures that parties are able to locate themselves in policy space and thus 
capable of choosing a strategy that will maximise payoff. Given that parties spend their time 
trying to get their position through to their potential voters, the position of other parties should 
not be difficult to obtain. While there may be cases where some parties misjudge the position of 
other parties, it is argued that it is more often than not the case that national parties know the 
position of the other parties when engaged in EU legislative politics on the matter.
National parties have perfect information about both own and their opponents ’ strategies 
This means that they not only know what they should do in order to maximise their pay-off, they 
know what their opponents are likely to do. They thus consider this information when adopting 
their strategy. While the perfect information assumption might be implausible in some situations 
considered by game theorists, the highly institutionalised and information rich environment of 
EU legislative politics ensures that the actors’ information regarding their own and others optimal 
strategies approximates perfect information.
It is common knowledge that national parties are rational
This assumption simply states that all parties know that the other parties are rational. This 
assumption is innocent if the previous assumptions are acceptable. It ensures that parties do not 
follow strategies that presuppose that the other parties do not know what they are doing. This 
type of strategies would if the above assumptions hold, lead to sub-optimal outcomes for parties 
pursuing them.
These assumptions are the basics for non-cooperative game theory. They can be relaxed in 
several ways. For example, by not assuming perfect information or by modelling the game as 
dynamic rather than static. While this complicates the calculations somewhat, the basic insight 
remains similar (e.g. Gibbons 1992). However, the essential assumption that actors are rational 
remains a cornerstone in this type of analysis.
Collective positions and preference aggregation rules
Now, consider the effect of different types of collective decision-making rules. Let two 
institutions (A and B) both consisting of 11 players. The institutions have collectively to agree in 
order to adopt new legislation. Institution A applies two different decision rules, simple majority, 
6 out of 11 in the first stage and an oversized majority rule 7 out if 11 to amend or reject in 
second stage. Institution B adopts and amends by oversized majority, 8 out of 11. All players in 
A are also players in B, such that all players in B are also players in A. The preference profiles of 
all players are constant across the different decision rules. If a player prefers x over y under 
simple majority rule in institution A, then he also prefers x over y under oversized majority rule 
in institution A as well as under oversized majority rule in institution B. Neither the decision rule 
nor the institution changes the preferences of a player over alternatives x and y.
Consider a decision game where the sequences and the majority requirement needed at the 
different stages are as follows. Institution A adopts, amends, or rejects by simple majority at 
stage 1. This causes institution A to adopt the ideal position of the median voter, player 6 of 11, 
labelled SM in figure 2.1. Institution B rejects the proposal from institution A by 4 out of 11 
votes if the current policy, the SQ, is located between its two pivotal voters, player 4 and player 8.
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If the SQ is located outside the area between player 4 and player 8, B adopts the ideal policy of 
player 4 if the SQ is located to the left of player 4 and the ideal point of player 8 if located to the 
right of player 8 by a majority of 8 out of 11. Hence, even with identical preferences we observe 
a conflict between the two institutions as the ideal policy of institution A is 6, regardless of the 
SQ, while the ideal position of institution B is either 4 or 8. The different decision rules in the 
institutions create different collective positions even though the individual positions of the actors 
are identical in both institutions.
Now, for simplicity, assume that SQ is located to the left of player 1. Continuing the procedure, 
institution A rejects or amends the proposal of institution B by an oversized majority, 8 out of 11, 
labelled O2. Institution A, deciding by an absolute majority is only able to shift the policy back to 
ideal point of player 5, labelled Oi. Again, we observe a difference in the collective ideal policy 
of the different institutions. If the two institutions split the difference in policy positions at the 
final stage, the end policy will be located at the midpoint of player 5 and player 4, provided that 
SQ is located further away from the pivotal voters in institutions A (simple majority) and B 
(oversized majority 8/11) than the new policy. Because the actors are aware of how the decision 
rules affect the policy outcome, they will only vote in favour of changing the status quo if they 
know that the adopted policy will be an improvement upon the status quo. Actors will not support 
a policy change if they know that the outcome will be worse than the current policy, even if the 
propose change represent an improvement. To illustrate, if player 4 prefers his own ideal point to 
the SQ, but not the midpoint between 5 and 4 to the status quo, he will not support a policy 
change in the first round in if he knows that the midpoint between 4 and 5 will be the outcome.
By the same logic, if player 4 prefers the midpoint between 4 and 5 to the status quo, he can end 
the game by proposing that point already in the first round. The game is illustrated in figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 The effect of majority requirement of policy change
Status quo located to the left, maximal possible policy change if no player monopolise agenda-setting power
SQ 0 2 Oi SM
_i i i i i i i i i i i i__
1 2 3  4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
SQ = the current policy, the status quo 
0 2 = Policy outcome under 8/11 majority rule 
Oi = Policy outcome under 7/11 majority rule 
SM = Policy outcome under simple majority rules
We see that a majority of the players in both institutions are in favour of moving the policy closer 
to the centre. Because institution B needs an oversized majority of 8 out of 11 to adopt legislation 
at every stage of the game, the most favourable position for the majority is to continue the game, 
ensuring that the pivotal players prefer the outcome to the SQ. The differences in majority 
requirement cause actors to vote against proposal they supported in institution B when they vote 
in institution A. They can improve their policy payoff if the SQ is located sufficiently far away 
from the pivotal players. Thus, a conflict between the two institutions may be observed even 
when the two institutions are composed of players sharing identical preferences, if the preference 
aggregation rule differs.
Parties and aggregation rules of EU’s Codecision procedure
The game presented in the previous section can be thought of as a model of the Codecision 
procedure used in the EU since the reform in the treaty of Amsterdam, know in the literature as 
Codecision n. This section introduces two dimensions and allows two, rather than just one party 
from all member states to be represented in institution A. As such, institution A represents the 
European Parliament, while B represents the Council of Ministers.
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Let C denote the Qualified Majority (QMV) pivotal government in the Council of Ministers. S 
denotes the simple majority pivotal voter in the European Parliament A denotes the absolute 
majority pivotal voter in the European Parliament. SQ denotes the location of the current policy, 
the status quo.
The Commission will only initiate a proposal if the likely outcome is closer to Commission’s 
ideal policy than the current policy, the status quo. At stage 2, the median voter in the European 
Parliament, S, rejects the proposal, p, if SQ is preferred to any possible outcome of the procedure, 
if not, S either accepts or amends the proposal. At stage 3, the Council’s qualified majority pivot 
C rejects if SQ is preferred to any likely outcome. C accepts if S amends p to any point that 
makes him indifferent or better off than what he can obtain at a later stage. If not, C amends to 
his ideal position, which also is preferred by A over the status quo. At stage 4, the absolute 
majority pivotal, A, rejects only if SQ is preferred to p. A amends if any point preferred by both S 
and C to the SQ is closer to his ideal point than the Common position adopted by C. At stage 5, 
the Council qualified majority pivot C accepts A’s proposal if it is preferred to any point he can 
agree to with S. C rejects some or all of the amendments if the likely outcome of an agreement 
with S makes him better off than the proposal from A. At stage 6, C and S will agree in 
Conciliation if they can find a common point that makes them both better off than the status quo. 
If so, a joint text is adopted by both institutions in the seventh stage.
There are two possible win-sets of the status quo W(SQ), X, and Y in this game. W(SQ)X is the 
area preferred to SQ by S, the simple majority pivot in the EP and C, the QMV This is illustrated 
in two dimensions in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2. The Codecision game
Level o f  
inte­
gration
Left-right dimension
The black area, Y, represents the win-set of the QMV majority pivot in the Council and the absolute majority pivot 
in the EP. The grey area X represents the win-set of the QMV majority pivot in the Council and the simple majority 
voter in the EP. C is the QMV majority pivot in the Council. A is the absolute majority pivot in the EP. S is the 
simple majority pivot in the EP. SQ represents the location of the current policy.
The grey area indicates the win-set o f the simple majority pivot in the EP and the QMV majority 
pivot in the Council, C, W(SQ)X. C, the majority voter in the Council, is the only actor whose 
support is necessary for all possible win-set. The EP also is an institutional veto-player. However, 
the identity of the pivotal actor in the parliament changes at the different stages of the game. It is 
S, the simple majority pivotal voter at the first and third reading. A, the absolute majority pivotal 
voter, is pivotal only in the second reading. S and A are identical only if all MEPs participate in 
the vote, an empirically unlikely scenario. C can thus choose whom of the actors, S or A, it
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prefers to form a winning coalition with. Its strategic advantage lies in the possibility of finding a 
policy proposal within Y, preferred by A to the SQ, or accepting the first reading proposal from 
the EP, if the proposal is located closer to C than any point inside Y.
There are four necessary conditions for a shift away from the Status Quo. First, W(SQ)X and/or 
W(SQ)Y are non-empty. Second, the Commission prefers any point inside W(SQ)X and 
W(SQ)Y to SQ. Third, S prefers any point inside W(SQ)X and W(SQ)Y to SQ. Fourth, C prefers 
any point inside W(SQ)X and/or W(SQ)Y to SQ. In short, they all prefer a policy change along 
similar directions. Note that A is not a veto-player in this game as C and S can agree in the first 
reading, before A is involved.
In order to derive testable predictions it is necessary to disaggregate the collective actors. The 
Council is composed of 11 players. The EP is composed of 22 players, where 11 of the players in 
the Council make up a subset of the players in the EP. All members have single-peaked 
preferences over the final policy. All actors maximise their policy pay-off.
The Council accepts or amends policies by an 8/11 majority. For the EP, the majority 
requirements differ as the game moves along. In the second stage, the EP amends or adopts by a 
simple majority (11/22). Simple majority is also used to accept in the sixth stage. In the fourth 
stage, Parliament amends or rejects by a 14/22 majority.
Outcome of the game
Applying backward induction as the solution concept, the game can be solved in terms of finding 
the smallest possible connected winning coalitions in equilibrium (see for example Crombez
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1996; 1997a in the context of the EU; and Gibbons 1992 for a general treatment). At the sixth 
and final stage of the game, a new policy is adopted if both an 11/22 majority in the EP and an 
8/11 majority in the Council prefer the outcome to the status quo. As the eleven governing parties 
of Council also sit in the EP, policy is adopted if one of the following minimum connected 
winning coalitions forms: (1) All parties of the Council prefer the agreed outcome to the SQ. (2) 
Ten of the governing parties in the Council and one of the opposition parties in the EP prefer the 
agreed outcome. (3) Nine of the governing parties in the Council and two opposition parties in 
the parliament agree on an outcome that is preferred to the SQ. (4) Eight governing parties the 
Council and 3 opposition parties in the EP prefer the agreed policy to the status quo.
In the fifth stage, 8 of the 11 governing parties in the Council can form a connected winning 
coalition with 14 out of the 22 parties in the EP. The minimum connected winning coalition that 
can form at this stage needs to include at least three opposition parties if the Council is 
unanimous. If the Council is minimum connected winning (8/11), it needs the support from at 
least 6 opposition parties. This is a larger connected winning coalition than the connected 
winning coalitions in the final stage. Some of the governing parties in the Council will be better 
off continuing the game. Hence, terminating the game in the fifth stage is not in equilibrium. 
Remember that the EP ends the game if 9 out of its 22 parties prefer the proposal made by 
Council in the fourth stage. Given that Council makes the decision to continue the game into the 
fifth stage if 8 governing parties can agree on how to amend the text, the support from one 
opposition party is sufficient to adopt the legislation at stage 4. If the 8-member majority in the 
Council is the only ones who favour the outcome from the final stage over the status quo, the 
legislation should be rejected at this stage. If not there must be one opposition party that prefers 
this outcome to the outcome of the final stage. The game should thus end here rather than
continuing to Conciliation, as the minimal winning coalition is realised at this stage. The 
sequence of the game is illustrated in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3 Stages in the partisan Codecision game
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At the third stage of the game, the Council can accept, by an 8/11 majority, the 14/22 majority 
proposal from the EP. It is sufficient for the proposal to pass in the EP if all of the governing 
parties support it. However, 8 of the governing parties will be able to form a smaller connected 
winning coalition by including one opposition party at the next stage. Thus, the game will end at
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stage 3 only if at least three opposition parties in the EP are located between the eight-members- 
minimal-winning-coalition in the Council.
To establish an overview of the theoretical predictions, it is useful summarise the theory. There 
are three institutional actors, the simple majority pivot in the EP, the QMV pivot in the Council, 
and the absolute blocking minority in the EP. While the QMV pivot in the Council is by 
definition from a governing party, the two other institutional actors may be either from governing 
or opposition parties. The preferences of the different actors are summarised in table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Actors’ preferences over when Codecision legislation is adopted
Stage Simple 
majority EP 
pivot
Council QMV 
pivot
Blocking 
minority EP 
pivot
Governing
parties
Opposition
parties
1st reading 1st preference 21*1 preference 2nd 1st 3rd preference
Council 
2nd reading 
EP
2nd reading
3 rd preference 1st preference
preference 
1st preference
preference 
3 rd preference 2nd preference
Not Not Not Not Not
Council equilibrium equilibrium equilibrium equilibrium equilibrium
Conciliation 2nd preference 3 rd preference 3 rd 2nd 1st preference
preference preference
The simple majority pivot prefers legislation to be adopted in the first reading in the Council, if 
the QMV pivot accepts her proposal. If  not, she prefers the outcome of the Conciliation 
Committee to the common position of the Council, i.e. that legislation is adopted in EP 2nd 
reading.
The QMV pivot in the Council prefers to be able to choose its ideal policy amongst those 
alternatives absolute blocking minority would prefer to the outcome of the Conciliation
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Committee. It does, however prefer to end the procedure in the first reading rather than ending up 
in Conciliation. The possible minimal connected winning coalitions are of identical size. It is thus 
better to adopt the policy at an earlier stage.
The absolute blocking minority pivot in the EP prefers legislation to be adopted in the second 
reading in the EP, as this connected winning coalition is smaller than any other possible 
connected winning coalitions. If not, she also prefers 1st reading to Conciliation as the size of the 
necessary majorities is identical, but the former alternative is realised at an earlier stage.
While the Council collectively prefers to adopt legislation in the second EP reading, this does not 
mean that this is the case for most of the parties sitting in the Council. Most governing parties are 
more likely to be better off by accepting the proposal from the simple majority EP, or concluding 
the negotiations in the Conciliation Committee than from having the common position of the 
Council accepted by a blocking minority in the EP second reading. The oversized majority 
requirement prevents the Council from collectively changing the outcome as much as the 
majority of the government would like to have seen it changed. These governing parties would 
thus like to use their MEPs in an attempt to force more change on the more reluctant members of 
the Council. These governing parties prefer the likely outcome of the Conciliation Committee to 
the common position of the Council adopted in the first reading. In the first reading, the common 
position of the Council is determined by the ideal location of the QMV pivot. The QMV pivot 
will propose its own ideal policy, or a policy located as close as possible while at the same time 
capable of being supported by a blocking minority in the EP to the likely outcome of the 
Conciliation Committee. In the Conciliation Committee, the joint text is adopted if both a simple 
majority in the EP and a qualified majority in the Council prefer it to the status quo. Thus as long
as the joint text makes the QMV pivot in the Council better off than the status quo, it is possible 
to move the policy outcome beyond the ideal point of the QMV pivot. Hence, the majority of the 
Council members gain upon the common position of the Council by supporting second reading 
amendments in the EP.
Having investigated the logic of the Codecision procedure, the next section spells out the 
behavioural predictions for governing and opposition parties.
Behavioural predictions
Based on the above investigation into the logic of the Codecision procedure, this section presents 
three behaviour predictions. The predictions are as follows. Hypothesis 1: Governing parties 
write more Codecision reports than opposition parties. Hypothesis 2: Codecision legislation on 
which the rapporteur comes from a governing party is more likely to be adopted in the first 
reading in the Council than Codecision legislation on which the rapporteur comes from an 
opposition party. Hypothesis 3: The majority of governing parties and ideologically close 
opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than opposition parties.
Governing parties write more reports
The power of an agenda setter is to be able to choose between alternative winning majorities. The 
agenda setter inside the European Parliament is the rapporteur (Tsebelis 1995). The right to act as 
a rapporteur is determined by the size of the party delegation and national party within that 
delegation (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000; Kreppel 2002; 
Mamadouh and Raunio 2003). The process of allocating reports to individual parties is a two- 
stage process. The right to write reports is a pure function of the size of the party group, and
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within each party group, the size of the national party. This process determines the number of 
points each party has available to spend on reports. However, this does not imply that the number 
of reports each national party writes is a pure function of their size. The parties can decide for 
themselves how to spend their points.
To illuminate the process on allocating reports amongst parties it is useful to draw on insights 
from consumer theory in microeconomics (e.g. Jehle and Reny 2000: 3-60). Behaviour is 
explained as a function of preferences, the budget constraint, and relative prices. In the context of 
allocating Codecision report, the budgetary constraint can be understood as the number of points 
a party have, which is a pure function on number of MEPs. Hence, if preferences and relative 
prices are held constant, bigger party groups, countries and national parties should write more 
reports than smaller.
In microeconomics, it is usually assumed that actors prefer more rather than less of any given 
combination of consumption bundles. This will normally be the case for allocation of reports as 
well. Reports can be thought of as both office policy and vote benefits. It is common to consider 
these three types of benefits to be guiding party behaviour (see Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999 in 
the case of the European Parliament; and Muller and Strom 1999; Strom 1990a for a general 
treatment). As office-benefits, all parties may prefer more reports rather than fewer. This type of 
benefits is hence constant for all parties. Standard spatial theory would predict that all parties 
regardless of location would benefit equally from moving the policy closer to their ideal policy, 
regardless of the actual distance between the final policy and their ideal policy (see for example 
Hinich and Munger 1997). However, if the final policy outcome is sufficient far from the ideal 
policy of the party, with or without its involvement, it might choose not to reap the policy
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benefits as the electoral cost of being associated with the final policy outcome might be high 
relative to be policy gain of being involved. Some parties might hence choose not be involved in 
writing reports.
There should be a difference in terms of vote benefits between government and opposition 
parties. Voters can be thought of as acting retrospectively, evaluating governing parties on the 
overall policy performance (but see Cheibub and Przeworski 1999 for evidence questioning this 
link). This may be the case regardless of whether the legislation is purely domestic or of 
European origin. If so, governing parties have more of an incentive to get involved as rapporteurs 
in as many legislative initiatives as possible in order to claim credit or avoid blame. Opposition 
parties on the other hand are not able to take credit for the overall policy development, nor do 
they get any of the blame. Hence, it only makes sense for opposition parties to spend their points 
for electoral purposes on controversial issues or issues with a clear constituency interest. This 
type of legislative initiatives is likely to be of interest to all parties. The number of points 
necessary to secure the right to become a rapporteur is hence on average likely to be higher on 
these initiatives. Because opposition parties are mainly interested in salient Codecision reports 
while governing parties are interested in all Codecision reports, opposition parties are likely to 
write fewer Codecision reports than governing parties of similar size and policy location.
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Figure 2.4 Effect of being a governing party on number of Codecision reports
Saliency
Governing 
Parties saliency 
of EU legislatior
Number of reports by governing parties
Opposition 
Parties saliency 
of EU legislatior
Number of reports by opposition parties
Policy payoff o f EU legislation
The difference between government and opposition parties can be thought o f as a shift in the 
payoff o f writing winnable reports, holding the preference relation (ideal policy location) and the 
budgetary constraint (number of MEPs) constant. This is illustrated in figure 2.4. The curves 
represent the combination of saliency and policy pay-off that makes a party equally well off 
given the budget constraint (number of MEPs). The curves are convex, indicating that the trade­
off between saliency and policy payoff are not constant. The more salient a report is, keeping 
policy payoff constant, the more interested is a party in writing it. Conversely, the less salient it is 
the higher the policy payoff will have to be in order for a party to be willing to write it.
In sum, governing parties consider all legislation salient to them given that they stand to take the 
blame or reward for all new policies. The evaluation of saliency is only a function of how likely it 
is that they can create some media attention around it for opposition parties. Not all EU
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legislation has an equal potential of receiving media attention. Opposition parties will thus only 
be interested in a subset of all available Codecision reports, while governing parties will be 
interested in the whole universe of Codecision reports. This means that governing parties will on 
average write more reports than opposition parties.
Hypothesis 1: Governing parties write more Codecision reports than opposition parties
Rapporteurs from governing parties conclude negotiations in first reading
The question of when the Codecision procedure reaches the conclusion can be understood as an 
instance of sequential bargaining, similar to a classical divide the dollar game, but with no 
discount factors (Gibbons 1992: 68-71). Instead, the players at the different stages of the game 
change. As we saw above, an agreement is needed between the simple majority pivot in the EP 
and the QMV majority pivot in the Council in order to adopt legislation at the third stage. In 
order to adopt legislation at the fourth stage, in the second reading in the EP, the QMV majority 
in the Council needs to find support for its common position from a blocking minority in the EP, 
capable of preventing an absolute majority to form. At the fifth stage, if an absolute majority in 
the EP is found to amend the common position of the Council, a QMV majority needs to accept 
the amended proposal. If not the proposal goes to Conciliation. The outcome needs to be 
preferred to the status quo by a QMV majority in the Council and a simple majority in the EP. As 
we can see, a QMV majority is needed in the Council at every stage, while the required majority 
in the EP changes.
The EP simple majority pivot, S, makes an offer to the Council QMV pivot, C, over how to 
divide the payoff between all the actors. C then decides whether to accept the offer. If he accepts,
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the game terminates. If C does not accept S’s offer, he makes an offer to the EP absolute majority 
pivot, A. If A accepts the offer, the game ends and all players receive their payoff If not, the 
legislation falls unless S and C agree on how to divide the payoffs. S and A are drawn from the 
same institution, where their location and identity is a function of different majority requirement. 
C is more likely to prefer the ideal point of A to the ideal point of S. Hence C prefers agreement 
in the fourth stage to agreement in the third or sixth. Agreement in any of these stages is preferred 
to agreement in the fifth stage, as termination in stage five offers C, the pivotal voter in the 
Council, the same payoffs as stage three, but at a later stage in the game.
This has implications for the predictions of when legislation will be adopted as a function of the 
preferences of the agenda-setter in the EP, from which S and A is drawn. The closer the 
preferences of that agenda-setter is to the preferences of C, the more likely it is that the she will 
propose something that makes C indifferent or better off than it will be from agreeing on how to 
divide the payoff at a later stage. Hence, S can do C job by offering C an identical payoff to what 
C will obtain from A in the second stage of the game. C will accept this. It is the best possible 
outcome for both the simple majority pivot in the EP and qualified majority pivot in the Council.
Different rapporteurs seek to realise alternative winning coalitions. The theory predicts that the 
stage of agreement will be a function of whether the rapporteur comes from a government or 
opposition party. A rapporteur from a governing party is more likely to find a simple majority in 
favour of a proposal that a qualified majority in the Council will find acceptable than a rapporteur 
from an opposition party. Because of the absolute majority requirement to amend or reject the 
common position of the Council, rapporteurs from opposition parties are more likely to find the 
common position being adopted and the proposal ending in the second reading in the EP.
The assumption that the rapporteur is able to influence the policy position of the parliament is 
essential for the prediction that the rapporteur’s identity as a member of a governing or an 
opposition party should influence when legislation is adopted. Existing empirical and theoretical 
work supports this assumption. Neuhold (2001) uses case studies to argue the importance of the 
committee system, highlighting the role of the rapporteur, focusing on the importance of previous 
experience. Bowler and Farrell (1995) also highlight the role of the rapporteur in the EP 
committee system as do Whitaker (2001). Tsebelis (1995) presents a theoretical argument of why 
the rapporteur can be thought of as an agenda-setter inside the EP, at least in the Cooperation 
procedure. Practitioners’ accounts also lend support for the assumption (Corbett, Jacobs, and 
Shackleton 2000; Wurzel 1999).
Hypothesis 2: Codecision legislation on which the rapporteur comes from a governing party is 
more likely to be adopted in the first reading in the Council than Codecision 
legislation on which the rapporteur comes from an opposition party
Governing parties amend Council’s common position
The pivotal voter in the EP changes between the first, second, and third reading. Parties that 
prefer an outcome inside the- QMV-in-Council-and-simple-majority-in-the-EP win set, labelled 
X in figure 2.3 to an outcome inside the QMV-plus-a-blocking minority in the EP win set, 
labelled Y, will vote to amend the Common position in the second reading in the EP. This is the 
case even if these parties may have supported the common position of the Council in the first 
reading. Figure 2.3 illustrates that any party located to the left of SQ and more integrationist than
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the absolute majority pivot in the EP or the QMV pivot in the Council will try to pass an 
amendment to the common position. They do this in order to provoke the Conciliation 
Committee to form, as an agreement between the Council and a simple majority in the EP in the 
Conciliation Committee would most likely be closer to their ideal point than any deal reached 
between the Council and a blocking minority in EP in the second reading. If the QMV pivot in 
the Council, C, does not accept the proposal from the simple majority in the EP, S, then C will be 
able to propose its ideal policy as the common position of the Council. This position may be 
modified so that it is within the win set Y, that of the blocking minority in the EP, A. However, 
as most of the governments prefer outcomes that are inside win set X to those inside win set Y, 
they will vote in favour of amendments to the common position. They do this in the knowledge 
that the pivotal QMV voter in the Council is likely to prefer the outcome of the Conciliation 
Committee to the status quo. As the ranking of alternative policy outcomes is a function of 
location in the policy space, opposition parties that are ideologically close to the majority of the 
governing parties will also support second reading amendments.
Hypothesis 3: The majority o f governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are 
more likely to support second reading amendments than opposition parties
Limitations to the scope of the theory
The theory is limited to countries with adversarial national political systems. Marsh argues that 
whether the norm of government alternation exists in a country affects the second order effect in 
the European elections (Marsh 1998). The norm of government alternation equates having an 
adversarial national political system.
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Modem theories of coalition politics start with Riker’s (1962) minimum winning coalition theory. 
He argues that political parties will include the minimum number of partners necessary to hold 
the bare majority in the parliament. Any parties which’s support is not necessary to control the 
median voter in the Parliament will be left outside the coalition, as there will be fewer parties to 
split the benefits of holding office between. Any coalition seeking office needs to control the 
majority of the votes, so minority governments are not possible, as the opposition will throw 
them out of office, preferring to take the seats in office themselves. However, Axelrod (1970) 
argues that controlling the government is also about policy, so coalitions need to be connected in 
the policy space. He predicts minimal connected winning coalitions will form. It is impossible to 
exclude potential excess parties that are located between two minimal winning coalition partners.
Empirically we observe both surplus majority government and minority governments (Laver and 
Schofield 1990; 1999a; Laver and Shepsle 1999b; Lijphart 1999; Strom 1990b; Warwick 1999a; 
1999b). The suggestion here is that in countries where either of these two types of governments is 
found, we have evidence of a weak government alternation norm, hence a non-adversarial 
political system. The reason is that in both of the cases, the value of holding office is not 
sufficiently high to encourage political parties to seek to monopolise the office power. The parties 
may prefer to invite parties into office that they do not have to. Alternatively, because opposition 
parties choose to support governing parties on a day-to-day basis without getting any office spoils 
in return, they are able to invite fewer parties into the cabinet than what is necessary to command 
a majority in the Parliament. This reduces the observable differences between governing and 
mainstream opposition parties from these countries. Hence, we should not expect to find support
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for the hypotheses regarding differences between governing and opposition parties from non- 
adversarial member states.
Summary and comparison with existing literature
This chapter presented a theory of legislative politics in the EU. The building blocks of the theory 
are national political parties and institutional preference aggregating rules. The system of 
separation of powers in the EU causes national political parties to have different influence over 
policy outcomes. This is a function of being a governing or an opposition party. An opposition 
party is only represented in one of the legislative chambers, the Parliament, while a governing 
party is represented both in the Parliament and in the Council. Hence, governing parties have 
more influence over policies than opposition parties. The collective decision-rules used in the 
Codecision procedure create different behavioural incentives for governing and opposition parties. 
It is the oversized majority requirement in the Council and the shifting between simple and 
absolute majority requirements at different reading in the Parliament that creates these incentives.
The government in EU legislative politics are the parties that make up winning coalitions. These 
made up by a qualified majority of the parties in the Council supported by either a simple 
majority or a blocking minority of parties in the EP, located ideologically close to the QMV 
majority, regardless of their status as governing or opposition parties. The loosing coalition, the 
opposition, is hence the minority parties in the Council and most of the opposition parties 
represented in the EP.
Three testable hypotheses were derived by applying non-cooperative game theory and spatial 
modelling.
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Firstt, governing parties are more willing to write Codecision reports than opposition parties as 
they have a bigger change of influencing the outcome because they are represented in both 
institutions. EU legislation is also more salient to governing parties given that that stands to take 
the credit or blame from the voters for the overall policy output regardless of their actual 
involvement.
Second, Codecision reports written by representatives of governing parties are more likely to be 
adopted in 1st reading in the Council than in the Parliament’s second reading. These rapporteurs 
from governing parties have more to gain by pitching their initial proposal inside the Council 
win-set than rapporteurs from opposition parties. Firstly, their representation in the Council gives 
them the ability to influence the size and location of the win-set. Secondly, in order for the efforts 
of the rapporteur to be noticed by the national party leadership, it is sufficient for MEPs from 
governing parties to make proposals where their own party is on the winning side. An opposition 
rapporteur needs to either make the Council agree to something the governing party from his 
country is against, be able to claim credit for something the government failed to secure through 
its position in the Council, or show its opposition to the policies promoted by the Council, in 
order to get noticed by the national party leadership.
Third, governing parties are more likely to vote against the common position of the Council in 
EP’s second reading. The qualified majority requirement for establishing a common position in 
the Council means that most governments would prefer a further shift of the status quo than what 
they can collectively agree to. Hence, they will try to provoke the Conciliation Committee to
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form. The likely outcome of an agreement between a simple majority of the EP and the Council 
will bring the policy outcome closer to their ideal point.
The scope of the theory is limited to parties from adversarial political systems. In systems that are 
more consensual based the coordination between government and opposition parties will be 
greater, hence the observed behavioural differences will be smaller. The explanatory force of the 
government -  opposition party distinction might therefore be weaker in the case of parties from 
these member states.
This theory of legislative politics in the EU differs from the existing theories of EU politics as it 
sees national parties as actors, not supranational institutions and governments or trans-national 
party groups. It is thus useful to compare its predictions with those existing in the literature. 
Consider voting behaviour in the second EP reading. I suggest that MEPs from most governing 
parties will vote in favour of amending the common position of as they predict that the outcome 
from the Conciliation Committee will be closer to their ideal policy while still be preferred to the 
status quo by the QMV pivot in the Council. As we saw in the previous chapter, there exists a 
large literature that emphasises the consensus of the Council (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 
1997). Since it is so hard to get a deal in the Council, the implication is that government will try 
to prevent the EP from unpacking the deal from the Council. This leads us to the prediction that 
governing parties will vote against amending the common position in EP’s second reading, 
contrary to the prediction of the third hypothesis. This logic would however be sympathetic to the 
prediction of the first and second hypotheses.
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Kreppel (2000) models the two major party-groups in the EP, the Commission, and the 
governments as actors in EU legislative politics. She predicts that the EPP and PES will vote in 
favour of second reading amendments when both parties are located on the same side of the 
common position of the Council or if the distance from the common position of the Council to 
the ideal position of the party-group closest to it is greater than the distance from that party- 
group’s ideal position to the compromise amendment the two party group can agree to. Voting 
behaviour in the second reading should hence be a function of party group membership. Whether 
a party is represented in the Council should not influence the voting behaviour of its MEPs in 
second reading votes if it is party groups that dictate MEPs behaviour. This logic seems to 
suggest that reports written by members of the EPP or PES are more likely to end up in the 
Conciliation Committee. Elsewhere, Kreppel (2002) has argued that the supranational party- 
system is set up to favour the two major party-groups. Hence, parties from these party-groups are 
likely to write more reports than MEPs from other party groups. While national parties might 
decide whom of their MEPs will be allocated reports within party groups, her logic does not seem 
to suggest any difference between governing and opposition parties, neither in terms of number 
of Codecision reports, nor when they are adopted.
Most formal models of EU decision-making treat the EP as a unitary actor. Garrett and Tsebelis 
(1996) place the EP as an extreme outlier in EU legislative politics. The dominant dimension is 
level of integration where the EP and the Commission want a large change whereas the member 
states want smaller changes. This implies that MEPs voting behaviour should be driven by their 
attitudes towards further integration. MEPs from parties hostile to integration should vote against 
EP amendments, while those that are pro-integrationist should vote in favour. The same logic 
should lead pro-integrationists parties to write more reports than those less integrationist or
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hostile to further integration. Tsebelis (1995) argues that the rapporteur is an agenda-setter inside 
the EP. Given that his model only assume complete information from the second reading 
onwards, one would expect reports written by pro-integrationist MEPs to be more likely to go to 
the Conciliation Committee.
The theory presented in this chapter provides an institutional argument in favour of the liberal 
intergovernmental theory. Moravcsik (1993; 1998) argues that governments are the central actors 
in the grand bargains in the EU. The institutional set-up consolidates the interests of the 
governments that had the most bargaining power in the IGCs and ensures that the results of the 
bargain are translated into specific EU policies. I have here presented a theory showing how the 
majority of the governing parties are able to translate the grand bargains into favourable 
legislative policy outcomes in day-to-day legislative politics, thereby provided a reply to the 
institutional critique of liberal intergovemmentalism (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). The next 
chapter presents an operationalisation of the theory. Empirical tests are carried out in subsequent 
chapters.
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Chapter 3: Research Design
The previous chapter developed a theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics. 
This chapter presents the empirical material subsequent chapters draw on to test the hypotheses. 
Morton (Morton 1999: 142-275) distinguishes between three types of evaluations of theoretical 
models: (1) the evaluation of assumptions; (2) evaluation of predictions; (3) comparison with 
alternative models. The evaluation of the assumptions is integrated in the theory chapter. The 
main task of the empirical chapters is to evaluate the predictions of the model as hypothesised in 
chapter 2 and compare the results with theoretical predictions existing in the literature. These 
theories are tested as alternatives. They may generate competing or complementing hypotheses. 
The model is evaluated both as a complete and as a partial data generating process. As a complete 
data-generating process, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables are 
expected to exist even after controlling for other potential intervening variables. As a partial data- 
generating process the relationship between the dependent and independent variables are 
expected to exist even when intervening variables are controlled for (Morton 1999: 101-41). The 
data used to test the theory is limited to the fifth Parliament, i.e. after the introduction of the 
Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure.
The first section of this chapter presents the dependent variables. The second section describes 
the independent variables related to the different aspects of the model. The third section presents 
the control variables.
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Dependent variables
Chapter 4 tests the first hypothesis. This hypothesis is related to the distribution of Codecision 
reports amongst parties in the EP. Data was collected on all Codecision reports initiated during 
the fifth parliament. Reports not assign to any rapporteur were excluded, as were legislation 
initiated by the Commission before 1999. The is mainly Codecision legislation adopted under the 
simplified procedure without report, but also legislation initiated in 2004, where the EP had not 
allocated the report to any MEP by the time of the final plenary session in May 2004. Reports on 
which information is missing on some of the control variables (described below) are also 
excluded. Once these reports are excluded, we are left with 372 Codecision reports.
The unit of analysis here is number of reports allocated to a party per year. It is important to 
emphasis that the national delegations to party-groups, e.g. the British delegation to the Party of 
European Socialists (PES) is not the same as the British labour party, as the former also includes 
the SDLP from Northern Ireland. Most data from the EP only labels the nationality and the party- 
group affiliation of the MEPs. However, the actors on national level, hence also in the Council, 
are national political parties, not national delegations to European party-groups. The unit of 
analysis here is political parties. A party scores 0 if none of its MEPs were allocated any 
Codecision reports initiated by the Commission a given year. The years included are 1999,2000, 
2001, 2002 and 2003. The distribution of reports by year is as follows: 1999; 37 reports; 2000; 85, 
2001; 74,2002; 68 and 2003; 108 reports. The number of reports distributed per party per year 
range from 0 to 11. There are 530 observations in total, 106 parties observed over a period of 5 
years. 361 of these observations take the value 0, while 169 observations take a positive value.
The zero-observations are distributed as follows: 1999, 81; 2000,67; 2001, 73; 2002, 75; 2003,
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65. Thus, Codecision reports are allocated amongst less than 40% of parties represented in the EP. 
A complete list of all pieces of legislation is presented in appendix I. The data was collected from 
the official website of the European Parliament 21 May 20042.
Chapter 5 tests the second hypothesis. It relates to when Codecision legislation is adopted. The 
unit of analysis is the stage in the process when the legislation is adopted. It is coded 1 if the 
legislation is adopted in the first reading in the Council. It is coded 2 if it is adopted in the second 
reading in the EP. It takes the value 3 if it is adopted in the second reading in the Council and 4 if 
it is agreed in Conciliation. The data consists of all Codecision legislation initiated between 1999 
and 2003 and adopted before the final plenary session of the fifth Parliament in May 2004. The 
reports where there was no rapporteur, where the proposal had lapsed, or was redrawn, or where 
information on some of the independent variables was missing, are excluded. This leaves us with 
254 completed pieces of Codecision legislation. Of the 254, 36 were initiated in 2003, 46 in 2002, 
61 in 2001, 78 in 2000 and 33 in 1999. 87 were completed in the first reading in the Council, 64 
in the second reading in the EP, 58 in the second reading in the Council and 45 when to 
Conciliation.
In this study, only legislation where the first reading in the EP took place after 1 May 1999 is 
included. This means that the whole of the legislative process is conducted under the rules of the 
Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision D). The data hence differs from 
those presented by the EP itself (e.g. Dimitrakopoulos, Cedershiold, and Imbeni 2004). The EP 
counts all legislation passed by the EP during the fifth parliament, regardless of when it was
2 http://wvyw.europarl.eu.int/oeil/
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initiated. The stage of termination for all Codecision legislation initiated and completed during 
the fifth EP is presented in appendix I.
Chapter 6 tests the third hypothesis, related to the different voting behaviour by government and 
opposition parties in the second reading of the Codecision procedure. All second reading roll call 
votes in the first one and a half year of the fifth parliament were collected as a part of the Hix- 
Noury-Roland project on voting behaviour in the EP3. My contribution on the project was to code 
most of the vote characteristics of the votes. 1675 roll call votes were taken between July 1999 
and the end o f2000. 380 of these were Codecision votes, of which 167 were second reading 
votes on amendments of the common position of the Council.
Not all votes in the EP are taken by roll call, only between 20-30% of the total. There are indeed 
reasons why some parties call roll-call votes on some amendments and not on others (Carrubba 
and Gabel 1999). It can also be shown that roll-call votes might not be a fully representative 
sample of all votes (Carrubba et al. 2003). In the second reading of Codecision, roll call votes 
might be called in order to ensure party discipline or to record its own view and the views of 
other parties for electoral purposes. This increase the potential costs and benefits of voting one 
way or the other in a roll call vote, compared to a ''normal" vote. Thus, the results of roll call 
vote’s studies might be bias downwards, showing fewer differences between actors than what 
really exist in the whole universe of votes. However, the opposite might also be true, when roll- 
call votes are taken; parties have a chance of showing opposition or support for something to a 
greater extent than with "normal" votes. Anyway, roll call votes are the only types of votes we 
can study in any detail.
3 http ://personal. lse. ac.uk/HIX/HixNourvRo landEPdata.HTM
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The voting decisions are on the disaggregated level, each voting decision for all MEPs on all 
second reading votes are analysed. This gives 167 times 626 voting decisions to analyse, in total 
104,542 individual voting decisions. Of the 167 votes, 65 received the necessary support from an 
absolute majority while 102 foiled. The distribution between the years is as follows; 1999: 26, 
2000: 141. The characteristics of the votes show that second reading roll call votes were taken on 
all major policy areas covered by Codecision, environment, economics, social affairs, inter- 
institutional issues and external trade.
A challenge when testing voting behaviour in second reading votes is how to code decisions 
other than votes in favour. Yes-votes are the only voting decision counting towards the absolute 
majority requirement of 314. No votes, abstentions, those present but not voting, and those 
absents are all contributing towards the total number of non-positive votes. Nevertheless, not all 
of these possible lines of actions are equally likely to be a result of the policy-preference of the 
MEPs on the specific policy. As most of the voting takes place on Wednesdays and Thursdays, 
those absents cannot necessarily be assumed to be against a specific amendment. The reason for 
their absent might very well not be related to the specific policy at all. The same holds to some 
extent for MEPs who have sign in the day of the vote, but who are not present in the plenary 
when the vote is actually taken. Their absent from the plenary might be strategic, but it might 
also be due to reasons not related to the issues voted over. It is plausible that those that abstain or 
vote against a second reading amendment are in fact against the amendments. Their failure to 
support the amendment is most likely due to reasons related to the specific amendment. However, 
all non-positive votes count against the majority requirement. Thus, two alternative specifications 
of the dependent variable are tested. The first classify all non-positive votes as negative, while the 
second exclude all absents and present but not voting. The total number of observations, once
MEPs on which information on some of the independent variables are missing is excluded, is 
97.644 and 87.817, respectively. A complete list of number of second reading roll call votes to 
amend the common position of the Council is included in Appendix n.
Independent variables
This section describes the independent variables. The theory distinguishes between governing 
and opposition parties. As the study goes over five years, the identity of some of the governing 
parties changes during the period. Data on governing status is coded on a yearly basis. Parties 
sitting in government at the start of each year are coded as government parties that year. This 
classification is not without problems related to change in governments. For example, if the 
government changes in February, the old governing parties are coded as governing parties 
throughout the year. Yet, in for example second reading votes in the EP will be related to 
amendments of the Common position adopted in the Council some months ago, so it is perhaps 
more plausible to believe that the old government had more influence over the common position 
of the Council than the new government.
The theory presented in chapter 2 is limited to parties from member states with adversarial 
political system. Muller and Strom (2000/2003) assess the extent to which government formation 
tends to results in minimal winning coalitions (either connected or not) or in minority/over-sized 
governments. They do not discuss the UK, Greece or Spain, as these countries do not have a 
history of coalition governments. Since single party governments are by definition minimal 
winning, these countries are coded as having a strong norm of government alternation, hence an 
adversarial political system. The classification of the different countries is reported in table 3.1. 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden are seen as having a
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weak norm of government alternation, hence a non-adversarial political system. In the rest of the 
EU countries, the norm is strong. Their political systems are adversarial. The classification 
corresponds with the one found in Marsh (1998), but here the member states that joined in 1995 
are also classified. Table 3.1 presents a list of governing parties by country, by the start of each 
year. The table also indicates whether the country is classified as adversarial or not.
The type of party (governing or opposition) in the two types of national political systems 
(adversarial or non-adversarial) is categorised as a categorical variable with four different 
categories, adgov, nongov, nonopp and adopp. The latter category, adopp, which consists of 
opposition parties from adversarial member states, is the reference category. Adgov takes the 
value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial national politic system at 
the start of a given year. It takes the value 0 for all other parties. Nongov takes the value 1 if a 
party sits in government in a member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the 
start of a given year, otherwise 0. Nonopp takes the value 1 if a party sits in opposition in a 
member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.
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Table 3.1. Governing parties in the 15 EU member states 1999-2003, as of 1 January each year
Adversarial 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria No SPO/ OVP sp o /  o v p OVP + FPO OVP + FPO OVP + FPO
Belgium No CVP+PSC + SP + VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + VLD + PRL/FDF+ SP + VLD + PRL/FDF + SP VLD + PRL/FDF +
PS PS + Ecolo + Agalev PS + Ecolo + Agalev + PS + Ecolo + Agalev SP + PS + Ecolo +
Denmark No SD + RV SD + RV SD + RV V + KF
Agalev 
V + KF
Germany Yes SPD + Die Griinen SPD + Die Griinen SPD + Die Griinen SPD + Die Griinen SPD + Die Griinen
Finland No SDP + KOK + SFP + SDP + KOK + SFP + SDP + KOK + SFP + SDP + KOK + SFP + SDP + KOK + SFP +
VAS + VIHR VAS + VIHR VAS + VIHR VAS + VIHR VAS + VIHR
France Yes PS + PCF + PRS + PS + PCF + PRS + MDC PS + PCF + PRS/PRG + PS + PCF + PRS/PRG RPR + UDF + DL
MDC + Verts + Verts MDC + Verts + MDC + Verts
Greece Yes PASOK PASOK PASOK PASOK PASOK
Italy Yes DS + PPI + RI + DS + PPI + RI + PDCI + DS + PPI + RI + PDCI + FI + AN + LN + CCD FI + AN + LN +
UDR + PDCI + F V + FV + D + Udeur FV + D + Udeur + SDI + CDU CCD + CDU
SDI
Ireland Yes FF + PD FF + PD FF + PD FF + PD FF+PD
Luxembourg No CSV + LSAP CSV + DP CSV + DP CSV + DP CSV + DP
Netherlands No PvdA + VVD + D66 PvdA + W D  + D66 PvdA + VVD + D66 PvdA + VVD + D66 CDA + W D  + LPF
Portugal Yes PS PS PS PS PSD + CDS-PP
Spain Yes PP PP PP PP PP
Sweden No SAP SAP SAP SAP SAP
UK Yes LP LP LP LP LP
Austria SPO: Social Democratic Party of Austria; OVP: Austrian People's Party; FPO: Freedom Party of Austia
Belgium Agalev: (Flemish) ecologists; CVP: (Flemish) Christian People's Party; Ecolo: (Walloon) ecologists; FDF: (Brussells) Democratic Front o f Francophones; PRL: (Walloon) Liberal Reformist 
Party; PS: (Walloon) Socialist Party; SP: (Flemish) Socialist Party (from 2001, SP.A); VLD: Flemish Liberals and Democrats;
Denmark KF: Conservative People's Party; V: Venstre, "Left", or Liberal Party; RV: Radical (Left-Social) Liberal Party; SD: Social Democracy in Denmark;
Germany SPD: Social Democratic Party; Die Griinen: The Greens
Finland KOK: national Coalition Party; SDP: Finnish Social Democratic Party; SFP: Swedish People's Party in Finland; VAS: Left-Wing Alliance; VIHR: Green League
France PS: Socialist Party, UDF: Union for the French Democracy (confederation to 1998; then single party); RPR: Rally for the Republic (disbanded 21 Sep 2002); PCF: French Communist Party; 
PRS: Radical Socialist Party (then PRG); PRG: Radical Party o f the Left; MDC: Citizens Movement; DL: Liberal Democracy; les Verts: The Greens;
Greece PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
Ireland FF: Fianna Fail; PD: Progressive Democrats;
Italy DC: Christian Democracy; FI: Forward (Forza) Italy; LN: Northern League; AN: National Alliance; CCD: Christian Democratic Center, CDU: United Christian Democrats; PPI: Italian People's 
Party; RI: Italian Renewal; UDR: Democratic Union for the Republic; FV: Federation of Greens; PDCI: Party of the Italian Communists; SDI: Italian Democratic Socialists; Udeur Union of the 
Democratic European Reformers;
Luxembourg CSV: Christian Social People's Party; LSAP: Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party; DP: Democratic Party
Netherlands CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; PvdA: Labour Party; W D : People's Party for Freedom and Democracy; D66: Democrats 66; LPF: List Pim Fortuyn Portugal PSD: Social
Democratic Pary; PS: Socialist Party; CDS-PP: Social Democratic Center-Popular Party
Spain PP: Partido Popular
Sweden SAP: Social Democratic Labour Party
United Kingdom LP: Labour Party
Source: http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00europa.htm
83
Control variables
Since the theory is tested both as a complete and as a partial data generating mechanism, it is 
necessary to include some control variables. The control variables are introduced either to control 
for empirical irregularities, alternative explanations, or for statistical reasons. This section 
presents control variables of the two former types. The latter type is discussed in the relevant 
sections of subsequent chapters when the statistical technique is presented.
Some of the control variables are common for all empirical chapters. These are, amongst others, 
the dummy variables for the different party-groups. The biggest party group, the EPP, is the 
reference category. It is well known that committee chairs are over-represented as rapporteur and 
that the type of reports they write might be systematically different from the reports written by 
other MEPs. To control for this a dummy variable, chair, is included. It takes the value 1 if the 
rapporteur is the committee chair in the relevant committee at the time and 0 if not. This variable 
is used in chapter 5, where the dependent variable is at the individual MEP level. In chapter 4, the 
dependent variable is number of reports per party, per year. A continuous variable, chairman, 
captures the number of reports written by a committee chair from a party a particular year.
To control for the experience of the rapporteur, a continuous variable, experience, captures the 
number of Codecision reports written by an MEP under the Amsterdam version of the Codecision 
procedure. A dummy variable, incumbent, captures the effect of being familiar with the system 
through long service in the EP. It takes the value 1 if an MEP was a member of the fourth EP, 0 if 
not. It is conceivable that actors in the EP have changed their behaviour as they have updated 
their information about how the new version of the Codecision procedure works (Shackleton and
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Raunio 2003). A variable to capture the general trend in behaviour of the actors in the EP 
regardless of the position of their party in national politics called trend is introduced to control 
for this development.
The difference in interest in EP activities is captured in a continuous variable measuring the 
average level of attendance in plenary sessions of the national delegations to the different party 
groups. It is conceivable that some MEPs frequently sign the attendance registry for purely 
financial reasons, without being active in the EP. Member of the European Parliament might also 
have other commitments on their time, preventing them from attending the plenary sessions as 
often as they would like. These other commitments and financial considerations may or may not 
differ systematically between different party delegations. Nevertheless, the attendance record in 
the plenary sessions is the most straightforward way to measure general interest in the EP’s 
activities. As the average level of attendance is measure at party delegation level, individual 
differences should only marginally influence the score on the variable. In lack of a better, more 
accurate measure of MEP’s interest in EP activities, attendance in plenary sessions is used (e.g. 
Kirchner 1984; Mamadouh and Raunio 2001; Scully 1997c). When this variable is used, it is 
labelled attendance. The data for this variable is taken from www.europarliament.net.
To control for the effect of the number of MEPs per party, a variable, party size, is calculated 
using data from Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton (2000). Similarly, to control for the effect of 
MEPs per member state, a variable, countrysize, is calculated using official data. Nominate scores 
on the first dimension calculated by Hix, Noury and Roland (2004) is used to measure the 
relative location of MEPs and their national parties on the primary dimension in the EP. The 
location of MEPs and parties might vary over time but it is unlikely that it would significantly
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change the results as the data on voting behaviour only cover the first one and a half years of the 
fifth EP. Furthermore, the nominate scores are used only as a proxy for the location on the left 
right scale, either on individual MEP level or averaged at party level. The variable is labelled 
nominate. The variable absolute is the absolute value of the nominate score, either at party level 
(chapter 4) or at individual level (chapter 5), measuring the distance from the MEPs or their 
parties to the centre in the EP on the first dimension.
To control for attitudes towards European integration, data from the expert survey conducted by 
Marks and Steenbergen (2004) is used. The dataset includes five relevant variables, position, 
future, salience, dissent and EP. Unfortunately, this data set does not include information about 
parties from Luxembourg. Hence, Luxembourg is excluded from the statistical analysis in the 
subsequent chapters.
Position aims to capture the party’s overall orientation of the party leadership towards European 
integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favour. A score of 5 
would suggest that the party is neutral on the issue of European integration. Future is the party’s 
stance of a on the future of European integration. The scale is from 1 to 5; where 1 means that the 
party thinks that unification has gone too far, while 5 means that the party thinks that unification 
should be pushed much further.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics, allocation of Codecision reports
Variable Description of variable Obs Mean St.D. Min Max
Reports Number of reports written by a party during a particular year 530 .704 1.569 0 11
Adgov Adgov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial national 
politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0
530 .145 .353 0 1
Nongov Nongov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non-adversarial 
national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.
530 .170 .376 0 1
nonopp Nonopp takes the value 1 if a party sits in opposition in a member state with non-adversarial 
national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.
530 .245 .431 0 1
Chairman Number of Codecision reports written by committee chairs belonging to the party 530 .089 .585 0 10
Position Position aims to capture die party’s overall orientation of the party leadership towards European 
integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favour.
530 4.962 1.836 1 7
Salience Salience is the relative importance of this issue in the party’s public stance. A score of 1 means that 
the party does not think that European integration is important while a score of 7 means that it is 
the most important issue for the party.
530 3.042 .558 1.5 4
Dissent Dissent is am measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration on a scale from 
1 to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the party activists oppose the 
position of the leadership.
530 1.753 .555 1 3.56
Ep The scale is 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the powers of the 
EP, while 7 suggests that the party is strongly in favour
530 4.912 1.346 1 7
Absolute National party location from die median voter on the left-right dimension. The higher die value, the 
further away from the median voter.
530 .406 .292 .005 .899
Partysize Number of MEPs in the national party delegation 530 5.670 7.397 1 43
Attendance Average attendance in plenary sessions, coded at national party-group delegation 530 82.613 8.196 60 97
countiysize Number of MEPs from the same country 530 50.538 31.663 15 99
Eldr Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of ELDR, 0 if not 530 .170 .376 0 1
Green Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of The Greens, 0 if not 530 .132 .339 0 1
Pes Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of PES, 0 if not 530 .160 .367 0 1
Small Takes the value 1 if the party was a from a small party group, 0 if not 530 .283 .451 0 1
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Table 33 Descriptive statistics, stage in the procedure legislation is adopted
Variable Explanation Obs Mean St. D. Min Max
reading The stage in the procedure when the legislation was adopted, 1 = Coucnil 15t reading, 2= EP second 
reading, 3= Council second reading and 4= Conciliation committee
254 2.240 1.108 1 4
Adgov Adgov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial national 
politic system at die start of a given year, otherwise 0
254 0.319 0.467 0 1
nongov Nongov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non-adversarial national 
politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.
254 0.118 0.323 0 1
experience Number of Codecision reports already written in the fifth EP 254 0.713 1.149 0 6
Absolute National party location from the median voter on the left-right dimension. The higher the value, the 
further away from the median voter.
254 0.417 0.246 .004 .874
Chair Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the rapporteur is a committee chair, 0 otherwise 254 0.087 0.282 0 1
incumbent Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the rapporteur was a member of the 4th EP 251 0.454 0.499 0 1
position Position aims to capture the overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration 
on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favour.
254 5.605 1.491 1.33 7
salience Salience is the relative importance of this issue in the party’s public stance. A score of 1 means that 
the party does not think that European integration is important while a score of 7 means that it is the 
most important issue for the party.
254 3.318 0.487 2.33 4
dissent Dissent is am measure of die internal dissent in the party over European integration on a scale from 1 
to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the party activists oppose the 
position of the leadership.
254 1.911 0.593 1 3.56
Ep The scale is 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the powers of the EP, 
while 7 suggests that the party is strongly in favour
254 5.329 1.151 1.71 6.79
countrysize Number of MEPs from die same country 254 64.921 31.433 15 99
partysize Number of MEPs in the national party delegation 254 17.972 13.948 1 43
attendance Average attendance in plenary sessions, coded at national party-group delegation 254 84.055 7.020 60 96
Eldr Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of ELDR, 0 if not 254 0.110 0.314 0 1
Green Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of The Greens, 0 if not 254 0.441 0.497 0 1
Pes Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of PES, 0 if not 254 0.083 0.276 0 1
Small Takes the value 1 if the party was a from a small party group, 0 if not 254 0.280 0.450 0 1
y99 Takes the value 1 if the report was initiated in 1999,0 if not 254 0.169 0.376 0 1
yOl Takes the value 1 if the report was initiated in 2001,0 if not 254 0.240 0.428 0 1
y02 Takes the value 1 if the report was initiated in 2002,0 if not 254 0.181 0.386 0 1
y03 Takes the value 1 if the report was initiated in 2003,0 if not 254 0.142 0.349 0 1
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Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics second reading Codecision votes, non-voting excluded
Variable Description o f variable Obs Mean St.D. Min Max
Decision Take the value 1 if the MEP voted in favour, 0 if he voted no or abstained 87817 0.521 .500 0 1
Adgov Adgov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial 
national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0
87817 0.309 .462 0 1
Nongov Nongov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non- 
adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.
87817 0.114 .318 0 1
Nonopp Nonopp takes the value 1 if a party sits in opposition in a member state with non- 
adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.
87817 0.111 .314 0 1
Position Position aims to capture the party’s overall orientation of the party leadership towards 
European integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in 
favour.
87817 5.381 1.697 1 7
Salience Salience is the relative importance of this issue in the party’s public stance. A score of 1 
means that the party does not think that European integration is important while a score 
of 7 means that it is the most important issue for the party.
87817 3.278 .526 1.5 4
Dissent Dissent is am measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration on a 
scale from 1 to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the 
party activists oppose the position of the leadership.
87817 1.886 .563 1 3.56
Ep The scale is 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the powers 
of the EP, while 7 suggests that the party is strongly in favour
87817 5.094 1.282 1 7
Nominate National party location in the left-right policy-space. The scale is from -1 to 1, where -1 
is extreme leftwing while 1 is the extreme rightwing score
87817 -0.010 .474 -.899 .821
Party size Number of MEPs in the national party delegation 87817 15.566 13.175 1 43
attendance Average attendance in plenary sessions, coded at national party-group delegation 87817 82.943 7.016 60 97
countrysize Number of MEPs from the same country 87817 65.588 31.248 15 99
Edd Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of EDD, 0 if not 87817 0.016 .124 0 1
Eldr Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of ELDR, 0 if not 87817 0.094 .291 0 1
Green Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of The Greens, 0 if not 87817 0.066 .248 0 1
Gue Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of GUE, 0 if not 87817 0.064 .245 0 1
Non Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a non-attached member, 0 if not 87817 0.049 .215 0 1
Pes Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of PES, 0 if not 87817 0.302 .459 0 1
Uen Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of UEN, 0 if not 87817 0.035 .184 0 1
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Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics second reading Codecision votes, all voting decisions
Variable Description of variable Obs Mean St.D. Min Max
Allneg Take the value 1 if the MEP voted in favour, 0 if he voted no or abstained,, present 
but did not vote or was absent
97644 .493 .500 0 1
Adgov Adgov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with 
adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0
97644 .309 .462 0 1
Nongov Nongov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non- 
adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.
97644 .109 .311 0 1
Nonopp Nonopp takes the value 1 if a party sits in opposition in a member state with non- 
adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.
97644 .107 .310 0 1
Position Position aims to capture the party’s overall orientation of the party leadership 
towards European integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is 
strongly in favour.
97644 5.337 1.725 1 7
Salience Salience is the relative importance of this issue in the party’s public stance. A score 
of 1 means that the party does not think that European integration is important while 
a score of 7 means that it is the most important issue for the party.
97644 3.272 .534 1.5 4
Dissent Dissent is am measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration 
on a scale from 1 to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of 
the party activists oppose the position of the leadership.
97644 1.876 .562 1 3.56
Ep The scale is 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the 
powers of the EP, while 7 suggests that the party is strongly in favour
97644 5.063 1.296 1 7
Nominate National party location in the left-right policy-space. The scale is from -1 to 1, where 
-1 is extreme leftwing while 1 is the extreme rightwing score
97644 -.009 .472 -.899 .821
Partysize Number of MEPs in the national party delegation 97644 15.370 13.069 1 43
attendance Average attendance in plenary sessions, coded at national party-group delegation 97644 82.681 7.149 60 97
countrysize Number of MEPs from the same country 97644 66.069 31.021 15 99
Edd Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of EDD, 0 if not 97644 .022 .148 0 1
Eldr Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of ELDR, 0 if not 97644 .090 .286 0 1
Green Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of The Greens, 0 if not 97644 .063 .243 0 1
Gue Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of GUE, 0 if not 97644 .065 .246 0 1
Non Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a non-attached member, 0 if not 97644 .055 .228 0 1
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Salience is the relative importance of this issue in the party’s public stance. The scale is 1 to 7. A 
score of 1 means that the party does not think that European integration is important while a 
score of 7 means that it is the most important issue for the party. Dissent is a measure of the 
internal dissent in the party over European integration. The scale goes from 1 to 5. 1 represents 
complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the party activists oppose the position of the 
leadership. EP is the position of the party leadership on strengthening the powers of the European 
Parliament. The scale is 1 to 8, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the 
powers of the EP, while 7 suggests that the party strongly favours expanding the powers of the 
EP. A value of 8 would indicate that the party has yet to take a position regarding the role of the 
EP in EU decision-making. None of the parties included in this study were coded yet to take a 
position. Hence, the scale in this sample goes from 1 to 7. Table 3.2, 3.3,3.4 and 3.5 present the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent independent and control variables.
The correlation between the two variables taken from the Marks and Steenbergen (2004), 
position and future is high. The correlation is .96 in the allocation of reports dataset and .94 in the 
dataset looking at which stage Codecision legislation is adopted. This seems to suggest that the 
two variables are measuring the same phenomena. The correlation between future and ep is also 
quite high, .82 or higher. The correlation between position and ep is slightly lower, between .77 
and .81. It is not surprising that these two variables are correlated as further integration usually 
means giving more power, or powers in new areas to supranational actors like the Commission, 
the European Court of Justice and the EP (Pollack 2003; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). It is 
nevertheless high. In order to limit the multicolinearity problem the variable future is not used in 
the further statistical analysis. However, as some multicolinerarity problems are associated with 
the variables position and ep are still present, the coefficients and the standard error of these two
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variables need to be interpreted carefully. There does not seem to any other problems of 
multicolinearity. We nevertheless note that the correlation between number of reports and size of 
national party is over .7, and between number of reports and committee chair is over .5.
In the dataset related to the stage in the Codecision procedure legislation is adopted there is a 
negative correlation between reading and trend of .29. More recently initiated legislation seems to 
be agreed at an earlier stage. This is in line with the report from practitioners who pointed to an 
inter-institutional understanding of the need to complete legislation before the 10 new member 
states form Eastern and Southern Europe joined in May 2004 (Dimitrakopoulos, Cedershild, and 
Imbeni 2004). It is also a function of the cut-off point. Legislation initiated in 2003 and 2002 are 
more likely to be included if it terminated early, rather than if it ended up in the Conciliation 
Committee. Correlation tables can be found in Appendix HI.
Summary
This chapter has presented the dataset that will be used to test the theory. The theory is tested on 
a large dataset containing all Codecision reports issued (and, for hypothesis 2, completed) during 
the fifth European Parliament, 1999-2004. The data of second reading votes includes all relevant 
roll calls in the period from July 1999 to end of December 2000. Table 3.6 summarise the 
expected findings.
In chapter 4, the expected finding is that governing parties from adversarial member states write 
more Codecision reports than other parties. In chapter 5, it is expected that the result will show 
that Codecision legislation written by rapporteurs from governing parties from adversarial 
member states are more likely to be accepted in the first reading in the Council than legislation
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written by rapporteurs from opposition parties or governing parties from non-adversarial member 
states. Finally, the evidence presented in chapter 6 is expected to show that governing parties will 
be more likely than opposition parties to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The 
predictions of the control variables are derived from the literature or implications from the theory, 
following King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994) advice to create as many observable implications 
of the theory as possible.
This chapter completes the first part of the thesis. In the second part, the hypotheses are tested on 
the data just described. The three empirical chapters have the same structure. A focused literature 
review presents alternative explanations. A bivariate analysis follows. Then the relevant 
statistical model is presented with the predicted directions of relevant variables offering a test of 
the hypothesis. The results are then discussed.
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Table 3.6 Summary of predictions
Variable Chapter 4 reports Chapter 5 agreement Chapter 6 voting
name
Adgov Positive (theory) 1st reading positive (theory) Positive (theory)
Nongov Not significant Not significant Not significant
position Positive (existing 
literature)
1st reading negative 
2nd reading EP positive 
Conciliation positive 
(existing literature)
Positive (existing literature)
salience Positive (existing 
literature)
1st reading negative (existing 
literature)
Positive (existing literature)
dissent Both ways (existing 
literature)
Both ways (existing literature) Positive (existing literature)
ep Positive (existing 
literature)
1st reading negative 
2nd reading EP positive 
(Existing literature)
Positive (existing literature)
Absolute Negative (theory) 1st reading positive (theory)
nominate
nominate Negative (theory)
partysize Positive (existing 
literature)
1st reading positive 
2nd reading EP negative 
Conciliation committee positive 
(existing literature)
Positive (existing literature)
attendance Positive (existing 
literature)
1st reading positive 
2nd reading EP negative 
Conciliation committee positive 
(existing literature)
Positive (existing literature)
countrysize Positive (existing 
literature)
1st reading positive 
2nd reading EP negative 
Conciliation committee positive 
(existing literature)
Positive (existing literature)
Chair 1st reading positive 
2nd reading positive 
(existing literature)
Chairman Positive (existing
literature)
2nd reading Council negative 
Conciliation committee negative 
(theory)
Experience
Incumbent No effect (existing literature)
PES Positive (theory) 1st reading positive (theory), 1st 
reading negative (existing literature)
Positive (theory)
ELDR Negative (existing 
literature)
1st reading negative (existing 
literature)
Green Negative (existing 
literature)
1st reading negative (existing 
literature) 2nd reading Council 
negative (theory)
Small party Negative (existing 1st reading negative (existing Negative (theory)
groups literature) literature)
2nd reading Council negative (theory)
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PART II
Chapter 4: Governing parties write more Codecision reports
The EP organises its legislative activities through a committee system (Bowler and Farrell 1995). 
At the committee stage, responsibilities for Commission initiatives are delegated to individual 
MEPs, who are responsible for producing reports. The reports form the basis for deliberation, 
both in the committee and in the plenary session. Therefore, a MEP who is responsible for 
writing a report, a rapporteur, has agenda-setting power inside the European Parliament. He can 
propose his preferred policy amongst those acceptable to a majority inside the Parliament 
(Tsebelis 1995). In order to see his proposal being adopted, he needs to make it acceptable to a 
qualified majority of the Council. A rapporteur has the possibility to choose the dimensions on 
which the policy is evaluated. He can either choose to focus on amendments regarding the 
institutional balance, in which case the EP might be more easily able to unite against the Council, 
or he can chose to focus on left-right issues, where the divisions inside the Parliament may be 
more apparent. It is hence essential to understand how reports are allocated in the European 
Parliament. This allocation is the focus in this chapter.
The theory presented in chapter two suggests systematic differences in the number of Codecision 
reports parties write. It predicts that governing parties from adversarial member states will write 
more reports than other parties. This prediction is tested on a dataset of all Codecision reports 
initiated by the Commission under the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure until the 
end of the fifth Parliament in May 2004. The results support the theoretical predictions. 
Significant differences only seem to exist between government and opposition parties from 
adversarial member states. Governing parties from adversarial member states write more 
codecision reports than opposition parties from these states. The results disconfirm the suggestion
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that the party groups are powerful in the allocation of reports, at least in terms of the number of 
reports distributed amongst different party groups. The correlation between party group size and 
number of reports disappears once the size of national parties is controlled for. Parties more 
concerned with European integration write more Codecision reports than parties that do not find 
“Europe” salient.
To investigate how Codecision reports are allocated amongst parties in the European Parliament 
section one provides a review of the existing literature. It shows that the tendency has been to 
focus mainly on the size of party group and national delegations. Section 2 presents a bivariate 
analysis of the allocation of Codecision reports between governing and opposition parties.
Section 3 presents the statistical technique and the relevant variables for testing hypothesis one. 
Section 4 discusses the results.
Existing Research on the Allocation of Reports in the European 
Parliament
‘The choice of rapporteurs and draftsmen is normally decided upon within individual committees by a system whose 
broad lines are common to all committees. Each Political Group receives a quota of points according to its size. 
Reports and opinions to be distributed are then discussed by the committee coordinators who decide on the number 
of points each subject is worth, and then make bids on behalf of their Group, the strength of their claim being based 
in theory (but not always in practice) on the relationship between the number of points already used by the Group 
and their original quota.’(Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000:117)
Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton highlight two aspects. First, groups not particularly interested in a 
report may attempt to make other groups pay more for it by raising the bid. Second, it may be 
advantageous to submit the name of their rapporteur, if he or she is considered an expert in the
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area, in particular if the issue at hand is of a highly technical nature. Nevertheless, they point out 
the informality of the system and that trades between groups are common (Corbett, Jacobs, and 
Shackleton 2000:117-8). A potential problem with their descriptive account of the allocation of 
reports is that it does not address how reports are allocated amongst the national party delegations 
within the different party groups once the coordinator has secured the report for his party group. 
Kreppel addresses this aspect:
‘ [bjecause of the need to cater to national diversity as well as ideological affiliation, the general pattern within the EP 
has been to distribute positions pro-portionally first to the party group (ideology), which then go through a similar 
process internally on the basis of nationality. Thus, after a group is allocated its share of key positions (committee 
chairs etc.) it must then distribute these proportionally amongst its own membership on the basis of the various 
national delegations within the group’ (Kreppel 2002: 190).
She shows that within the party group, there is no relationship between voting behaviour and the 
number of reports allocated to a particular member of the party group. Those who receive an 
unusually high number of Codecision or Cooperation reports are not more supportive of the 
party-group position than other MEPs. She argues that this is because the party group leadership 
does not have any power inside the group. The power is in the hands of the national delegations, 
in particular the larger ones (Kreppel 2002:202-6). However, since she only focuses on the two 
biggest party groups, it remains questionable to what extent her results are generalisable to the 
whole population of parties in the EP.
Mamadouh and Raunio (2001; 2003) test the relationship between size of party group and 
national delegation and the allocation of reports. In their studies, they investigate the allocation of
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all reports in the third and fourth parliament. They find that the numbers of allocated reports is 
highly correlated both with the size of party groups and with size of national delegations. They 
also find big differences amongst individual MEPs. They suggest that these differences might be 
cultural or related to particularities of different national political systems, e.g. language skills or 
double mandates. Studying allocation of reports in the environmental committee 1995-99, 
Reading (2004) finds that the group of rapporteurs does not mirror the composition of the full 
plenary.
A problem with these studies is that they fail to distinguish between different types of reports. 
Being a rapporteur on a Codecision report gives the MEP far more potential influence than if he 
is responsible for an own initiative report or a consultation report. A second problem is that they 
do not control for potential omitted variables. By not controlling for other variables than size of 
party group and national delegations, factors like attitudes towards further integration and 
location on the left - right policy spectrum might be ignored. A third problem, which is common 
in all of these accounts, is the one-sided focus on the supply side, assuming that all parties and 
MEPs are equally interested in writing reports. Hall (1996) shows that this is not the case in the 
US Congress, where only a small number of actors are interested in any one piece of legislation. 
There is no reason why this may not be the case in the European Parliament. Indeed, Euro- 
sceptics are in general less interested in taking on committee work. Medium size party groups 
like the Greens chose their report with care. In only a limited number of policy areas are they 
likely to find a majority in the EP somewhat sympathetic to their views, making it worthwhile to 
attempt to obtain the right to write a report on the issue (Benedetto forthcoming). Whitaker 
(2001) hints of a possible difference between parties on the basis of whether or not they belong to 
the government or the opposition at the national scene.
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Bivariate analysis
The data used in this chapter are described in chapter 3. The dependent variable is number of 
Codecision reports allocated to a national party per year during the period 1999-2003. Table 4.1 
presents the distribution according to governing status and national political system.
Table 4.1 Number of Codecision reports per year per party by governing status
Number of parties 
writing codecision 
reports in a 
particular year*
Governing 
parties from 
adversary states
Governing parties 
from non- 
adversarial states
Opposition
from
adversarial
states
Opposition 
from non- 
adversarial 
states
Total
0 40 56 176 89 361
1 15 (15) 25 (25) 25 (25) 30 (30) 95 (95)
2 7 (14) 5 (10) 12 (24) 8 (16) 32 (64)
3 1 (3) 4 (12) 5 (15) 3 (9) 13 (39)
4 3 (12) 0 6 (24) 0 9 (36)
5 3 (15) 0 1 (5) 0 4 (20)
6 3 (IB) 0 2 (12) 0 5 (30)
7 0 0 3 (21) 0 3 (21)
8 1 (8) 0 1 (8) 0 2 (16)
9 1 (9) 0 1 (9) 0 2 (18)
11 2 (22) 0 1 (11) 0 3 (33)
Ratio: Parties 
writing reports to 
parties not writing 
reports
.900 .607 .324 .427 .465
Total number parties 
writing reports (total 
number reports in 
brackets)
36 (116) 34 (47) 57 (154) 41 (55) 168
(372)
* Total number of reports written by parties in brackets, e.g. 7 parties wrote 2 reports, in total 14 reports.
From this table we see that most parties are not allocated one or more new Codecision report 
every year. The total number o f report to non-report observations was 168 to 361, a ratio of .465. 
Amongst the governing parties from adversarial member states, this was the case in 40 of the 
observations, compared to 36 times when this was not the case. Thus, almost half o f the 
governing parties from adversarial member states were allocated at least one Codecision report
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per year, a ratio of reports to non-reports of .9. This is the best ratio for any of the different 
groups. Opposition parties from adversarial member states were only allocated one or more 
reports in 57 out of 176 incidences. This corresponds to a ratio of less than one in three. The 
difference between governing and opposition parties is smaller in non-adversarial states. The 
ratio for governing parties from non-adversarial member states is 34 non-zero observations and 
56 zero observations, or just over .6. Opposition parties from these countries were observed not 
to receive any Codecision reports 89 times, while receiving at least one 38 times, a ratio of .427.
It might be useful to compare the total number of reports written in the time-period by governing 
and opposition parties in different systems and different party groups. By calculating the total 
number of reports by governing status, we then find that governing parties from adversarial 
member states wrote 116 reports while opposition parties from adversarial states wrote 154. 
Opposition parties from non-adversarial member states wrote more report than governing parties 
from these countries, 55 versus 47.
It is useful to consider the relationship between party groups and number of reports, as it has been 
so dominant in the literature on rapporteurships. Table 4.2 presents the allocation of Codecision 
reports by year to the different party groups.
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Table 4.2 Number of Codecision reports per year per party by party group
Number of parties PES EPP ELDR Green GUE UEN EDD Non Total
writing codecision
reports*
0 43 84 62 49 47 24 18 34 361
1 18(18) 20 (20) 17(17) 18(18) 11(11) 1(1) 6(6) 4(4) 95 (95)
2 8(16) 13(26) 6(12) 2(4) 2(4) 0 1(2) 0 32 (64)
3 4(12) 2(6) 5(10) 1(3) 0 0 0 1(3) 13 (39)
4 6(24) 2(8) 0 0 0 0 0 1(4) 9(36)
5 2(10) 2(10) 0 0 0 0 0 0 4(20)
6 2(12) 3(18) 0 0 0 0 0 0 5(30)
7 0 3(21) 0 0 0 0 0 0 3(21)
8 0 2(16) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2(16)
9 1(9) 1(9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2(18)
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3(33)
Ratio: Parties .953 .607 .452 .429 .277 .042 .389 .176 .465
writing reports to
parties not writing
reports
Total number of 41 51 26 (44) (21)25 13(15) K D 7(8) 6 168
parties writing (101) (167) (11) (372)
reports, total
number of reports
in brackets
* Total number of reports written by parties in brackets, e.g. 8 parties wrote 2 reports, in total 16 reports.
The table shows that socialist parties are almost as often engaged as rapporteurs in any given year 
as not. The ratio of parties writing report to not writing is .953. This is a much larger proportion 
than the EPP where .6 of all national parties wrote one or more Codecision reports. The liberals 
and greens both have a ratio of just over .4, while the smaller party groups all have a ratio 
under .4, with the rightwing UEN hardly writing Codecision report at all. These figures seem to 
suggest that the coalition between governing parties from adversarial member states and socialist 
parties are most active as Codecision rapporteurs, thereby supporting the theory.
PES wrote 101 reports, EPP 167, ELDR 44 and the Greens 25. GUE wrote 15 reports, UEN 1, 
EDD 8, and the non-attached MEPs wrote 11 Codecision reports. On the one hand, the bivariate 
analysis supports the theory as more o f the governing parties and their ideological close allies
102
tend to have more of their parities active through rapporteurships. On the other hand, opposition 
parties from adversarial member states and the EPP seem to write more Codecision reports 
overall. This latter finding might be a function of the fact that the EPP was the biggest party 
group in the fifth Parliament and that opposition parties from adversarial member states 
controlled more seats in the EP than governing parties. This gives the EPP and opposition parties 
more points to spend on Codecision reports. In order to control for party size and other possible 
intervening factors, the next section presents the statistical model and data used to test the 
hypothesis. ^
Operationalistion
Statistical method
Since it is the number of reports, rather than just whether a party wrote a report in the period that 
is of substantial interest, it is neither possible nor desirable to use a logistic regression model. Nor 
is it advisable to use an ordinary least square regression as it treats the count outcome as a 
continuous variable. This may lead to inefficient, inconsistent and biased results (Agresti and 
Finlay 1997; King 1988; Long 1997). The standard model for count data is the Poisson regression 
model. Here ‘the probability of a count is determined by a Poisson distribution, where the mean 
of the distribution is a function of the independent variables. This model has the defining 
characteristic that the conditional mean of the outcome is equal to the conditional variance’
(Long 1997: 217-8). Long notes that this might not always be the case in practice as the 
conditional variance often exceed the mean. The assumption can be relaxed through a binominal 
negative regression model, which allows for greater variance in the conditional variance. 
However, in the dataset used here, described in chapter 3, the dependent variable is not number of 
counts, but number of counts per year. It is time-series count data. It is also-cross section as the
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interest is not in difference between different years, but between parties with different 
characteristics observed over several years. Hence, the suitable model is a longitudinal count 
model. Cameron and Trivedi (1998: 275-93) present the count versions of two commonly used
<T
models for longitudinal data. The conditional maximum likelihood approach, commonly known 
as a fixed effect model only provides estimates of time-varying regressors. The random effect 
model, on the other hand, implies that individual unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the 
observed effect. If not, the random effect estimator will be inconsistent. Cameron and Trivedi 
(1998: 291) advise us that ‘[t]he random effect model is appropriate if the sample is drawn from a 
population and one wants to do inference on the population; the fixed effects model is appropriate 
if one wishes to confine oneself to explaining the sample’. The results from both fixed and 
random effect models are reported. In order to control for possible heterogeneity, and to comply 
with the norm in the literature on count models, negative binomial models are also fitted and 
reported. However, given that longitudinal data methods control for heterogeneity, the difference 
between negative binomial and Poisson models should be minor. Thus five models are fitted; a 
simple Poisson regression model, and fixed and random effect longitudinal versions of the 
Poisson and negative binomial models. The structural model of the Poisson regression is:
Pr(yi | Xi) = exp (-pO p^) / yd
Where p = exp (xp), xp is a vector of all the independent variables x, times their effect p. In the 
negative binomial model p is replaced with a random variable p~, where 
p~ = exp (xip + e i). Then p is the observed heterogeneity, different values of x give different p, 
but p is the same for all cases with identical x. Variation in p~ is due to both variation in x and 
unobserved heterogeneity e. Thus, for any value of the independent variables there is a
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distribution of jx~ not a single p. The variation is a function of both p and 5. As 8 is unknown, we 
need to compute the distribution of y given only x. Hence Pr (y | x ) is computed by averaging Pr 
(y| Xi 8i) by the probability of the different values of 8. Hence, the model is specified as:
Pr(y, | *,) = J o ”  [Pr(yi | *,&) * g(5i)] d &
The longitudinal models are somewhat more complex, but the insight is to add a time-period 
parameter to the models, either holding variance between individuals with the same value of x 
constant, as in the fixed effect, or allowing it to vary as in the random effect specification. The 
interested reader can consult Cameron and Trivedi (1998: 279-92).
Variables
The dependent variable is the number of Codecision reports per national party, per year. The 
descriptive statistics and information regarding the collection of the data, both for the dependent 
and the independent variables can be found in chapter 3.
The dichotomous variable adgov, takes the value 1 if the party sat in a national government in an 
adversarial member state in the beginning of the year of the initiation of the report. The 
theoretical expectation is that the coefficient of the variable will be positive. The dichotomous 
variable nongov is the equivalent for governing parties from non-adversarial member states. The 
dichotomous variable nonopp takes the value 1 for opposition parties from non-adversarial 
member states. It takes the value 0 for other parties. The reference category is opposition parties 
from adversarial member states.
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The continuous variable chair captures the number of reports written by a committee chair from 
the party. The expectation from the literature is that the direction of the effect will be positive, the 
higher the number of reports written by a chairperson, the more reports the party writes in total.
The continuous variable position captures the attitude of the party towards European integration. 
A high score indicates a favourable position toward European integration. A low score indicates 
Euro-scepticism. The existing literature expects the sign of this variable will be positive.
The continuous variable salience indicates how salient the issue of European integration is for the 
party. This variable is also predicted to have a positive effect on the number of reports.
Dissent is a continuous variable that indicates the degree of conflict within the party of EU 
integration. A higher score means more dissent. There is no clear prediction in the existing 
literature.
The variable ep is also continuous. It captures the party’s attitude towards strengthening the 
powers of the EP. A high score means in favour, a low score means that the party is opposed to 
strengthening the powers of the EP. The expected effect of this variable is also positive.
Absolute is the absolute value of the nominate score of the MEPs in the party on the dominant 
division of conflict in the EP, normally understood as the left-right dimension (Hix 2001; Hix and 
Lord 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2003). The absolute value hence indicates distance from the 
centre. The expected sign is negative. The existing literature would suggest that parties further 
away from the centre would write fewer reports than parties more centrally located would.
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The continuous variable party size measures the number of MEPs from the party. It is expected to 
be positive. More members lead to more reports.
Attendance is also continuous variable. It estimates the effect of the national party delegation 
attendance in plenary sessions on the number of Codecision reports the party writes. The effect is 
expected to be positive. Unfortunately, the attendance scores are not easily available on national 
party level; so data on national party group delegations is used. These only differ in cases where 
two or more parties from a particular country sit in the same party group. The continuous variable 
countrysize captures the number of MEPs from the same country as the party in question. Again, 
the literature suggests a positive effect.
A categorical variable for party groups is also included. In this variable, the smaller, less centrally 
located, party groups and the non-attached are merged into one category, small, while PES,
ELDR and Greens have separate categories. The biggest party group EPP is the reference 
category. The theory expects socialist parties to write more reports than parties in the EPP of the 
same size. The existing literature expects all smaller party groups to write fewer Codecision 
reports than the two big party groups, even after controlling for size of national parties. For every 
model, two alternative specifications are fitted. In one of the specifications, only the variables in 
the theory are included. This provides a test of the relative merit of the model as a complete data 
generating process. In the other specification, the control variables, mainly derived from the 
existing literature, are included, providing a test of the model as a partial data generating process 
(Morton 1999).
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Results
The overall fit of the Poisson version of model 2, the partial data-generating process, is good. The 
pseudo R2 is .368. The reduction in the log-likelihood score by moving from a simple Poisson 
regression to cross sectional time series models (fixed and random effect Poisson and negative 
binominal) is not massive, between 5 and 35, while massively increasing the degrees of freedoms. 
The magnitude of the individual variables does not change a lot either, nor the statistical 
significance, with the exception of EP. The correlation between the predicted values using 
Poisson regression and the actual number of reports is .741, and highly significant beyond 
the .0001 level.
The results are reported in table 4.3.First, there is an effect of being a governing party from an 
adversarial member state is positive and significant across all specifications of the model. This is 
clear evidence in favour of the theory. The results hold for the model as both a complete (model 
1) as well as a partial data generating process (model 2).
The statistical results support hypothesis one. Governing parties write more Codecision reports 
than opposition parties. However, this only holds for governing parties from adversarial member 
states. Being a governing party, rather than an opposition party, increases the probability of 
writing one or more reports in any given year. The effect is shown in figure 4.1, which provides a 
kernel density plot of the fitted probabilities for all parties, using the results of the Poisson 
version of model 2. A kernel density plot is a smoothed histogram, indicated the relative 
frequencies of the different predicted probabilities amongst observations in the different 
categories. The figure compares governing parties from adversarial member states with all other
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parties. We see that the probability of writing zero reports is higher for opposition parties and 
governing parties from non-adversarial member states, while the probability of writing at least 
more than one report is higher for governing parties from adversarial member states. The 
probability of writing one report is higher for opposition parties. In line with the theory, it 
suggests that many opposition parties find only one report each year that is worth writing.
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T able 4.3 A llocation  o f  Codecision reports in the 5th European Parliam ent
Poisson Random effect Poisson Fixed effect Poisson Random effect Fixed effect
negative binominal negative binominal
Variables H Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
adgov + 0.832 0.318* 0.817*** 0.334 * 0.815*** 0.337 * 0.864 *** 0.367 * 0.858 *** 0.372 *
***
Nongov 0 -0.236 0.349 -0.245 0.331 -0.246 0.327 0.324 0.414 0.320 0.407
Nonopp 0 -0.446 ** 0.261 -0.446 ** 0.256 -0.446 ** 0.254 0.132 0.355 0.132 0.353
chair + 0.234 *** 0.206 *** 0.199*** 0.239 *** 0.230 ***
Position + -0.065 -0.070 -0.072 -0.045 -0.047
Salience + 0.508 ** 0.492 ** 0.488 ** 0.494** 0.488 **
dissent + 0.228 0.233 0.234 0.166 0.168
ep + 0.264 * 0.269 ** 0.271 * 0.225 0.227
Absolute - -0.499 -0.482 -0.477 -0.296 -0.290
partysize + 0.077 *** 0.077 *** 0.077 *** 0.077 *** 0.077 ***
Attendance + -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 0.004 0.003
countrysize + -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
eldr - -0.282 -0.283 -0.282 -0.141 -0.142
green - -0.266 -0.294 -0.302 -0.138 -0.149
pes + -0.270 -0.281 -0.283 -0.178 -0.182
small - -0.379 -0.404 -0.411 -0.270 -0.280
cons -0.414 ** -3.416 *** -0.410 ** -3.209** -1.272*** -3.113* -1.27 *** -3.028 *
/lnjr 4.316 -2.887 4.316 3.203
/ln_s 3.347 0.056 3.347 3.821
r 74.857 24.600
s 28.413 45.654
Group Years (5) Years (5) Years (5) Years (5) Years (5) Years (5) Years (5) Years (5)
Pseudo R5 .0508 .3680 — — — — — — — —
Log -716.68 -477.21 -706.63 -472.49 -683.87 -450.59 -472.70 -463.31 -549.80 -441.42
likelihood
N 530 530 530 530 530 530 530 530 530 530
* p-value < .05, ** p-value <.01, *** p-value <.001, H= hypothesised sign of the independent variable
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Figure 4.1 Predicted difference in number of reports, government and opposition parties
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Predicted number of reports reports. Continouos line = governing parties from adversarial 
member states, dotted line = all other parties
It is also, as expected, strong statistical significant evidence supporting the view that Codecision 
reports are allocated according to number of MEPs per party, more MEPs means more 
Codecision reports. This supports the argument made by Kreppel (2002). The number of reports 
is not a function o f the size o f the party groups and the number of MEPs per country. These 
effects disappear once the effect of national parties is controlled for.
Interpretation o f the other variables
While not statistically significant, the further away from the centre in the EP a party is, the less 
Codecision reports it writes. Thus, while the direction of the coefficient is as predicted in the 
existing literature, one should not draw any firm conclusion given the low level o f statistical
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significance. The position of the party towards further integration does not seem to have an 
impact on the number of reports a party writes. We should however be careful when interpreting 
this variable baring in mind the high correlation it has with the wish to strengthening the power 
of the EP.
As the direction, significance level and values of the coefficients are very similar across the 
different models, the remainder of this section provides a substantive interpretation of the Poisson 
version of model 2. The focus is on the change in probability holding all other variables at their 
base value. The base value is 0 for the dichotomous variables, i.e. the first four and the last four 
variables (adgov, nongov, nonopp, chair, eldr, green, pes, and small). The value of each of the 
continuous variables is fixed at its mean. The baseline probability for different number of reports 
per year is as follows. A party will write 0 reports with a likelihood of 70.2%. It will write 1 
report with a likelihood o f 20.9%. The chance of it writing 2 reports is 6.2%. The baseline party 
hence has a likeliness of writing 3 or more reports per year of less than 2.7%. The baseline 
probabilities, and the resulting chance in probabilities as a result of changing the value on one of 
the variable while keeping all other variables at their base values, is presented in table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Predicted probabilities of number of reports
Count 0 1 2 3 <
Base .7023 .2091 .0622 .0264
Governing party from an adversarial state .6319 .2326 .0856 .0499
Active Committee chair (mean) .6980 .2108 .0637 .0275
Minimum salience attached to integration .8378 .1359 .0220 .0043
Maximum salience attached to integration .5918 .2416 .0986 .0680
Minimum salience attached to strengthen the EP .8687 .1141 .0150 .0022
Maximum salience attached to strengthen the EP .5764 .2442 .1034 .0760
Minimum party size .7714 .1764 .0403 .0119
Maximum party size .1191 .1049 .0924 .6836
Calculated by changing the value on one variable at the time, keeping all other variables at its base
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From table 4.4 we can see that changing from being an opposition party to a governing party 
from an adversarial member state, holding all other variables at its base, decreases the likelihood 
of writing zero reports from 70.2% to 63.2%, a decrease of 7%. Hence, such a governing party 
has a likelihood of 36.2% of writing at least one report, compared to the chance in opposition of 
29.8%. When comparing the probability of writing 3 reports or more a year, we see that the 
probability of this occurring for a governing party from an adversarial member state is twice as 
high (5% vs. 2.6%) compared to an opposition party with an identical score on all other variables.
Having an active chair has a marginal but significant positive effect on the number of Codecision 
reports a party writes. The change in the probability is in the region o f . 1 - .2%.
The salience a party attaches to European integration has a substantive impact on the predicted 
number of reports a party writes. A party that does not find “Europe” salient at all has a predicted 
chance of not writing reports of 83.8%, compared to the base of 70.2% and the chance of a party 
that attaches maximum level of salience of 59.2%. Thus, the chance of not writing reports 
increases or decreases by more than 10% from the base level as a party’s salience of “Europe” 
increases or decreases to its maximum/minimum value. The effect of saliency has its strongest 
substantive effect on the probabilities in the lower range of the spectrum of number of reports. At 
the higher end of the spectrum, we see that the chance of writing three or more reports is less 
than .5% for parties that do not find “Europe” salient. This compares to a probability of 6.8% for 
parties that score a high value on the saliency variable.
The effect of parties’ attitudes towards increasing the power of the EP were statistical significant 
in most specifications of the model. The lack of significance in the negative binominal fixed and
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random effect specification may be due to the multicoliniarity problem between the variables 
position and ep, discussed in chapter 3. The substantive interpretation of the difference shows, as 
expected, that the attitude towards increasing the power of the EP substantively change the 
probability of producing Codecision reports. The chance of not writing Codecision report in a 
given year of the fifth EP decreases from 70% to less than 58% if the party is very interested in 
strengthening the EP. Their predicted likelihood of writing at least three reports per year is 7.6%. 
Conversely, no interest in strengthening the power of the EP increases the chance of not writing 
any reports to over 86%. The likelihood of writing three or more reports is only one-fifth of the 
base, .43% compared to 2.64%.
The last variable showing up to be statistically significant in the model is the size of parties. The 
effect is, as expected, positive. The more MEPs, the more Codecision reports a party writes. This 
is not surprising and in line with both the theory and existing literature. The key added value of 
this study to our understanding of the effect of party size is to quantify the effect in terms on the 
predicted number of reports a party will write as a function of its size. The baseline, mean, value 
on thepartysize variable is 5.6. When all other variables are also held at their base, there is a 70% 
chance that such a party will not write any Codecision reports in a given year. If the party has 
only one member, that chance rises to over 77%. Holding all other variables constant, the chances 
of not writing any reports in a given year decreases to less than 12% if the number of MEPs is 
equal to that of the biggest party in the fifth EP, the German CDU with 42 members. The chance 
of a one-member party writing at least three reports in a given year is just over 1%, while it is 
more than 68% for the biggest party.
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Conclusion
Compared to the existing explanations, the theory of government and opposition adds addition 
explanatory force to the question of allocation of Codecision reports in the European Parliament. 
Governing parties from adversarial member states are more active as rapporteurs than opposition 
parties or governing parties from non-adversarial member states. This holds both when the theory 
is tested as a complete data-generating process and when other explanations are controlled for.
There is nothing to suggest that more centrally located parties write more reports, nor that some 
party groups are over-represented once the size of national parties has been controlled for.
The findings disconfirm the argument that European Party groups, independently from national 
parties, are significantly able to influence the allocation of Codecision reports once other factors 
are controlled for. While the allocation of reports between the party-group coordinators may be 
some kind of a poker-game, as Corbett at al argue (2000), no party group seems to be better than 
any other at “winning” more Codecision reports. Some might of course be better at winning the 
“importanf’ reports. That aspect is not investigated here.
In addition to pointing out the difference between governing and opposition parties and the effect 
of party size, the number of Codecision reports a party writes depend on two set of factors. The 
first is party saliency over “Europe” and the wish to increase power of the EP. The parties that 
find European integration, or want to strengthen the power of the EP, write more Codecision 
reports. The effect is both statistical significant and substantive. The second is whether the party 
controls a chair in a committee that deals with Codecision legislation. Having an active
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committee chair has a significant, but marginal effect on the number of Codecision reports a 
party produces. Given that most Committee Chairs go to the biggest national parties in the larger 
party groups, there does not seem to be a large “top-up” effect of having the Committee Chair.
Large national parties normally tend to come from the bigger party groups as well as from the 
larger member states. This might explain why existing research has found correlation between 
number of reports and party group size as well as between number of MEPs per country and 
number of reports. The results presented here show that these correlations disappear once size of 
national parties is controlled for.
Having established that systematic differences exist in the number of Codecision reports each 
party writes even after controlling for size, the next chapter investigates to what extent 
government and opposition can explain decision speed in the Codecision procedure, or more 
precisely, at which stage of the procedure legislation is adopted.
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Chapter 5: Rapporteurs from governing parties conclude the 
negotiations in the 1st reading
Decision-making in the European Union (EU) is often described as cumbersome and time- 
consuming. Studies of decision-making efficiency have compared different procedures and time- 
periods. The key finding in this literature is that while the increased use of qualified majority 
voting in the Council has increased decision-making speed, the increased participation by the 
European Parliament has partially devaluated the effect (Golub 1999; Schulz and Konig 2000). 
These studies focus on the differences between the procedures as well as over time. In this 
chapter, the focus is on differences within the same procedure, the Codecision procedure as 
amended in the Amsterdam treaty (Codecision II). Rather than measuring decision-making 
efficiency as the time lag between an initiative from the Commission and an inter-institutional 
agreement on policy, the focus is on the stage reached in the procedure. While largely neglected 
by observers of EU policy-making, the treaty of Amsterdam reformed the first reading of the 
Codecision procedure as well as the third reading. After Amsterdam, it is possible for the 
procedure to conclude in the first reading if there is an agreement between the Council of 
Minister and the European Parliament. As time limits do not exists in the first reading of the 
Codecision procedure, only in the second and third, looking at the time-lag between the proposal 
and the final agreement will be more a function of time spent in the first reading than a function 
of in which stage of the procedure an agreement was reached. The aim here is to shed light on 
what might explain at which stage of the procedure legislation is adopted under the new 
Codecision procedure.
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This chapter tests the second hypothesis of the theory developed in chapter 2. It predicts that 
Codecision legislation where the rapporteur comes from a governing party is more likely to be 
adopted in the first reading than if the rapporteur comes from an opposition party. The empirical 
findings support the theory. There is a significant difference in the probability of Codecision 
legislation being adopted in the first reading in the Council, when the rapporteur comes from a 
governing party in an adversarial member state, compared to if he comes from an opposition 
party. The results also show that governing parties from non-adversarial member states are 
significantly less likely than opposition parties to see their legislation ending in the second 
reading in the Council rather than in the first reading.
The next section reviews the existing literature. Section 2 presents a bivariate variant analysis of 
the relationship between the adoption stage and the governing status of the party of the rapporteur 
as well the relationship between the adoption stage and the party group of the rapporteur. Section 
3 presents a statistical method for testing the hypothesis. Section 4 reports the findings.
What the existing literature predicts
The literature suggests that several factors influence the role of the rapporteur, thereby also when 
the procedure is concluded. Although I am not aware of any alternative explanation of when 
Codecision legislation is adopted, it is possible to infer from this literature in order to present 
some alternative explanations. The dominant explanation of the influence of the rapporteur is 
experience (e.g. Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000; Neuhold 2001). Experienced MEPs 
should be better able to conclude legislation at an early stage as they may have a better 
understanding of the procedure and the preferences of the Council. However, experienced MEPs 
might also be appointed as rapporteurs on more important and controversial legislation, which is
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more likely to end up in the Conciliation Committee. Thus, experience might work both ways, 
but it does produce an alternative explanation that should be tested.
It is possible that the speed of adopting Codecision legislation is a pure function of the ideal 
policy location of the rapporteur. More centrally located MEPs or those from the main party- 
group might be more likely to find the necessary majority in the EP sympathetic to their views, 
hence making it more likely that their legislation will end up in Conciliation. Centrally located 
MEPs might, given the multiparty nature of the Council, also be more likely to see the Council 
accept their initial proposal (Kreppel 2000). Their policy preferences are likely to be closer to the 
policy core of the Council than the policy preferences of a rapporteur from a party group located 
further from the centre in the policy space.
Corbett et al (2000) mention that committee chairs have to take up reports which none of the 
committee coordinators want. Thus, reports written by committee chairs might be more likely to 
be adopted at an early stage than reports written by other MEPs.
Traditional integration theories like neo-functionalism (e.g. Haas 1968; Rosamond 2000; 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998) and intergovemmentalism (e.g. Garrett 1995; Hoffmann 1966; 
Moravcsik 1998) as well as most existing spatial models of EU politics (e.g. Crombez 1996; 
1997a; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001) assume that the EP is highly 
integrationist. It follows that the policy preferences of MEPs over the level of integration might 
influence when legislation is agreed. One can think of two alternative scenarios. MEPs from pro- 
integrationist parties might be more willing to compromise on the wording of new legislation in 
order to see more integration. Alternatively, one might think that pro-integrationist rapporteurs
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might be less willing to compromise, and bargain hard in order to push integration as far as 
possible (Rittberger 2000).
The size o f the party of the rapporteur might influence her ability to secure support for her 
position. The EP is run by the larger national parties (e.g. Hix 2002). If  the rapporteur comes 
from a large party, the chances o f finding support for the amendments might increase. This makes 
it more likely that the legislation will be adopted in the first reading in the Council. When not 
concluded in the first reading, membership of a large party should increase the chances of seeing 
the legislation pass the absolute majority hurdle in the EP’s second reading. National alliances, 
rather than party politics might also influence when legislation is adopted.
Bivariate analysis
The dependent variable is adoption stage. As we saw in the theory chapter, Codecision legislation 
can be adopted in either the first reading in the Council, the second reading in the EP, the second 
reading in the Council or following an agreement in the Conciliation Committee. Table 5.1 
presents the bivariate relationship between adoption stage and whether the rapporteur came from 
a governing or an opposition party.
Table 5.1 Adoption stage by the governing status of the rapporteur’s party
Council 1st 
reading
EP 2nJ 
reading
Council 2nd 
reading
Conciliation
Committee
Total
Governing parties from 
adversarial states
36 (44.4%) 17 (21.0%) 18 (22.2%) 10 (12.3%) 81 (99.9%)
Governing parties from 
non-adversarial states
10 (33.3%) 6 (20.0%) 3 (10%) 11 (36.7%) 30 (100.0%)
Opposition parties from 
non-adversarial states
8 (24.2%) 9 (27.3%) 9(27.3%) 7(21.2%) 33 (100.0%)
Opposition parties from 
adversarial states
33 (30.0%) 32(29.1%) 28 (25.5%) 17 (15.5%) 110(100.1%)
Total 87 (34.3%) 64 (25.2%) 58 (22.3%) 45 (17.7%) 254 (99.5%)
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The table shows that one third of all Codecision legislation initiated between 1999 and 2003 was 
adopted in the first reading. However, for rapporteurs from governing parties in adversarial 
member states the first reading adoption rate was 44.4%. Governing parties from non-adversarial 
states were close to the average, having a first reading adoption rate of one in three. The lowest 
score came from rapporteurs from opposition parties in non-adversarial member states. They had 
a first reading adoption rate under 25%. Opposition parties from non-adversarial member states 
also had a first reading adoption rate below the average, seeing only 30% of its reports being 
adopted by the Council in the first reading. Thus, rapporteurs from governing parties are more 
likely to be successful agenda-setters in the first reading. This supports hypothesis two. Proposals 
from rapporteurs from governing parties are more often adopted in the first reading than 
proposals from rapporteurs from opposition parties.
The theory also suggest that parties ideologically close to the majority o f the governing parties 
are more likely to see legislation adopted in the first reading compared to the parties that make up 
the opposition in EU legislative politics. These figures are compared in table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Adoption stage by party group of the rapporteur
Council 1st 
reading
EP 2nd reading Council 2nd 
reading
Conciliation
Committee
Total
PES 37(52.1%) 12(16.9%) 15(21.1%) 7 (9.9%) 71 (100.0%)
EPP 33 (29.2%) 28 (24.8%) 33 (29.2%) 18(15.9%) 113(100.1%)
ELDR 8 (28.6%) 5 (17.9%) 5(17.9%) 10(35.7%) 28(100.1%)
Green 5(23.8%) 7 (33.3%) 2 (9.5%) 7 (33.3%) 21 (99.9%)
GUE 1 (12.5%) 4 (50.0%) 1 (12.5%) 2 (25.05) 8 (100.0%)
EDD 3 (50.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 0 6 (100.0%)
UEN 0 0 0 1 (100.0%) 1 (100.0%)
Non 0 6 (85.7%) 1 (14.3%) 0 7(100.0%)
Small * 4 (18.2%) 12 (54.5%) 3 (13.6%) 3 (13.6%) 22 (99.9%)
Total 87 (34.3%) 64 (25.2%) 58 (22.3%) 45 (17.7%) 254 (99.5%)
* Small is GUE, EDD, UEN and Non-attached together
121
The table supports for the theory. As described in chapter 3, most of the legislation that was 
adopted by the end of the fifth EP was initiated in the first part of the legislative term, when the 
PES held the majority of the seats in the Council. Consistent with the theory we would expect 
that rapporteurs from the PES would see their reports being adopted in the first reading in the 
Council more frequently than rapporteurs from other party groups. In fact, the PES saw 52.1% of 
its Codecision reports being adopted in the first reading, while the EPP saw only 29.2%. On 
average, smaller party groups (GUE, EDD, UEN and non-attached) saw only on average 18.2% 
of “their” legislation adopted in the first reading compared to an average of 34.3%.
Moving on to the second reading in the EP, we see that the proposals from the opposition, the 
small parties (54.5%), the Greens (33.3%) and the EPP (24.8%) have a much higher chance of 
being adopted at this stage, than proposals from the Liberals (17.9%) or the Socialists (16.9%). 
We also see that it is the Liberals (35.7%) and the Greens (33.3%) that have the biggest change of 
seeing their legislation ending up in Conciliation. In fact, rapporteurs from the Greens were just 
as often in Conciliation Committees as rapporteurs from PES. This is the case despite the fact 
that the Greens only wrote 21 reports, while the PES produced 71. To further test to what extent 
this interpretation holds once intervening factors are controlled for, the subsequent sections will 
present the statistical model and the independent and discuss the results of the statistical test.
Operationalisation
Statistical model
To test the hypothesis, the most appropriate statistical method is a multinomial logit regression. 
Multinomial logit regression works like a normal binary logistic regression, except that all the 
different outcomes are compared against each other. Hence, in a model with three alternative
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outcomes, outcome A is compared to outcome B, outcome B to outcome C, and outcome C to 
outcome A. Although it is technically more complex, it can essential be thought of as a series of 
binary logistic regression, comparing all possible outcomes (Long 1997). As the difference 
between A and C is given by the difference between A and B plus B and C, it is possible to use 
one of the categories as a baseline comparison category. A potential problem with this kind of 
analysis is that the number of parameters might get very large relatively fast. The structure of the 
model is:
Pr(yi=l | Xi) = l / l+ Z Jj=2 exp(xipj)
Pr(yi=m | xj) = exp(xipm)/l+ Z Jj=2 expfaPj) for m > 1
Here, y is the dependent variable with j nominal outcomes. The categories, while not assumed to 
be ordered, are numbered 1 to j. Pr(y= m | x) gives the probability of observing outcome m given 
x (Long 1997: 152-4). The data are pooled over 4 years. The reference outcome is termination in 
the first reading. There are some differences in the frequency of the different outcomes between 
legislation initiated in different years, which is causing some problem with heteroskedasticity. 
This is solved by adjusting the standard error for clustering on year of initiation (Croux, Dhaene, 
and Hoorelbeke 2003; Zorn 2001; 2003).
If a multinomial model is used when the data can in fact be ordered, the result is a loss of 
efficiency, as not all the data is used. However, if an ordered logit regression is used when the 
data cannot in fact be ordered; the results may be biased or nonsensical. Biased or nonsensical
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results are more problematic than a loss in efficiency, so ordered logit regression should only be 
used is if there is no question about the order in the data (Long 1997: 149).
An ordered logic model is not appropriate here. It may seem obvious that it is possible to order 
the different stages of the Codecision procedure. It starts with the first reading, then the second 
and ends in Conciliation. However, the majority requirement for concluding the procedure at the 
different stages does not follow this order. To conclude the procedure in the first reading in the 
Council, it is necessary that a simple majority in the Parliament and a qualified majority in the 
Council agree. To conclude the legislation in the second reading in the Parliament, it is sufficient 
that a blocking minority in the EP prefers the position of the Council, as an absolute majority is 
needed to pass amendments. To conclude in the second reading in the Council, a qualified 
majority in the Council has to accept all the amendments passed by an absolute majority in the 
EP. To pass legislation in the Conciliation Committee it is sufficient that a simple majority from 
the parliament and a QMV majority in the Council agree, which is identical to the requirement 
for passing legislation in the first reading.
Independent variables
All of the independent variables are described in detail in chapter 3. Adgov is a dummy variable, 
taking the value 1 if the rapporteur comes from a party that held office in national politics in a 
member state with an adversarial political system at the start of the year when the legislation was 
initiated,. It is coded 0 if this is not the case.
Nongov is also a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the rapporteur comes from a party that 
held office in national politics in a member state with a non-adversarial political system at the
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start of the year when the legislation was initiated, otherwise 0. It will not be distinguished 
between opposition parties from different political systems. This is primarily because the theory 
does not have any clear predictions and secondly to ensure a sizeable reference category. The 
predicted sign of adgov is negative when EP second reading is compared to the first reading in 
the Council. It is more likely for rapporteurs from governing parties than from opposition parties 
to see all their amendments being adopted by the Council in the first reading. Nongov is not 
expected to be significantly different from opposition parties. A dummy variable for opposition 
parties from non-adversarial member states was included in an alternative specification of the 
model, but taken out as no significant difference was found between the different types of 
opposition parties.
It is necessary to add a few control variables. This is in order to reduce the risk of having a bias in 
our results due to omitted variables and in order to test the alternative explanations presented 
above. Experience is a continuous variable counting the number of times the rapporteur has 
already acted as a rapporteur under the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure. The 
predicted sign is negative when comparing termination in the first reading in the Council with all 
other outcomes.
An alternative measure of experience is incumbency, i.e. whether the rapporteur was a member of 
the fourth Parliament. Data from Corbett et al (2000) is used to identify which rapporteurs were 
also members of the 4th EP. The variable, incumbent, is a dummy, which takes the value 1 if the 
rapporteur is an incumbent and 0 if not. The predicted sign of the coefficient is positive.
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Nominate scores on the revealed ideal policy location of all MEPs in the first half of the 5th 
Parliament is used to locate each rapporteur in the EP policy space (Hix, Noury, and Roland 
2004). I use the absolute distance from the centre on the first dimension as a measure of the 
rapporteurs’ location vis-a-vis the rest of the EP. The variable is labelled absolute. The prediction 
is that rapporteurs who are located centrally in the policy space will have a better chance of 
seeing their report passing the absolute majority hurdle in the second reading. The sign of the 
coefficient should be negative.
There are two types of potential conflicts between the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers that may arise in the Codecision procedure; policy-content and institutional balance. 
The latter may arise in the form of oversight of the implementation through the choice of 
comitology procedure (Ballmann, Epstein, and O'Halloran 2002; Franchino 2000; 2001; 2004; 
Hix 2000). It may be easier for the Parliament to unite, i.e. find an absolute majority; on issues 
related to institutional balance than policy-issues that divide the EP along the left-right dimension 
(Hix 2001; Kreppel 1999; Kreppel and Hix 2003). However, some parties in the EP are more 
interested in strengthening the role of the EP than others. The absolute majority requirement in 
the second reading to pass amendments presents a demanding hurdle for the rapporteur. The 
ability of the rapporteur to find the necessary support not only depends on the issue at hand, but 
also on the base of support, he can rely on. The core of this base is the national party. The bigger 
this is, the more votes behind his recommendations in all of the stages of decision-making in the 
Parliament; in the Committee, in the party-group week and in the plenary. A variable measuring 
the number of MEPs in the same party as the rapporteur is included. The variable is labelled 
partysize.
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If loyalty exists along national, rather than party lines, the same logic should hold for the number 
of MEPs from the same country as the rapporteur. The number of MEPs per country corresponds 
very closely with number of votes in the Council, thus the variable countrysize captures both 
national support beyond the national party and the effect of the number of votes the country 
although not necessarily the party, commands in the Council. The prediction is negative when 
conclusion in the Council’s first reading is compared with ending in second reading in the EP. 
The direction is positive when the EP’s second reading is compared to terminating in the 
Council’s second reading or in Conciliation.
All other things being equal, the bigger the party group, the more likely it is that the rapporteur 
will be able to find an absolute majority for his second reading amendments. However, since no 
party group is large enough to command an absolute majority by itself, support from other party 
groups will be necessary. Rapporteurs from the more centrally located parties, the EPP, PES and 
the liberal ELDR are more likely to have an advantage in terms of finding loyal support for their 
amendments, given both the size and location of the former two, and the central location of the 
ELDR. Four dummy variables, PES, Green, ELDR and Small compare the effect of belonging to 
any of these four party groups to membership of EPP, the biggest party group. The prediction is 
that rapporteurs from all party groups will have a harder time than rapporteurs from the EPP in 
finding the necessary majority in the second reading. Rapporteurs from the EPP are thus more 
likely than those from other party groups to end up in Conciliation or to see their amendments 
being adopted in the second reading in the Council.
If there is dissent over the issue of European integration in the party of the rapporteur, she will be 
wary of provoking any reactions from the national party that may be at the expense of her the seat
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come the next elections, either to the national parliament or to the EP (Hix 2004). She will thus 
only seek reports on issues where the party is able to unite, and attempt to take the legislation all 
the way to Conciliation in order to make the most out of it. Dissent is a measure of the internal 
dissent in the party over European integration.
Position aims to capture the party’s overall orientation of the party leadership towards European 
integration. Most of the existing literature would predict pro-integrationist rapporteurs either to 
seek conclusion in the first reading in order to get “some Europe today”, or fight legislation all 
the way to Conciliation to show that they are concerned with the institutional balance between the 
Council and the EP.
Salience is the relative importance of this issue in the party’s public stance. The same prediction 
as for position should also hold here.
EP is the position of the party leadership on strengthening the powers of the European 
Parliament. The same prediction as for position and salience applies.
A committee chair writes reports that the committee has agreed to produce, but which none of the 
party-coordinators are willing to commit their group to write. These reports may be rather 
uncontroversial. It is thus necessary to control the effect of the rapporteur being the chair of the 
committee. This dummy variable is labelled chair. It takes the value 1 if the rapporteur is a 
chairperson and 0 if not. If the rapporteur is a committee chair, the prediction is that it will be 
concluded in the first reading in the Council, or in the second reading in the EP. It should not go 
to Conciliation.
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Some parties might be more active in general than other parties regardless of policy position. 
Scarrow (1997) found that MEPs from Germany and the UK were more interested a career at the 
European level than French and Italian MEPs. Hence, it might be necessary to introduce a control 
variable for the general level of activity amongst MEPs from the different parties and member 
states. The variable attendance is included, testing the effect of average level of attendance in 
plenary session of the national delegations to the different party groups. The prediction is that 
rapporteurs from more active national party delegations are more likely to see the Council 
accepting their proposal in the first reading, or end up in Conciliation.
Finally, dummy variables controlling for the effect of the different years are included, using 
2000, the year when most of the legislation included in the dataset was initiated as the reference 
category. Two alternative models are tested. Model 1 only includes the theoretical variables 
related to the governing status of party and the political system. It test the theory understood as a 
“complete data generating process”. Model 2 includes all the control variables listed above, 
testing the theory as a "partial data generating process" (Morton 1999).
Results
The results of the multinomial logit regressions are reported in table 5.3. There is support for the 
theoretical model. Government and opposition influence when Codecision legislation is adopted. 
The “pure” model finds governing parties from adversarial member states to be more likely to 
conclude the agreement in the first reading than in the second reading in the EP, the second 
reading in the Council or in the Conciliation Committee. While the relationship is the predicted 
direction in all readings, the difference is not statistically significant when the first reading is
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compared with the second reading in the Council. The theory predicts that legislation will 
terminate at this stage in cases where incomplete information has been a problem at earlier 
stages. It is hence not surprising to find the difference not being statistically significant. 
However, since the pseudo R2 is only just over .02, there seem to be other factors influencing the 
process that need to be controlled for. As such, the model is perhaps better understood as only a 
partial data-generating process.
Model two also support the theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics. Even 
when controlling for alternative explanations and intervening variables, rapporteurs from 
governing parties from adversarial member states are more likely to conclude Codecision 
legislation in the first reading than governing parties from non-adversarial member states or 
opposition parties. The pseudo R2 is over .21, over ten times bigger than the simple model. Thus, 
the thrust of the interpretation will focus on the latter model.
130
Table 5.3 Multi-nominal logic, effects on completion of Codecision legislation
2nd Reading EP vs Ist Reading Council______ 2nd Reading Council vs 1st Reading Conciliation vs Ist Reading
H B Rst B Rst H B Rst B Rst H B Rst B Rst
adgov - -.750 .325* -.434 .198 * - -.590 .392 -.363 .438 - -.745 .169*** .226 .761
nongov 0 -.511 .652 -.059 1.050 -1.101 .671 -1.307 .601 * .631 1.045 .173 1.424
experience 0 -.045 .161 - -.165 .234 - -.375 .151 *
Absolute - -1.622 1.190 0 -.089 .979 0 -1.312 2.280
chair - .680 .579 : - -34.878 .706 *** - -1.514 .612 *
incumbent 0 -.324 .426 0 .149 .568 0 .254 .393
position + -.380 .343 -.205 .193 -.170 .328
salience -.307 .631 -.909 .501 -1.254 .857
dissent + .160 .518 -.452 .449 + .684 .267 *
ep + .662 .314 * + .195 .405 + .476 .278
Country - -.022 .018 -.004 .012 - -.024 .010 *
party size - .059 .038 .011 .016 + .048 .019 *
attendance - -.030 .031 -.008 .032 -.055 .064
eldr -.969 1.399 -.199 .673 .421 1.145
green .634 1.072 -1.781 .623 ** .446 1.076
pes -.627 .425 -.612 .525 -1.627 .886
small + 1.611 1.007 - -1.496 .485 ** .122 .748
y99 .310 .191 -2.003 .156 *** -.545 .181 **
yOl .435 .139 ** -.028 .107 -.545 .083
y02 -1.189 .254 *** -.681 .133 *** -2.854 .202 ***
y03 -2.425 .319 *** -1.853 .155 *** -36.004 2.962 ***
_cons .000 .523 3.330 1.665 * -.103 .503 4.574 2.969 -.536 .721 7.604 4.458
Pseudo R2 .0213 .2147 .0213 .2147 .0213 .2147
N 254 251 254 251 254 251
* p-value < .05, ** p-value < .01, *** p-value < .001, H= hypothesised direction of coefficient, Rst = Robust standard errors adjusted for year of initiation, 
B= unstandardised beta-coefficient
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Investigating the relative risk ratio, the exponential of the coefficient, we see that relative to 
belonging to the opposition, the probability of rapporteurs from adversarial member states 
seeing their legislation adopted in EP’s second reading rather than first reading in the Council 
is .648. The chance of it happening is only two thirds of the chance for opposition MEPs. 
Thus, the difference between governing parties and opposition parties is not only statistically 
significant, but substantively significant as well. Whether the rapporteur come from a 
governing or an opposition party makes a difference in terms of when legislation is adopted. 
However, this only holds for governing parties from adversarial member states. Being from a 
governing party of a non-adversarial member state only has a significant effect on the 
probability of legislation being adopted in the second reading in the Council. The effect is 
negative. The risk of this occurring if the rapporteur comes from a governing party from a 
non-adversarial member state is only 27% of the risk of the rapporteur is from an opposition 
party. Whether the rapporteur comes from a governing or an opposition party does not seem 
to have an effect on the probability of the legislation ending up in the Conciliation 
Committee.
Figure 5.1 shows the density of the predicted probabilities of concluding legislation in the 
first reading in the Council. It compares governing party rapporteurs from adversarial member 
states with all other rapporteurs. The table shows that rapporteurs from governing parties in 
adversarial member states are over-represented amongst those with a probability of more than 
.3 of seeing legislation adopted in the first reading and under-represented amongst those 
rapporteurs with a lower probability than .3. This clearly shows support for the hypothesis.
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Figure 5.1 Predicted probability of adopting the legislation in Council’s 1st reading,
government and opposition parties
Density
2. 5-1
15
0 .2 4 8,6 1
Fitted probabilities of concluding negotiations in 1st reading
Continuous line = governing parties adversarial member states, dotted line = all other MEPs
Interpretation o f the other variables
Experience has the predicted direction concerning both second reading EP versus first reading 
Council and concerning Conciliation Committee versus first reading in the Council. Previous 
experience as Codecision rapporteur makes it more likely that the Council will adopt the 
initial proposal from the rapporteur. However, the effect is only significant when comparing 
Conciliation committee with the first reading in the Council. Here, every additional 
Codecision report decreases the chance o f ending up in Conciliation rather than the first 
reading by one third.
133
The distance from the centre in the EP does not seem to have a significant effect on the 
probability of terminating in any particular reading. While not being statistically significant, 
the direction is contrary to the prediction from the existing literature. Being centrally located 
actually makes it more likely, not less, that the legislation will be adopted in the second 
reading in the EP, rather than the first reading in the Council. However, the standard error is 
large relative to the coefficient, resulting in a low significance level.
The effect of being a chair is significant when comparing the first two stages with the last 
two. When the rapporteur is the chairperson of a committee, legislation tends to be adopted 
either in the first reading in the Council, or in the second reading in the EP. Being a chair 
lowers the chance of ending up in Conciliation by 22% compared to other MEPs. Thus, 
having a committee chair may increase the number of write more Codecision reports, as 
shown in chapter 5, these reports tend to be adopted in an early stage in the procedure. This 
may indicate either that the reports a chairperson writes are uncontroversial, or that the chair 
is better than other rapporteurs are at finding the optimal policy at an early stage.
The findings support the existing literature with regard to the effect of incumbency on when 
reports are adopted (e.g. Bowler and Farrell 1995). Whether the rapporteur was a member of 
the fourth Parliament or not does not seem to have an impact on when legislation is adopted. 
This may be a result of the high turnover of MEPs in each election.
While most of the variables related to party attitudes towards European integration do not 
have any significant effects, internal party dissent over the issue seems to make their 
rapporteurs more likely to bring their legislation all the way to the Conciliation Committee. A 
one-unit change on the 5-units scale increases the chance of ending up in Conciliation by
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97%. Being a member of the Greens or from any of the minor parties significantly decreases 
the likelihood of ending up in the second reading in the Council.
The size of the country and national party has an effect on the probability of ending up in the 
Conciliation Committee. The former decreases the probability by 2.2% per extra MEP, while 
the latter increases it by 4.9% per extra MEP. The former is the opposite of what is expected 
in the literature that emphasises the dominance of national interests in EU politics, while the 
latter is in line with the literature that understands the EU as a system of party politics (Hix 
and Lord 1997).
Rapporteurs from parties that want to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament are 
unlikely to write reports that are acceptable to the Council in its first reading. The effect is 
significant at the 5% level concerning the difference between first reading in Council and 
second reading in the EP and at the 10% level concerning the difference between first reading 
in the Council and Conciliation Committee. The effect is substantive. For every one-unit 
increase on the 7-units scale, the chance of ending in the second reading in the EP almost 
doubles. The chance of ending up in Conciliation increases by 60% for every one-unit change. 
This is in line with the logic found in Hix (2002a) and Rittberger (2000).
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that there are systematic differences in the 
stage of the procedure where Codecision legislation is adopted. Some of these differences are 
related to the rapporteur. A rapporteur from a governing party in an adversarial member state 
is more likely to see the Council adopt his proposal in the first reading. This is in line with the 
theory.
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Given that committee chairs write reports that none of the party coordinators wants any of 
their MEPs to write. It is likely that these reports are of low saliency. These reports tend to be 
concluded in the first reading in the Council, or in the second reading in the EP. It is not likely 
that legislation where a committee chair is the rapporteur will end up in Conciliation. This 
suggests that these reports are uncontroversial, or that committee chairs are better finding a 
winning majority at an early stage of the process.
The results also show that rapporteurs from parties that care strongly about the power of the 
European Parliament are more likely to see their legislation being adopted in the second 
reading in the EP. This is a function of the absolute majority requirement. If governing parties 
or parties that, if not in government themselves, are supporting the governing parties, are less 
interested in strengthening the powers of the EP, the theory suggests that votes from these 
parties are sufficient to ensure that the EP fails to find an absolute majority more favourable 
to strengthening the position of the EP. The empirical test also found that parties that were in 
dissent over European integration were more likely to supply rapporteurs who took the 
legislation all the way to Conciliation before agreeing with the Council. One interpretation of 
this finding might be that these rapporteurs have a larger scope for manoeuvring given the 
divisions in their own party. Hence, they can more easily find an absolute majority in favour 
of amending the common position.
It is interesting to note that the larger parties are more likely to see Codecision legislation 
adopted in the EP’s second reading or end up in Conciliation than smaller parties. This could 
suggest that rapporteurs from bigger parties are able to get reports that are more important.
The Council is more likely to have a diverging common position from the one proposed by 
the rapporteur on these reports. Reports that are more important are also more likely to divide
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the EP along party lines. This makes it less likely that an absolute majority in favour of 
amending the common position of the Council will be found. However, when such a majority 
is found, some of the amendments are likely to be unacceptable to the Council, causing the 
Conciliation Committee to convene.
In total, there seems to be evidence in favour of hypothesis 2. While some alternative 
explanations have merit, they tend to be complementary. Factors such as attitudes towards 
European integration and wish to strengthen the role of the EP influence when rapporteurs 
conclude the negotiations with the Council. Nevertheless, rapporteurs from governing parties 
from adversarial member states have a distinctively different pattern than rapporteurs from 
other parties.
Having established that governing parties tend to prefer to end the procedure in the first 
reading, the next chapter investigates behaviour in those cases when the Council do not accept 
the first reading proposal from the European Parliament. Voting behaviour in EP’s second 
reading is the subject of the chapter six, the final chapter of part two of the thesis.
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Chapter 6: Governing parties amend Council’s common 
position
This chapter tests hypothesis 3, whether the majority of governing parties and ideologically 
close opposition parties are the most likely parties to vote in favour of second reading 
amendments. The existing literature on voting behaviour in the European Parliament is 
reviewed in the first section. Section 2 presents a bivariate analysis of the relationship 
between second reading voting behaviour, government -  opposition status and party-group 
membership, the core ingredients of the theory of government and opposition in EU 
legislative politics. Section 3 presents the statistical model and the variables. The results of 
the statistical analysis are presented in section four.
The empirical results support the hypothesis. Governing parties from adversarial member 
states, and their ideological close allies, are the most likely parties to support second reading 
amendments. Other findings suggest that pro-integrationist parties are less likely to vote in 
favour of second reading amendments, but those parties that want to strengthen the powers of 
the EP are more likely to support second reading votes. MEPs from a national party that holds 
EU politics to be salient or controversial are more likely to support second reading 
amendments. There is also a positive relationship between attending plenary session and 
supporting second reading amendments. Neither party- nor country-size does seem to 
influence voting behaviour.
Existing accounts of voting behaviour in the EP
The existing literature on voting behaviour in the EP can be divided into four different strands. 
One body of literature investigates the voting cohesion of party-groups in the EP. Most of this
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research is based on samples of a few roll call votes. The key finding is that party groups in 
the EP have a surprisingly high level of cohesiveness, given their limited ability to sanction or 
reward behaviour. Bigger groups are, perhaps surprisingly, more cohesive than smaller ones, 
but party group fragmentation decreases cohesion (Brzinski 1995). Attina (1990) finds that 
cohesion seems to be higher on own initiative resolutions than on budgetary and legislative 
acts. Brzinski (1995) notes that the biggest problem facing party groups in the plenary 
sessions is not voting cohesion, but voting participation. A longitudinal study covering all roll 
call votes between 1979 and 2001 shows that party group size increases voting cohesion and 
that cohesion has increased over time (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). In contrast to earlier 
findings, the number of national delegations in a group did not seem to decrease voting 
cohesion. Instead, the results showed that increased ideological diversity inside a party group 
is responsible for decreasing cohesion. Of particular relevance to this study is the finding that 
the percentage of parties in government has a significant positive effect on voting cohesion of 
a party group. Hix et al (2004) suggest that this may be because national governments put 
pressure on their MEPs to ensure that legislation adopted in the Council is not amended in the 
EP.
The second strand in the literature investigates coalition formation under different majority 
requirements. The starting point for this literature is the claim that the two biggest party 
groups, the EPP and PES, form a grand coalition. They do it in response to the need to present 
a united front against the Council. This may be in order to ensure that its points are taken or to 
meet the absolute majority requirement given the high level of absenteeism during the plenary 
sessions (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000; Hix and Lord 1997; Hosli 1997; Nugent 
1999; Raunio 1997; Westlake 1994).
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Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) use correspondence analysis at national party delegation level to 
investigate the patterns of coalition formation in the EP in different readings in the 
Cooperation procedure. They find that the pattern of coalition formation differ according to 
procedure. Only the grand coalition between the PES and the EPP seems to be able to find the 
necessary votes to form an absolute majority. The centre-right is capable of preventing 
legislation being amended in the second reading, but not in the first. Amendments seem to be 
pitted towards the left, both in the first and the second readings. Even on legislation where the 
rapporteur comes from the EPP, the majority in favour is sought through the support from 
parties to the left, rather than to the right of EPP. While coalition formation is based on 
ideology rather than nationality, Kreppel and Tsebelis find that some pairs of national 
delegations within the same party group are more likely to vote against each other than other 
pairs.
Kreppel (2000) argues that the formation of the grand coalition in second reading votes is not 
a function of the need to meet the absolute majority requirement. It is a function of the multi­
partisan nature of the EU itself. Even if the grand coalition were not needed to find an 
absolute majority, support from the major groups in the EP makes it more likely that the 
amendments will be acceptable to the other institutions, which are also multi-partisan. Noting 
that the grand coalition frequently fails to form when an absolute majority is needed in order 
to amend the common position of the Council, she presents a policy-driven model to predict 
when the grand coalition should/ should not form. She treats the EPP and PES as unitary 
actors in the EP. The thrust of the model is that the grand coalition should only form if the 
compromise position is closer to the ideal point of both party groups than to the common 
position of the Council. However, given that Christian Democrats and Socialists 
predominantly make up the Council, Kreppel does not explain why the grand coalition made
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up by Christian Democrats and Socialist in the EP should want to amend the position agreed 
by the Socialists and Christian Democrats in the Council.
Hix (2001) dismisses the claim that different majority requirements, simple or absolute, 
dictate MEPs voting behaviour. Coalitions forms along partisan lines (see also Hix, Noury, 
and Roland 2004). Most of the time when one major party group proposes an amendment the 
other major party group rejects it. However, Hix, Kreppel and Noury (2003) finds that the 
EPP and the PES are more likely to vote together when an absolute majority is required, 
compared to when only a simple majority is needed. The discrepancies between these 
different results seem to stem from different units of analysis. EPP and PES are more likely to 
vote together under absolute majority rules compared to simple majority. Nevertheless, at the 
individual level, voting behaviour is explained by ideological distance. This would suggest 
that only those MEPs located closest to the other big party group are likely to vote with the 
other party group under absolute majority rules, while those further away from the centre are 
less likely to vote with the opposite party group. This finding brings us on to the third strand 
in the literature.
A third strand assess to what extent voting behaviour in the EP can be characterised as 
competitive or consensual. A common critique against the democratic character of the 
European Union is its perceived lack of a competitive party system. The criticism of often 
based on the lack of competition over “European” issues in the elections to the European 
Parliament (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996), as EP elections are fought by national parties 
along the organising policy-dimensions of individual countries. The EPP and PES collude 
more than they compete at the aggregate level (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). There are 
several reasons for why the PES and EPP should collude rather than compete, ranging from
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ideological similarity, technical reasons, collective institutional interests, in order to prevent 
smaller party groups from being influential (see Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003: 318-21). Hix 
et al. find support for all o f these reasons except the latter. EPP and PEP do not seem to vote 
together in order to keep the smaller parties out. A new finding is that the two big party 
groups compete more often as turnout increases. Turnout is likely to be higher on more the 
important votes (Noury 2002a; Scully 1997c). Hence, the EPP and PES are more likely to 
compete on issues that “matter”. Overall, the party system has grown more competitive as the 
powers of the EP have increased (Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003; see also Kreppel and Hix 
2003). The evidence also suggests that the nature of competition and coalition formation 
differs by policy area (Hix 2001; Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999).
Finally, a fourth strand in the literature investigates which factors determine individual MEPs 
voting decisions. Hix (2002b) uses roll-call votes from the first year of the fifth parliament to 
investigate to what extent MEPs voting behaviour is driven by individual preferences, EP 
party groups or national parties. He finds that neither EP party groups nor personal 
preferences explain voting behaviour. MEPs voting decisions are driven by national parties. 
He thus concludes that MEPs care more about pleasing the principals responsible for the 
selection process to the EP, than the principal responsible for allocating the spoils inside the 
parliament. Faas (2003) finds that national parties level of defection from the party group line 
explains the overall level of cohesion in party groups. National parties are able to ensure that 
their MEPs vote together against the party group on issues where their opinions differ. Hix 
(2004) argues that the probability of an MEP defecting from the party group to follow the 
national party is a function of the candidate selection process in national parties and national 
electoral system. Candidates from centralised-centred electoral systems with decentralised 
candidate selection process listen to their parliamentary leaders. MEPs from party-centred
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electoral system with centralised candidate selection are in the hands of local party leaders. 
Informal accounts suggest that parties in government are more interested in controlling the 
behaviour of their MEPs than opposition parties, in particular the behaviour in the Codecision 
procedure (Messmer 2003; Whitaker 2001). This suggests that there is a need to consider 
differences between government and opposition when investigating voting behaviour in the 
EP. The next section presents offers a bivariate analysis of the relationship.
Bivariate analysis
All roll call votes (RCVs) taken during the first one and a half years of the 1999-2004 EP 
were collected as a part of the “How MEPs Vote” project. During that period, 167 RCVs were 
on amendments in the second reading of the Codecision procedure. While the votes are 
limited to the first third of the parliament, they cover most of the areas in which the EU 
decides by Codecision. The votes range from environmental to economic and trade issues to 
social issues. As such, they should be a representative sample of all the votes taken at this 
stage of the procedure in the fifth EP. A more detailed description can be found in chapter 3 
along with summary statistics of the all the variables.
A challenge when testing voting behaviour in second reading votes is how to code decisions 
other than votes in favour. Yes-votes are the only voting decisions counting towards the 
absolute majority requirement of 314. No votes, abstentions, those present but not voting, and 
those absents, are all contributing towards the total number of non-positive votes. 
Nevertheless, not all of these possible lines of actions are equally likely to correspond with 
the policy-preferences of the MEPs. As most of the voting takes place on Wednesdays and 
Thursdays, those absent cannot necessarily be assumed to be against the specific amendment. 
The reason for their absence might very well not be related to the specific policy at all. The 
same holds to some extent for MEPs who have signed in the day of the vote, but who are not
present in the plenary when the vote is actually taken. Their absent from the plenary might be 
strategic, but it might also be due to reasons not related to the issues voted on. It is plausible 
that those that abstain or vote against a second reading amendment are in fact against the 
amendments. Their failure to support the amendment is most likely due to reasons related to 
the specific amendment.
As all non-positive votes count against the majority requirement, two alternative 
specifications o f the dependent variable are tested. The first classifies all non-positive votes as 
negative, while the second excludes all absents and present but not voting. The total number 
o f observations is 97.644 and 87.817, respectively. Before presenting the statistical model, it 
is useful to conduct a simple bivariate analysis o f the central relationships. The bivariate 
relationships, counting all non-positive voting decisions as negative votes, are presented in 
table 6.1. Both raw-numbers as percentage are presented. The percentage is o f the total 
number o f voting decisions.
Table 6.1 Voting decisions by governing status, numbers and percentage
Not in favour of 2nd In favour of 2nd reading Odds ratio of supporting
reading
amendments
amendments 2nd reading amendments
Governing parties 
from adversarial 
states
14,363 (14.71%) 15,836 (16.22%) 1.103
Governing parties 
from non-adversarial 
states
4,927 (5.05%) 5,696 (5.83%) 1.156
Opposition parties 
from non-adversarial 
states
5,068 (5.19%) 5,416(5.55%) 1.069
Opposition parties 
from adversarial 
states
39,552 (25.79%) 21,149(21.66%) 0.535
Total 49,547 (50.74%) 48,097 (49.26%) 0.971
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From the frequency table o f all voting decisions in EP second reading, we see that governing 
parties from adversarial member states are over 10% more likely to vote in favour o f second 
reading amendments than to vote against them. They are more than twice as likely to vote in 
favour o f such amendments compared to opposition parties from adversarial member states. 
The difference is smaller between governing and opposition parties from non-adversarial 
member states. Governing parties from these countries are almost 9% more likely to support 
second reading amendments. They are both more likely to support second reading 
amendments than to oppose. Both governing and opposition parties from these countries are 
about twice as likely as opposition parties from adversarial member states to support second 
reading amendments. However, since so much of the literature on voting behaviour in the EU 
sees party groups as actors, it might be useful to get an overview o f their voting pattern as 
well. This is presented in table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Voting decisions by party group, numbers and percentage
Not in favour of 2nd 
amendments
reading In favour of 2nd reading 
amendments
Odds ratio of supporting 2nd 
reading amendments
EPP 20,086 (20.57%) 16,350(16.74%) 0.814
PES 12,995 (13.31%) 15,877(16.26%) 1.222
ELDR 3.971 (4.07%) 4,772 (4.895) 1.202
Green 2,735 (2.805) 3,421 (3.50%) 1.251
GUE 3,146 (3.22%) 3,193 (3.27%) 1.015
UEN 2,176 (2.23%) 1,382(1.42%) 0.635
EDD 1,308 (1.34%) 872 (0.89%) 0.667
Non 3.130(3.21%) 2.230 (2.28%) 0.712
Total 49,547 (50.7%) 48,097 (49.3%) 0.971
The voting behaviour o f the party groups seems to provide further support for the theory. It is 
the PES, together with the Greens, and the liberals, that seem to be most likely to vote in 
favour o f second reading amendments. The PES controlled most o f the seats in the Council at 
the time. The EPP is almost 20% more likely to vote against second reading amendments than 
in favour o f them. The opposite is the case for the PES, the ELDR and the Greens. They are 
all more than 20% more likely to vote in favour. The leftwing GUE are almost just as likely to
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vote against as to support second reading amendments. The rightwing and Euro sceptic party 
groups (UEN, EDD, Non-attached) are all between 28 and 37 percent more likely to vote in 
against second reading amendments than to support them. This suggests that governing 
parties belonging to PES, together with ideological close opposition parties are attempting to 
use the EP to move the common position closer to their ideal point.
To ensure that the illustration is not driven by non-decisions, table 6.3 and 6.4 presents the 
frequencies once those present but not voting or not present are removed from the sample. 
From table 6.3 we see that MEPs from governing parties are more likely to support second 
reading amendment than opposition parties. The biggest difference is between government 
and opposition from adversarial member states where the difference is 30%. The odds ratios 
are 1.254 versus 0.943. Even those from the opposition that turn up to vote are more likely to 
vote against than in favour. The difference is much smaller between governing and opposition 
parties from non-adversarial member states. Both are more likely to support than to vote 
against amendments. Governing parties more likely to support second reading amendments 
than opposition parties in non-adversarial member states as well. The odds-ratio was 1.254 
versus 1.157, a difference of almost 10%. We can also see that those that show up to vote are 
over 8 percent more likely to support amendments than to abstain or oppose.
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Table 6.3 Voting decisions, non-voting excluded, by governing status, numbers and 
percentage
Not in favour of 2nd In favour of 2 nd Odds ratio of
reading amendments reading amendments supporting 2nd reading 
amendments
Governing parties 
from adversarial states
12,095 (13.77%) 15,058 (17.15%) 1.245
Governing parties 
from non-adversarial
4,437 (5.05%) 5,564 (6.34%) 1.254
states
Opposition parties 
from non-adversarial
4,513 (5.14%) 5,223 (5.95%) 1.157
states
Opposition parties 
from adversarial states
21,062 (23.99%) 19,865 (22.61%) 0.943
Total 42,107 (47.95%) 45,710(52.05%) 1.086
Table 6.4 Voting decisions, non-voting excluded, voting decision by party groups,
numbers and percentage
Not in favour of 2n reading In favour of 2n reading Odds ratio of supporting 2n
amendments amendments reading amendments
EPP 17,510(19.94%) 15,466 (17.61%) 0.883
PES 11,235 (12.79%) 15,259 (17.38%) 1.358
ELDR 3,557 (4.05%) 4,657 (5.30%) 1.309
Green 2,430 (2.77%) 3,364 (3.83%) 1.384
GUE 2,647 (3.01%) 2,990 (3.40%) 1.130
UEN 1,775 (2.02%) 1,291 (1.47%) 0.731
EDD 722 (0.82%) 654 (0.74%) 0.906
Non 2,231 (2.54%) 2.029 (2.13%) 0.909
Total 42,107 (47.95%) 45,710 (52.05%) 1.086
There is still a clear left-right pattern even after excluding all non-voting decisions. The PES, 
together with the Liberals and the Greens, seem to be those most frequently in favour of 
amending Council’s common position, with an odds ratio over 1.30. The EPP, together with 
the rightwing UEN and Euro-sceptic EDD and non-attached members are those less in favour 
of changing the position adopted by the Council in its first reading. All these party groups had 
an odds ratio o f less than 0.91. In total, this confirms the pattern o f a government opposition 
relationship operating at the EU level. Socialist governing parties together with ideologically 
close opposition parties are trying to amend the common position further left, while EPP and 
more rightwing parties, most o f them in opposition are trying to prevent such a move by
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preserving the status quo of the common position adopted in the first reading of the Council.
In other to further test whether governing parties support amendments in EP’s second reading, 
the next section presents a statistical model, facilitating a statistical analysis.
Operationalisation
The dependent variable is coded as panel data, where the voting decision of each MEP is 
recorded in each vote. The decision is binary, either yes or no. Given the nature of the data, 
the question of model specification is whether to use a fixed effect or a random effect model.
In linear models, fixed effect and random effect models give the same estimates of the 
covariates, and remains unbiased and consistent across various specification of the error term. 
However, the random effect can be biased if omitted variables correlate with the error-term. 
This has lead to fixed effect models being the preferred choice, in particular amongst 
empirical minded economists. However, the properties of the fixed effect linear model are a 
special case and do not hold for non-linear models. Due to the incidental-parameter problem 
arising if the number of unknown specific effects increases at the same rate as the sample-size, 
fixed effect models of non-linear relationships may yield inconsistent estimators of the 
coefficients (Lancaster 2000). When the aim is to say something about all second reading 
Codecision votes, rather than just the sample, a random-effect, rather than fixed effect model 
should be used. The former model allows the individual effects to be treated as random. 
However, we have to assume that the conditional mean of the observed variables is linear. We 
also have to assume that the distribution of the effects can be specified parametrically (Hsiao 
2003: 313-5 and 188-265). The probit version of the model is fitted using Stata 8SE, which 
used a Gaussian distribution of the random effects. The structure of the model is:
Prob (yit = 1) = O [(1+ On2) ' 172(P’xit+ a ’xi)]
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Here;, p is the estimated coefficients of the observations x, while a captures the random effects 
ofthfese same observations. The subscripts i and t represent the individual i and time-period, 
in ouir case, vote, t. The variance o is normally distributed. Thus the probability O is a 
function of the variance o, the coefficients p’x for individual i across the time-periods t and 
the random effects a ’x for individual i. The random effect is assumed to vary independently 
of thie time-periods t. In our case, this means that the random effects should not correlate with 
the votes.
The key independent variables for the theory of government and opposition are; ad.gov, the 
governing parties from adversarial member states; nongov, the governing parties from non- 
adversarial member states and; nonopp, the opposition parties from non-adversarial member 
states. The prediction of the theory is that adgov will be positive and highly significant. While 
the expectation is that the direction of the nongov and nonopp will be positive, i.e. MEPs from 
these parties are more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments, these effect are 
not likely to be as strong, nor as statistical significant as the coefficient of adgov. The pure 
test of the theory only includes these variables.
It is necessary to introduce some control variables in order to estimate the explanatory power 
of alternative theories. The dominant theory in the literature, developed by scholars 
originating from the field of International Relations, is that competition in the European 
Union is over the level of integration (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Moravcsik 1993; Sandholtz 
and Stone Sweet 1998; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). As a supranational organisation, the 
European Parliament and the Commission are seen as more integrationist than the Council. If 
this were the case, we would expect to find that parties in favour of more integration would be 
more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments in an attempt to increase the
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level of integration. To test the explanatory power of this argument, the variable position is 
included. The prediction of the IR theory is that the direction will be positive. Those parties 
more in favour of integration will vote in favour of second reading amendments, as these will 
tend to be integrationist, while those opposed will vote oppose.
A similar rationale can be used to defend the inclusion of the salience variable. Parties that 
hold European legislation salient are more likely to try to amend the common position of the 
Council. Either they do so in an attempt to change the policy, or if impossible, in order to 
signal to their voters and party leadership back home that they would prefer a different policy 
to the one adopted through the common position of the Council. Hence, the coefficient of the 
salience variable is expected to be positive. To control for the effect of division over 
European integration inside parties, a control variable, dissent, is included. The expectation 
can be derived from the principal agent literature (Pollack 2003; Rasmusen 2001; Weingast 
1984). It would suggest that MEPs from parties with higher level of dissent would have a 
larger room for manoeuvring. The direction of this agency-drift may depend on the preference 
of individual MEPs. If MEPs self-select and thus are more integrationist than the average 
party member, and the EP votes to increase the level of integration in its second reading votes, 
one would expect the sign of this coefficient to be positive (Katz and Wessels 1999; Schmitt 
andThomassen 1999).
MEPs from parties that want to strengthen the role of the EP should be expected not only to 
be willing to reject legislation which would give them some integration today in exchange for 
more integration tomorrow, but also be more likely to try to amend second reading proposals 
from the Council (Hix 2002a; Rittberger 2000). The variable ep is thus expected to be positive.
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As it may be argued that second reading votes are business as usual, no different from other 
votes taken in the EP, the nominate scores of the national parties in the 1999-2001 period is 
used to measure to what extent the difference between government and opposition parties 
adds to explanatory power. If second reading votes are just business as usual, then the effect 
of govemment-opposition status should disappear once nominate scores are controlled for. 
Nominate scores also allow us to test which way the EP is most likely to be trying to move 
the policy, to the right or to the left. During the period under investigation, ministers from the 
centre-left made up the majority of the Council. The EP was dominated by the centre-right. If 
the effect is positive, it means that the EP on average tries to move the common position 
rightward. The further to the right a party is located, the more likely it is to vote in favour of 
second reading amendments. If it is negative, as the theory suggests, it means that left-wing 
parties are more likely to support second reading amendments.
The size of the party, partysize, as well as the member state, countrysize, is also included.
This is in order to test to what extent the probability of a party/countiy to be pivotal as a 
function of their size explains how likely it is that their MEPs will vote in favour or against 
amendments (Albert 2003; Felsenthal et al. 2003; e.g. Hosli 1995; 1996; 1997; for a classic 
treatment, see Shapley and Shubik 1954).
Finally, it might be objected that the probability of voting in favour of amendments is a 
function of the probability of showing up to vote in the plenary sessions. Hence, the average 
level of attendance needs to be controlled for. The expectation is that MEPs from parties with 
higher average level of attendance in plenary sessions will also be more likely to vote in 
favour of second reading amendments. Dummy variables for the different party-groups are 
also included to test to what extent these have an effect of voting behaviour independent of
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the party groups. The expectation is that the coefficient of PES will be positive while the 
coefficient of the smaller party groups will be negative.
Results
The results are presented in table 6.5. They show strong support for hypothesis 3. Governing 
parties are more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments than opposition 
parties. The evidence suggests that there is a difference between types of national political 
systems. Governing parties from adversarial member states are much more likely to vote in 
favour of second reading amendments than opposition parties from these countries. There is 
not sufficient evidence to claim that this is also the case for parties from non-adversarial 
member states. The test of the pure theory shows a highly significant difference between 
government and opposition parties from adversarial member states. Governing parties are 
more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments than opposition parties from 
these countries. Parties from non-adversarial member states are more likely to support second 
reading amendments than opposition parties from adversarial states. Opposition parties from 
non-adversarial member states are less likely to support second reading amendments than 
governing parties from either of the different types of political systems. This is in line with 
the theoretical predictions.
When alternative explanations are controlled for, we find that MEPs from governing parties in 
adversarial member states are more likely than opposition parties from these states to vote in 
favour of amendments in the second reading of the Codecision procedure. These results hold 
for both specifications of negative votes.
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Table 6.5 Random-effects probit models, supporting for second reading amendments
Model 1 Model 2
H All voting decisions 
full DGP
All voting decisions 
partial DGP
H Non-voting excluded 
full DGP
Non-voting excluded 
partial DGP
Adversarial governing party + .188 (19.43)*** .036 (2.89)** + .193 (18.56) *** .046 (3.52)'***
Non-adversarial governing party 0 .218 (15.39)*** .018 (.87) 0 .200 (13.40) *** .017 (.77)
Non-adversarial opposition party 0 .170 (11.99)*** .064 (3.11)** 0 .146 (9.75) *** .041 (1.90)
Position + -.017 (-2.00)* + -.022 (-2.40) *
Salience + .049 (4.37) *** + .041 (3.41)**
Dissent + .031 (2.96) ** + .031 (2.75)**
EP + .031 (3.20) ** + .034 (3.32) **
Nominate, left-right §t| - -.099 (-2.58) ** - -.164 (-3.67)***
Partysize + .001 (2.33) * + .001 (.93)
Attendance + .006 (6.76) *** + .003 (3.86) ***
Countrysize + -.001 (-2.56)* + -.001 (-1.67)
EDD - -.147 (-3.05)** - -.126 (-2.16)*
ELDR .209 (8.20) *** .181 (6.40) ***
GREEN .132 (2.39) * .049 (.78)
GUE - .062 (1.06) - -.043 (-.64)
NON I l l  - -.044 (-1.39) - .003 (.09)
PES + .173 (5.32) *** + .138 (3.67) ***
UEN - -.111 (-3.49)*** - -.128 (-3.63) ***
Constant -.057 (-5.60)*** -.779 (-9.50) *** .009 (.61) -.521 (-5.83) ***
/lnsig2u -2.151 -2.130 -2.014 -1.997
Signm a .341 .345 .365 .368
Rho .104 .106 .118 .119
Obs 97,644 97,644 87,817 87,817
Groups 167 167 167 167
Wald chi2 521.15 *** 1606.67 *** 432.45 *** 1248.55 ***
log-likelihood -60,441 -60,990 -53,388 -52,977
* < p-value .05, ** < p-value .01, *** < p-value .001
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When all voting decisions except yes (i.e. absent and present but not voting) are 
counted as negative votes (model 1), opposition parties from non-adversarial member 
states turns out to be even more likely than governing parties from adversarial states 
to vote in favour of second reading amendments. This does not hold when absent and 
present but not voting decisions are excluded, as shown in model 2. As mentioned 
above, it is less plausible that these latter types of decisions are related to the policy 
issue, than the decision to vote no or to abstain from supporting second reading 
amendments. Model 1 also adds more noise. The difference in the log likelihood is 
large between the two models. Model 1 clearly has the larger values. This is partly 
because it has more observations, but also because the added observations to vote 
against second reading amendments were not necessary related to policy. The lower 
the value, the more of the variation in the data is explained by the model. The data 
used in model 2 has less random variation than the data used in model 1. Model 2 
reduces the standard errors for most of the control variables compared to model 1.
The correlation between the predictions from the complete data generating process 
and partial date generating process in Model 2 is .588. This indicates that the simple 
model captures almost 60% of the variation in the larger model. The correlation is 
highly significant. However, the log likelihood scores are -53,388 and -52,977, a 
difference of 311. This difference is highly significant, thus we have to reject the 
proposition that the partial data-generating process does not provide a better fit.
The nominate scores of the party does explain a lot of the voting behaviour of MEPs 
in second reading votes. The effect is highly significant in Model 1. It just makes the 
1% significance level in Model 2. While it is significant, it does not make the effect of
154
government and opposition status disappear. Thus, the behaviour in second reading 
voting in not purely a story about competition over left-right policy; it is also about 
government and opposition. The direction of the nominate coefficient is negative.
This suggests that parties on the left in each party group are more likely to support 
second reading amendments compared to parties from the right. This is in line with 
the theoretical expectation.
Investigating the effect of the party group dummies, we see that the liberal ELDR and 
the social democratic PES are more likely to vote in favour of amendments than the 
EPP. Both the rightwing UEN and the Euro-sceptics in the EDD are more likely than 
the EPP to oppose. The coefficient of EDD is however only significant at the 5% level 
in model 2, but well beyond the 1% level in model 1. This indicates that they, as 
members of an anti-EU group, tend to vote not only with their hands, but with their 
feet as well. Thus, while the biggest party group in the EP was right of centre, most of 
the support for amendments seemed to come from the parties on the left, which 
indicates that the EP was trying to move the common position of the Council leftward 
more often than it tried to move it rightward. At the time, the Council was dominated 
by socialist governments. The finding lends support to the majority requirement 
argument of the theory forwarded in this thesis. It rejects the common assertion that 
governing parties in the EP attempt not to reopen negotiations concluded in the 
Council.
Socialist governing parties, holding most of the seats in the Council use the second 
reading in the EP in an attempt to move the final policy closer to their ideal policy by 
trying to amend the common position adopted in Council’s first reading. The
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oversized majority requirement in the Council means that most of its members are in 
favour of a larger policy change than what they are able to find a qualified majority in 
favour of in the first reading. These parties use the second reading in the EP to 
propose amendments. Theses amendments might eventually and possibly in a 
modified form, move the adopted policy closer to their ideal point, while being within 
the limits of what the pivotal government in the Council prefers to the status quo.
In order for this to be a successful policy strategy, the socialist governing parties have 
to for an alliance with opposition parties that share their preferences. This might be 
either socialist opposition parties or parties from the liberal ELDR or the Greens. 
During the period investigated here, the evidence seems to suggest that the legislative 
governing majority consisted of the socialist parties, the biggest party-group in the 
Council, with support from the Liberals. Although EPP was the biggest party in the 
EP, they seem to make up the opposition together with more right wing and Euro 
sceptic parties from the UEN and the EDD.
The existence of two groups, one with a probability of less than .5 of supporting 
amendments, the other with a probability around .6 is supported by density plot of the 
probability o f voting in favour of second reading amendments. Figure 6.1 compares 
the probability of supporting second reading amendments for MEPs from governing 
parties in adversarial member states with the probabilities for all other MEPs.
156
Figure 6.1 Predicted probability of voting in favour of second reading
amendments, government and opposition parties
Density
15-
10 -
4 .45 5 .55 6 .65
Probability of supporting second reading amendments: The continuous line represents MEPs from 
governing parties from adversarial member states, the dotted line represents all other MEPs.
By investigating the mean predicted probability o f party groups, the identity o f those
two groups can be revealed. The mean probability o f the different party groups in
government and opposition is presented in table 6.6.
Table 6.6 Mean predicted probability by governing status and party group
Governing parties 
from adversarial 
states
Governing parties 
from non- 
adversarial states
Opposition 
parties from 
adversarial 
states
Opposition 
parties from non- 
adversarial states
PES .593 .582 .590 .588
ELDR .547 .585 .581 .584
Green .600 .592 .596 .591
EPP .481 .468 .470 .472
GUE .523 .541 .537 —
UEN .442 .408 .417 —
EDD — .463 .463 —
Non-attached »  £ .477 .477 —
Average .531 .515 .516 .558
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The table shows that governing status makes a difference in the predicted probability 
for liberal parties, where the differences between belonging to the government in an 
adversarial member states and being either in opposition or from a non-adversarial 
state is 4%. The direction is negative, Liberals in these governments are less likely to 
support second reading amendments. It also has a negative effect on the probability of 
rightwing governing parties in the UEN. There are only minor differences in the mean 
predicted probability between governing and opposition parties from the other party 
groups. There is however a significant difference between the different categories on 
average. Governing parties are more likely than opposition parties to vote in favour of 
second reading amendments. It is thus possible to conclude that two groups oppose 
each other in the second reading. The party group holding the minority of the parties 
in the Council and thus pivotal in forming the common position in the first reading in 
the Council, teams up with parties further away from the majority view in the Council 
to attempt to prevent an amendment of the common position. Those parties that make 
up the majority of the Council members, on the other hand, ally themselves with other 
parties that favour a policy shift in the same direction in order to amend the common 
position of the Council.
As the composition of the Council changes, the expectation is that the identity of the 
two groups will change as well. The picture should nevertheless stay the same. A 
majority of governing parties supported by ideological closely located opposition 
parties will make up the group that is most likely to support amendments, while a 
second group made up by the minority in the Council and their other ideological close 
parties will tend not to support amendments.
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Interpretation o f the other variables
The position of the party on the pro-anti integration scale is only significant at the 5% 
level, but not at the 1% level. However, the direction is the opposite of what the IR 
theorists predict. Pro-Europeans are less, not more likely to support second reading 
amendments, once other factors have been controlled for. Within the different party 
groups, MEPs from parties in favour on more integration are more likely to vote 
against second reading amendments than MEPs from parties less supportive of further 
integration.
The level of saliency a party attaches to European integration does influence how its 
MEPs behave in second reading votes. The more salient, the more likely it is that its 
MEPs will support second reading amendments. This is significant well above the 1% 
level. This is in line with the predictions of the existing literature.
The level of dissent is also significant above the 1% level. As predicted from 
principal-agency-theory and the self-selection thesis, MEPs from parties with a higher 
level of dissent over European integration are more likely to support second reading 
amendments than MEPs from parties that agree over their position.
Also, as implied by Hix (2002a) and Rittberger (2000), MEPs from parties in favour 
of strengthening the position of the EP are more likely to vote in favour of second 
reading amendments. The effect is significant beyond the 1% significant level.
Neither the size of parties nor countries have a significant effect on voting behaviour 
in model 2. In model 1, the effects are only significant at the conventional 5% level,
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not at the 1% level. Here, the effect of party size is positive. MEPs from bigger parties 
tend to be more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The effect of 
country size is negative. MEPs from bigger member states are less likely to vote in 
favour of amendments.
As predicted, attendance in plenary sessions influences the probability of voting in 
favour of amendments. The higher average attendance of the national party-group 
delegation, the more likely it is that an MEP will vote in favour. This also holds in 
model 2. Those that are more likely to turn up are also more likely to vote yes, rather 
than no.
Conclusion
This chapter has tested the theory of government and opposition in EU legislative 
politics with respect to voting behaviour in second reading Codecision votes. Overall, 
the results support for the theory. There exist two groups of parties in EP’s second 
reading. The governing parties from the largest party group in the Council together 
with ideologically close parties not necessarily represented in the Council are more 
active in supporting amendments than the other group, composed of the minority 
party group in the Council and parties ideologically close to it.
Chapter 2 showed that the common position adopted in the first reading in the Council 
would be a smaller move away from the status quo than what most of its member 
would like. This is a result of the oversized majority requirement to both accept and 
amend in the Council’s first reading. This allows the pivotal voter to demand a high 
price for his Cooperation. The other parties in the Council, those who want a further 
move in the status quo, attempt to realise this through the EP. As long as the pivotal
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voter in the Council is better off from the adopted policy than from the status quo, he 
will not veto it during or after Conciliation. Thus, the majority in the Council can push 
for amendments. The evidence presented here supports that notion. A coalition of 
Socialists, Liberals and Greens was much more eager than the parties on the right to 
push for amendments at a time when the majority in the Council came from the 
centre-left.
The findings question the logic put forward by the International Relations camp of EU 
studies. MEPs from integrationist parties are not more likely to vote in favour of 
second reading amendments. The evidence goes in the opposite direction. Controlling 
for other variables, coming from a pro-integrationist party makes an MEP less, not 
more, likely to support amendments of the common position of the Council. However, 
parties in favour of strengthening the role of the EP, tend to be more likely to vote in 
favour of second reading amendments. The same holds for MEPs from parties that 
regard EU politics to be salient, or that are in dissent over the issue. As expected, 
those who attend plenary session are more likely to support amendments. The size of 
the national party or the country might have an effect, but the evidence is not 
conclusive.
This concludes the empirical part of the thesis. It is time to summarise the finding, 
compare the theory with existing explanations, and discuss the implications of the 
findings. For all of this, we turn to the concluding chapter.
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Conclusion
The argument presented in this thesis is that there is government and opposition 
dynamics in legislative politics in the European Union. The argument is twofold. First, 
there is a clear behavioural difference between those parties that participate in 
national governments and parties belonging to the opposition at the national level. 
Second, there is a legislative “government” consisting of the largest party group in the 
Council and ideologically close parties in the European Parliament. The conclusion 
first summarises the evidence in favour of the three hypotheses. Then, the evidence in 
favour of alternative explanations is presented. The final section discusses topics for 
further research.
Summary of the empirical evidence in favour of the theory
The first empirical test is related to differences in the level of committee activity, 
expressed through the writing of Codecision reports. The hypothesis is that governing 
parties write more Codecision reports than opposition parties. The writing of reports is 
important as it gives the MEPs responsible agenda setting power inside the EP, 
shaping the institution’s expressed position vis-a-vis the Council. As predicted by the 
theory, governing parties from adversarial member states are significantly more active 
as rapporteurs than opposition parties. It might be best illustrated by reproduce the 
predicted probability plot of number of Codecision reports per party per year, as a 
function of being in government or in opposition. This is done in figure 1 of the 
conclusion. The figure shows that opposition parties are much more likely not to write 
any Codecision in any given year than governing parties. The density of zero- 
observations is substantively higher for opposition parties. The same applies for the 
parties writing only one report in a given year. Conversely, the number of predicted
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observations o f at least 2 reports a year is highest for governing parties from 
adversarial member states. It might be useful to recall M ustapic’s comment (2002: 39) 
that the opposition in Argentina, unlike governing parties “can choose when to act” . 
The same seems to be the case in the EU, at least in terms of writing Codecision 
reports.
Conclusion Figure 1 Predicted difference in number of reports, government and
opposition parties
Density
1.5-
6 100 2 4 8
Predicted number of reports reports. Continouos line = governing parties from adversarial 
member states, dotted line = all other parties
The second empirical test focuses on when legislation is adopted as a function o f 
whether the rapporteur comes from a governing or an opposition party. The second 
hypothesis suggests that the Council is more likely to adopt the proposal from the EP 
in the first reading if  the rapporteur is from a governing, rather than an opposition 
party. The empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. Rapporteurs from governing
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parties are more likely to conclude the negotiations in the first reading. It is again 
useful to illustrate with a plot of the predicted probabilities. Figure 2 of the conclusion 
reproduces figure 5.1. It shows that governing parties from adversarial member states 
have a much higher probability of seeing their report adopted in the first reading, the 
highest density of observations is found around a probability of .4, while the 
corresponding ‘peak’ for other parties is located between .1 and .2. The density of 
number of observations is lower for governing parties from adversarial member states, 
for probabilities lower than .25. Beyond that point, it is substantively higher. Overall, 
this suggests a significant difference between governing and opposition parties in EU 
legislative politics. It suggests that governing parties are better able to get their 
preferred policy adopted at an early stage in the legislative process. This may fail if 
the pivotal party in the Council prefers a smaller change in the status quo than the 
majority in the Council, or the first reading proposal adopted in the EP. If so, that 
majority try to use the EP to force the Conciliation Committee to form, calculating 
that the pivotal governing party in the Council will prefer the outcome of the 
Conciliation committee to the status quo. To the extent that the outcome of the 
Conciliation committee represents a move towards the EP, compared to the common 
position adopted in the first reading, then the majority in the Council is successful in 
its strategy.
164
Conclusion Figure 2 Predicted probability of adopting legislation in Council’s 1st
reading, government and opposition parties
Density
2. 5]
1.5
0 2 4 6 8 1
Fitted probabilities of concluding negotiations in 1st reading
Continuous line = governing parties adversarial member states, dotted line = all other MEPs
The third hypothesis is related to voting behaviour. It reads: “The majority o f 
governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support 
second reading amendments than opposition parties.” The investigation o f  voting 
behaviour the Codecision procedure shows that the governing legislative coalition in 
the EU consists o f governing parties from the largest party group in the Council and 
ideologically close opposition parties. The opposition is the governing parties from 
the minority party group in the Council and its ideologically close opposition parties, 
as well as extremists and anti-Europeans. This is perhaps best shown in figure 6.1, 
which shows the density plot o f the predicted probabilities o f voting in favour o f
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second reading amendments. We see that a large group o f M EPs from governing 
parties from adversarial member states have a predicted probability o f supporting 
second reading amendments o f around ,55-.6. The same is also the case for a small 
group o f other parties. Conversely, a large group of opposition parties and a small 
group o f governing parties have a predicted probability o f around ,45-.5. By 
comparing the mean probabilities o f the different party groups, it became clear that 
the difference in probability had its roots in ideological differences. For convenience, 
figure 3 o f the conclusion reproduces the results o f figure 6 .1.
Conclusion Figure 3 Predicted probability of voting in favour of second reading 
amendments, government and opposition parties
Density
15-
10 -
.55 6 .654 .45 5
Probability of supporting second reading amendments: The continuous line represents MEPs from 
governing parties from adversarial member states, the dotted line represents all other MEPs.
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In sum, the empirical evidence supports the theory of government and opposition in 
EU legislative politics. The difference between government and opposition can be 
found in three aspects. First, governing parties are more active as Codecision agenda- 
setters (rapporteurs) than opposition parties. Second, rapporteurs from governing 
parties are more likely to see their initial legislative proposal being accepted by the 
Council of Ministers in the first reading. Third, the majority o f governing parties and 
ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support second reading 
amendments than other parties. It should however be noted that the difference 
between governing and opposition parties exists to a lesser extent in member states 
with non-adversarial national political systems. The next section of the conclusion 
presents the evidence in favour of alternative explanations.
Evidence supporting aiternative explanations
Table 3.6 summarised the predictions of the empirical tests. In order to evaluate the 
support of the alternative explanation, table 1 of the conclusion summarise the 
findings and compare them with the predictions from table 3.6. The table shows that 
some of the predictions from the existing literature are supported, while other aspects 
are questioned. Starting with those that are supported, we see that incumbency does 
not seem to have an independent effect. Having a committee chair seems to increase 
the number of Codecision reports written by a party. These reports tend to be adopted 
at an early stage of the legislative process.
Most of the findings show mixed support for claims in the existing literature. The 
attitude of a national party towards integration seems to have no significant effect its 
behaviour after controlling for the effect of other factors. As such it supports the claim 
the EU politics is not primarily over level of integration (Hix 2001; Hix, Noury, and
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Roland 2003). Saliency of European integration has a behavioural effect in line with 
what the existing literature predicts when it comes to allocation of reports and voting 
behaviour. Parties to whom European integration is salient tend to write more reports 
than those parties that see European integration as a less salient issue. However, there 
is no effect on when legislation is agreed between the EP and the Council. Party size 
has a positive effect on number of Codecision reports. There is also evidence to 
suggest that rapporteurs from bigger parties are more likely to write reports that end 
up in Conciliation than rapporteurs from smaller parties. This support the notion that 
big national parties dominate EU politics to the extent that the most important 
legislation tend to end up in Conciliation rather than being concluded at an earlier 
stage of the procedure. As expected, attendance in EP plenary sessions increase the 
chance of MEPs supporting second reading amendments (Noury 2002a; Scully 1997c).
The only significant effect of country-size is that rapporteurs from bigger countries 
were more likely than rapporteurs from smaller countries to end up in the Conciliation 
Committee. Having controlled for other factors, country-size did not seem to have an 
effect on second reading voting behaviour in the EP, nor on the allocation of 
Codecision reports. While the evidence shows partial support for the existing 
literature, it provided strong support for the behavioural predictions of the theory 
chapter. Not only did all key predictions find substantive and significant support, the 
secondary predictions related to other variables were also largely supported, although 
a few, while producing the predicted direction, were associated with a large standard 
error. Having summarised the findings, the remainder of the conclusion presents topic 
for further research in light of these findings.
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Conclusion Table 1 Comparing predictions and findings
Variables Chapter 4 reports Chapter 5 agreement Chapter 6 voting
Adgov Positive (theory) 1st reading positive (theory) Positive (theory)
Nongov Not significant Not significant Not significant
Position Positive (existing 1st reading negative Positive (existing
literature) 2nd reading EP positive 
Conciliation positive 
(existing literature)
literature)
Salience Positive (existing 1 st reading negative (existing Positive (existing
literature) literature) literature)
Dissent Both ways (existing Both ways (existing literature) Positive (existing
literature) Positive effect on ending up in 
Conciliation
literature)
EP Positive (existing 1st reading negative Positive (existing
literature) (Existing literature) literature)
Nominate Negative (theory)
Partysize Positive (existing 1st reading positive Positive (existing
literature) 2nd reading EP negative 
Conciliation positive 
(existing literature)
literature)
Attendance Positive (existing 1st reading positive Positive (existing
literature) 2nd reading EP negative 
Conciliation positive 
(existing literature)
literature)
Countrysize Positive (existing 2nd reading EP positive Positive (existing
literature) Conciliation positive 
(existing literature)
literature)
Chair 1st reading positive, only 
significant when compared to 
Conciliation
2nd reading Council positive 
(existing literature)
Chairman Positive (existing 
literature)
Absolute Negative (theory) 1st reading positive (theory)
nominate
Experience 2nd reading Council negative 
Conciliation negative (theory)
Incumbent No effect (existing literature)
PES Positive (theory) 1st reading positive (theory), 1st 
reading negative (existing 
literature)
Positive (theory)
ELDR Negative (existing 
literature)
1st reading negative (existing 
literature)
Green Negative (existing 
literature)
1st reading negative (existing 
literature) 2nd reading Council 
negative (theory)
Small party Negative (existing 1st reading negative (existing Negative (theory)
groups literature) literature)
2nd reading Council negative 
(theory)
169
Topics for further research
The findings summarised above seem to suggest a simple answer to the question of 
why governments have chosen to strengthen the role of the European Parliaments in 
successive treaty reforms. The existing literature focuses on reducing the democratic 
legitimation, segmenting a particular partisan bias, or adjusting de jure rules in line 
with the de facto realities (Hix 2002a; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999; Pollack 2003; 
Rittberger 2003). The argument developed here suggests that increasing the power of 
the EP strengthen the hand of the majority in the Council against the minority. It 
reduces the power of the pivotal governments, i.e. those more resistant to changing 
the status quo. Nevertheless, it ensures that the pivotal government is made better off, 
although the policy change is likely to be further than she would prefer if she could 
make a take-it-or-leave it offer to the rest of the Council. To the extent that different 
coalitions form around similar dimensions in the Council and in the EP (Hix 1999a; 
Hix 2001; Mattila and Lane 2001), increasing the power of the EP makes all 
governments better off. They are able to realise a further policy change than in all 
areas where they previously were in the winning majority, while not loosing their 
power to block utility decreasing changes on issues where they are pivotal.
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis neglects the role of the Commission in 
EU legislative politics. The Commission is chosen by the governing parties, 
incorporating it in the analysis should not change the conclusion that governing 
parties dominating EU legislative politics (Crombez 1997b; Crombez and Hix 2003). 
A model incorporating the role of the Commission is left for future research.
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The thesis focuses on the role of national parties in the EU. A possible line of inquiry 
is to look at national party leadership’s strategy in committee assignment as a function 
of their position as governing or opposition parties. This may lead to investigating 
intra-party politics in the context of committee assignments in the EP (Laver and 
Shepsle 1990b). If the national party leadership is understood as the principal, 
assigning party members to different committees can be seen as an act of delegation. 
As in all question of delegation, information-asymmetries and preferences are central. 
Will party leaders weight these two factors differently depending on whether they sit 
in the Council or have the Commissionaire in the area?
The findings also have implication for the research on lobbying in the European 
Union. Most of the existing literature on lobbying in the EU looks at contact between 
lobbyists, the institutions, its committees, or characteristics of the lobbying system 
(Bouwen 2002; 2004a; 2004b; Broscheid and Coen 2003; Greenwood and Aspinwall 
1997; Mazey and Richardson 1993). An exception is Crombez (2002) who looks at 
which actors should be lobbied at the different stages of the process, given their 
location in the policy space. If governing parties are dominating legislative politics in 
the European Union, as this thesis argues, the payoff of influencing representatives 
from governing parties should be higher than influencing representatives from 
opposition parties of similar size. Empirical investigations of lobbying strategies 
should thus control for differences between governing and opposition parties.
The theory has implication for research on control of the EU executive. Recent 
research on executive politics in the EU suggests that there is a different between 
government and opposition parties in terms of approving the Commission President
171
and censuring of the European Commission (Gabel and Hix 2002; Hix and Lord 1996; 
Jun and Hix 2004). While these votes are highly profiles, the executive is also 
controlled on a day-to-day basis through parliamentary questions. Existing research 
on EP questions tend to be descriptive (Kirchner 1984; Raunio 1996; 1997). The 
theory developed here suggests that MEPs form opposition parties should more 
frequently be asking questions to the Council than governing parties. Parties without a 
Commissioner should be active in asking questions to the Commission, than those 
parties with a Commissioner. MEPs from the biggest party group in the Council and 
the Commission should ask fewer questions than those from minority groups and 
those not represented in the executive institutions.
Finally, the thesis has shown the fruitfulness of analysing legislative behaviour after 
carefully modelling the institutional rules guiding the behaviour of the actors involved, 
in particular in a bicameral setting. As such, it has followed Krebhiel (2004) recent 
suggestion to study micro-models in its macro context (see also Cox and McCubbins 
2004). Legislative behaviour can better be understood if  the incentive structure of the 
institutional arrangement is properly modelled. The analysis of institutional 
arrangements should move beyond the focus on institutions in order to investigate 
how parties use the institutional arrangement to forward their interests. The shift in 
focus can already be found in recent literature on legislative politics in the US and in 
some comparative work. This thesis has attempted to make this shift in the case of EU 
legislative politics through the careful modelling of the effect of institutional rules on 
how political parties behave in the Codecision procedure.
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Appendix I. All codecision legislation initiated during the 5th EP
Keys: * = not yet adopted, 1= adopted in the 1st reading in the Council, 2= adopted in EP 2nd reading, 3= adopted in Council 2nd reading, 4= adopted after conciliation, 99= 
failed to be adopted
Reading_______________ Title_________________________________________ Committee____________________________ Rapporteur___________________________
Animal diseases, public health: zoonoses control and prevention, 
food-borne intoxications (amend, direct. 92/117/EEC)
Car industry: front underrun protection o f motor vehicles (amend, 
direct 70/156/EEC)
Waste management: framework for the production o f Community 
statistics
Free movement o f workers: posting o f third-country nationals for the
provision of cross-border services
Legal units o f measurement o f the Systeme international SI,
supplementary after 31/12/1999 (amend, direct. 80/181/EEC)
Tropical forests, developing countries: conservation and sustainable
management
Developing countries: integrate the environment in the development 
process, sustainable development
Road transport: distribution o f permits for heavy goods vehicles 
travelling in Switzerland
Agricultural statistics: production potential o f plantations o f fruit 
trees (amend, direct. 76/625/ECC)
Air pollution: national emission ceilings for pollutant gas (S02, 
NOx, NH3, VOCs)
Air pollution: ozone in ambient air, emission ceilings 
Development cooperation, EC/South Africa relations (amend, regul. 
2259/96/EC)
Transport o f dangerous goods by road: standards, European 
agreement ADR annexes (amend, direct. 94/55/EC)
Health at work: protection of workers from exposure to carcinogens 
(6th direct. 90/394/EEC). Codification 
Transport o f dangerous goods by rail (amend, direct. 96/49/EC) 
Foodstuffs,consumers' protection: labelling, presentation and______
Agriculture
Legal affairs, internal market 
Environment, public health, consumers 
Legal affairs, internal market 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Conciliation delegation 
Conciliation delegation 
Regional, transport, tourism 
Agriculture
Conciliation delegation 
Conciliation delegation
Development, cooperation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Legal affairs, internal market 
Regional, transport, tourism **
Legal affairs, internal market________
BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD) 
BERGER Maria (PSE)
CHICHESTER Giles Bryan (PPE-DE) 
FERNANDEZ MARTIN Fernando (PPE-DE) 
WUKMAN Anders (PPE-DE)
APARICIO SANCHEZ Pedro (PSE)
MYLLER Riitta (PSE)
DAVIES Chris (ELDR)
MARTINEZ MARTINEZ Miguel Angel (PSE)
KOCH Dieter-Lebrecht (PPE-DE)
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
HATZIDAKIS Konstantinos (PPE-DE) 
WUERMELING Joachim (PPE-DE)_________
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advertising, (codif. direct. 79/112/EEC)
Transport safety: type-approval of two or three-wheel motorvehicles 
(amend, direct 92/61/EEC)
Energy efficiency: requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting 
Medicinal products for human use: Community code (codification) 
Community agricultural statistics: improvement and information 
(amend, dec. 96/411/EC)
Money laundering: prevention o f the use o f the financial system 
(amend, direct 91/308/EEC)
Protection o f personal data: application by the Community 
institutions o f the directive 95/46/EC 
Human consumption: food additives other than colours and 
sweeteners (amend, direct. 95/2/EC)
Forests: protection against atmospheric pollution (amend, regul. 
3528/86/EEC)
Forests: protection against fire (amend, regul. 2158/92/EEC) 
Veterinary medicinal products : Community code (codif. direct 
81/851/EEC, 81/852/EEC, 90/677/EEC, 92/74/EEC)
Protection of workers: exposure to biological agents (direct. 
89/391/EEC, 90/679/EEC). Codification 
Humanitarian aid: uprooted people in Asian and Latin American 
developing countries (exten. regul. 443/97/EC)
European System of national and regional accounts ESA: recording 
taxes and social contributions
Beef: identification and registration o f animals and labelling of beef 
(repeal, regul. 820/97/EC)
Beef: identification and registration o f animals and labelling o f beef 
and beef products (amend, regul. 820/97/EC)
European year o f languages 2001
Health problems: intra-Community trade in bovine animals and 
swine (amend, direct. 64/432/EEC)
Sustainable urban development: environmental legislation at the 
local level, Community framework for cooperation 
Child health protection: phthalates, dangerous substances, safety o f 
toys (amend, direct. 76/769/EEC, 88/378/EEC)_________________
Legal affairs, internal market 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Legal affairs, internal market
Agriculture
Conciliation delegation
Citizens’ freedoms and rights, justice
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers 
Environment, public health, consumers
Legal affairs, internal market
Legal affairs, internal market
Development, cooperation
Economic, monetary affairs
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers 
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Agriculture
Environment, public health, consumers 
Environment, public health, consumers
PALACIO VALLELERSUNDI Ana (PPE-DE) 
TURMES Claude (VERTS/ALE)
BEYSEN Ward (ELDR)
REDONDO JIMENEZ Encamaci6n (PPE-DE)
LEHNE Klaus-Heiner (PPE-DE)
PACIOTTI Elena Omella (PSE)
LANNOYE Paul A.A.J.G. (VERTS/ALE)
REDONDO JIMENEZ Encamaci6n (PPE-DE) 
REDONDO JIMENEZ Encamacion (PPE-DE)
BEYSEN Ward (ELDR)
WUERMELING Joachim (PPE-DE)
DEVANiij (PPE-DE)
KNORR BORRAS Gorka (VERTS/ALE)
PAPAYANNAKIS Mihail (GUE/NGL)
PAPAYANNAKIS Mihail (GUE/NGL)
GRAQA MOURA Vasco (PPE-DE)
GRAEFE zu BARINGDORF Friedrich-Wilhelm 
(VERTS/ALE)
LIENEMANN Marie-NoeUe (PSE)
AR VIPS SON Per-Ame (PPE-DE)___________
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4
1
2
2
2
1
4
1
*
3
2
*
1
2
2
1
Tobacco: manufacture, presentation and sale o f products (recast 
version direct 89/622/EEC, 92/41/EEC, 90/239/EEC)
Rail transport: interoperability o f the trans-European conventional 
rail system
Animal nutrition: undesirable substances and products for the animal 
and human health (amend, direct. 1999/29/EC)
Agreements EC/Bulgaria, EC/Hungary : road and combined transport, 
repartition o f authorizations
Dangerous substances and preparations: azocolourants in textiles and 
leather (19th amend, direct 76/769/EEC)
Audiovisual industry : training programme for professionals, 
MEDIA-T raining 2001-2005
Dangerous substances: cancerogens, mutagens and toxic, c/m/r 
category 1 or 2 (21st amend, direct 76/769/EC)
Financial sector: information with third countries (amend, direct 
85/611/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/22/EEC)
Compound feedingstuffs: marketing, tracing, labelling (amend, 
direct 79/373/EC)
European system of national and regional accounts ESA: swaps, 
forward rate (amend, regul. 2223/96/EC)
Satellite personal communication services: co-ordination granting of 
the approval (extern dec. 710/97/EC)
Free movement o f persons: mobility for students, persons undergoing 
training, young volunteers, teachers, trainers 
School education: european cooperation in quality evaluation. 
Recommandation
Transport by rail, road and inland waterway: aid for the coordination 
(repl. regul. 1107/70/EEC)
Documents o f the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission: right o f public access
Energy efficiency products: office and communication technology 
equipment, labelling programme Energy Star 
EC Investment Partners financial instrument ECIP: closure and 
liquidation o f projects (regul. 213/96/EC) 
JW ateijjohcyjJistofprioritys^
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Environment, public health, consumers
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Environment, public health, consumers
Economic, monetary affairs
Conciliation delegation
Economic, monetary affairs
Industry, external trade, research... **
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Regional, transport, tourism **
Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice
Industry, external trade, research... **
Development, cooperation 
Environment, public health, consumers
MAATEN Jules (ELDR)
SAVARY Gilles (PSE)
PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
MASTORAKIS Emmanouil (PSE)
BAKOPOULOS Emmanouil (GUE/NGL)
HIERONYMI Ruth (PPE-DE)
NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
GRAEFE zu BARINGDORF Friedrich-Wilhelm 
(VERTS/ALE)
KAUPPI Piia-Noora (PPE-DE)
EVANS Robert J.E. (PSE)
SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR) 
CAMIS6N ASENSIO Felipe (PPE-DE)
CASHMAN Michael (PSE)
McNALLY Eryl Margaret (PSE)
DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
BREYER Hiltrud (VERTS/ALE)_______________________
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*
2
2
4
4
2
3
*
1
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
and human health COMMPS
Air pollution: emissions from motor vehicles, on-board diagnostic 
systems OBD (amend, direct. 70/220/EEC)
Companies: valuation of annual and consolidated accounts, financial 
information (amend, direct 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC)
Transport o f dangerous goods by road: uniform procedures for 
checks (amend, direct. 95/50/EC)
Road transport, national and international traffic : maximum 
dimensions and weights (amend, dir. 96/53/EC)
Action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries 
Ship safety: standards in respect o f shipping using Community ports, 
package Erika I (amend, direct. 95/21/EC)
Ship safety: ship inspections and survey organisations, package Erika 
I (amend, direct 94/57/EC)
Ship safety: double hull or equivalent design for single hull oil 
tankers, package Erika I
Animal nutrition: official inspections, undesirable substances and 
products (amend, direct. 95/53/EC, 1999/29/EC)
Air transport, civil aviation: technical requirements and 
administrative procedures (amend, regul. 3922/91/EEC)
Social security: employed persons, self-employed persons and their 
families (amend, regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)
Protection o f consumers: general product safety (rev. direct. 
92/59/EEC)
Cosmetic products: animal experiments (7th amend, direct. 
76/768/EEC)
Food supplements: approximation o f the laws o f the member States 
Dangerous substances and preparations: short chain chlorinated 
paraffins SCCP (20th amend, direct 76/769/EEC)
Public procurement, service and woiks contracts: coordination of 
procedures for the award, classical directive 
Electricity, internal market: production from renewable energy 
sources, RES-E
Procurement water, energy, transport and postal sectors: coordination
Environment, public health, consumers
Legal affairs, internal market
Regional, transport, tourism **
Regional, transport, tourism **
Foreign affairs, human rights, security, 
defence
Conciliation delegation
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Environment, public health, consumers
Regional, transport, tourism **
Employment, social affairs
Conciliation delegation
Conciliation delegation 
Environment, public health, consumers
Conciliation delegation
Conciliation delegation
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Conciliation delegation_____________
JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE) 
INGLEWOOD (PPE-DE)
HATZIDAKIS Konstantinos (PPE-DE)
BONINO Emma (TDI)
WATTS Mark Francis (PSE)
ORTUONDO LARREA Josu (VERTS/ALE)
HATZIDAKIS Konstantinos (PPE-DE)
PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
SIMPSON Brian (PSE)
LAMBERT Jean (VERTS/ALE)
GONZALEZ ALVAREZ Laura (GUE/NGL)
ROTH-BEHRENDT Dagmar (PSE) 
MULLER Emilia Franziska (PPE-DE)
NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
ZAPPALA' Stefano (PPE-DE)
ROTHE Mechtild (PSE)
ZAPPALA* Stefano (PPE-DE)____________
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2
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3
4
3
1
4
2
4
4
4
2
4
1
1
1
3
3
of procedures for award, utilities directive
Public health: Community action programme 2003-2008
Safe seas: safe loading and unloading o f bulk carriers
Shipping: seafarers, minimum level o f training. Consolidation
Stockfarming: prohibition o f substances with hormonal or thyrostatic
action, o f beta-agonists (amend, direct 96/22/EC)
Air quality: emissions from two or three-wheeled motor vehicles, 
motorcycles (amend, direct 97/24/EC)
Postal services: further opening to competition (amend, direct 
97/67/EC)
Summer-time arrangements: consequences and timetable for 2002 to 
2006 (8th direct. 97/44/EC)
Equal opportunities between women and men: employment,
vocational training, working conditions
Air carriage: liability in the event o f accidents (amend, regul.
2027/97/EC)
Social exclusion: Community action programme 2001-2005 to 
encourage cooperation between Merriber States 
Environment and health: waste electrical and electronic equipment 
WEEE
Environment and health: electrical and electronic equipments WEEE,
restriction o f hazardous substances RoHS
Life insurance (recast direct. 79/267/EEC, 90/619/EEC, 92/96/EEC)
Public access to environmental information (repl. direct
90/313/EEC)
Environment: substances depleting the ozone layer, allocation of 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons HCFCs
Securities: admission to official stock exchange listing, information 
to be published. Codification
Environment: substances depleting the ozone layer, metered dose
inhalers and medical drug pumps
Protection of human health: hygiene o f foodstuffs
Protection o f human health: food o f animal origin, specific hygiene
rules
Conciliation delegation 
Regional, transport, tourism **
Legal affairs, internal market
Environment, public health, consumers
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Regional, transport, tourism **
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Conciliation delegation
Conciliation delegation
Conciliation delegation 
Legal affairs, internal market
Conciliation delegation
Environment, public health, consumers
Legal affairs, internal market
Environment, public health, consumers 
Environment, public health, consumers
TRAKATELLIS Antonios (PPE-DE) 
van DAM Rijk (EDD)
MEDINA ORTEGA Manuel (PSE)
OLSSON Karl Erik (ELDR)
LANGE Bemd (PSE)
FERBER Markus (PPE-DE)
HONEYB ALL Mary (PSE)
H AUTALA Heidi Anneli (VERTS/ALE)
SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
FIGUEEREDO Dda (GUE/NGL)
FLORENZ Karl-Heinz (PPE-DE)
FLORENZ Karl-Heinz (PPE-DE)
INGLEWOOD (PPE-DE)
KORHOLA Eija-Riitta Anneli (PPE-DE)
HULTHEN Anneli (PSE)
MEDINA ORTEGA Manuel (PSE)
HULTHEN Anneli (PSE)
SCHNELLHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
Environment, public health, consumers SCHNELLHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
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1
3
3
3
3
1
4
4
1
2
*
3
4
3
Products o f animal origin intended for human consumption: 
organisation o f official controls
Products o f animal origin, human consumption: health rules (amend, 
direct 89/662/EEC, 91/67/EEC). Food hygiene package 
Electronic communications, universal service : users' rights relating 
to networks and services
Electronic communications: common regulatory framework for 
networks and services
Telecommunications: unbundled access to local loops o f operators 
having significant market power
Electronic communications: access to networks and interconnection, 
new regulatory framework
Radiocommunications, broadcasting, transport: radio spectrum, 
regulatory framework
Electronic communications: authorisation o f networks and services 
(repl. direct. 97/13/EC)
Electronic communications: processing o f personal data, protection 
of privacy (repl. direct 97/66/EC)
Public health: action programmes (exten. dec. 645/96/EC,
646/96/EC, 647/96/EC, 102/97/EC, 1400/97/EC, 1296/99/EC)
Noise pollution: assessment and management o f exposure to 
environmental noise
Employment: Community incentive measures
Intra and extra-Community trading o f goods: trans-european network
for the collection o f statistics, Edicom
Air pollution: cold start emission limits for motor vehicles during 
warming-up (amend, direct 70/220/EEC)
Passenger public transport by rail, raod, inland waterway: 
competition (repl. regul. 1191/69/EEC, 1893/91/EEC)
Insurance: freedom of establishment and services o f the 
intermediaries, protection o f customers 
Animal-health requirements: non commercial movement o f pet 
animals (amend, direct 92/65/EEC)
Coastal zones: integrated management ICZM, implementation o f a 
strategy____________________________________________________
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
Legal affairs, internal market
Industry, external trade, research... **
Industry, external trade, research... **
Industry, external trade, research... **
Industry, external trade, research... **
Industry, external trade, research... **
Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice
Environment, public health, consumers
Conciliation delegation 
Conciliation delegation
Economic, monetary affairs
Environment, public health, consumers
Regional, transport, tourism **
Economic, monetary affairs
Conciliation delegation
Environment, public health, consumers
SCHNELLHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
SCHNELLHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
HARBOUR Malcolm (PPE-DE)
PAASILINNA Reino (PSE)
CLEGG Nicholas (ELDR)
BRUNETTA Renato (PPE-DE)
NIEBLER Angelika (PPE-DE)
NIEBLER Angelika (PPE-DE)
CAPPATO Marco (NI)
TRAKATELLIS Antonios (PPE-DE)
de ROO Alexander (/)
JENSEN Anne Elisabet (ELDR)
LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
LANGE Bemd (PSE)
MEUER Erik (GUE/NGL)
BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
EVANS Jillian (VERTS/ALE)
McKENNA Patricia (VERTS/ALE)
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2 Health police: animal wastes and by-products (amend, direct. 
90/425/EEC, 92/118/EEC, dec. 94/278/CE)
3 Measuring instruments: trading transactions and use o f legally 
controlled instruments
* Coffee and chicory extracts: range o f nominal weights (amend, 
direct 80/232/EEC)
2 Maritime safety and prevention of pollution from ships (amend, 
regul. 613/91/EEC, 2978/94/EC, 3051/95/EC)
2 Maritime safety, prevention o f pollution from ships (amend, direct
93/75/EEC, dec. 1999/468/EC)
2 European system o f national and regional accounts ESA 95: VAT- 
based own resource (amend, regul. 2223/96/EC)
3 Civil aviation: common rules, European Aviation Safety Agency
* Life insurance: solvency margin for undertakings (amend, direct. 
79/267/EEC)
1 Non-life insurance: solvency margin for undertakings (amend, direct. 
73/239/EEC)
* Health police: animal by-products not intended for human 
consumption, animal proteins in animal feed
* Institutions for occupational retirement, pension funds: laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions
4 Recreational craft industry: exhaust and noise emissions from boat 
engines (amend, direct. 94/25/EC)
3 Food safety: law, European Food Authority, safety o f food supply
* Agricultural statistics: production potential o f plantations o f fruit 
trees (repeal, direct. 76/625/EEC)
2 Access to the market in the carriage o f goods by road: uniform driver 
attestation (amend, regul. 811/92/EEC)
2 Road safety: compulsory use o f belts for children under 12 years of
age (amend, direct 91/671/EEC)
4 Public health and human blood: quality and safety of transfusion 
chain (amend, direct. 89/381/EEC)
* Maritime safety: monitoring, control and information for traffic, 
package Erika II (repeal, direct 93/75/EEC)
1 Oil pollution: fund for damage compensation in European waters,
Environment, public health, consumers 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Environment, public health, consumers 
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Regional, transport, tourism **
Budgets
Regional, transport, tourism **
Economic, monetary affairs
Economic, monetary affairs
Conciliation delegation
Economic, monetary affairs
Conciliation delegation 
Environment, public health, consumers
Agriculture
Regional, transport, tourism **
Regional, transport, tourism **
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Regional, transport, tourism **______
PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
CHICHESTER Giles Bryan (PPE-DE)
JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
BAKOPOULOS Emmanouil (GUE/NGL)
BAKOPOULOS Emmanouil (GUE/NGL)
HAUG JuttaD. (PSE)
SCHMITT Ingo (PPE-DE)
ETTL Harald (PSE)
ETTL Harald (PSE)
PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
KARAS Othmar (PPE-DE)
C ALLAN AN Martin (PPE-DE) 
WHITEHEAD Phillip (PSE)
van DAM Rijk (EDD)
HEDKVIST PETERSEN Ewa (PSE)
NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
STERCKX Dirk (ELDR)
ESCLOPE Alain (EDD)______________
package Erika II
2 Maritime safety: creation of a european Agency, package Erika II
3 Internet: Top Level Domain .eu, implementation
4 Environment: public participation in plans and programmes (amend, 
direct 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC)
* Cultural objects : restitution of those unlawfully removed from a 
territory of a Member State (amend, direct 93/7/EEC)
3 Air pollution: emissions from small park ignition engines, non-road 
mobile machinery (amend, direct 97/68/EC)
1 Cooperation EC/Latin America and Asian countries: aid to uprooted 
people after 31/12/2000
4 Air transport safety, civil aviation: prevention o f accidents, collect 
and dissemination o f information
* Road transport: ecopoints for heavy vehicles travelling through 
Austria (amend, protocole 9 act o f accession)
* Machinery, lifts: free movement, safety, health and consumers 
protection (recast direct 98/37/EC, amend. 95/16/EC)
* Food-aid policy: management and support of food security (amend, 
regul. 1292/96/EC, dec. 2000/421/EC)
3 Protection o f employees: insolvency of employee, transnational 
situations (amend, direct 80/987/EEC)
1 Statute and financing o f european political parties
4 Dangerous substances: marketing and use o f pentaBDE in 
polyurethane foam (24th amend, direct. 76/769/CEE)
2 Structural business statistics: additional sectors, credit institutions 
and pension funds (amend, regul. 58/97/EC)
1 Maritime transport: formalities for ships arriving in and departing 
from Member States ports, IMO FAL convention
4 Environment: 6th Community action programme 2001-2010
3 Road transport: training of professional drivers for the carriage of 
goods or passengers (regul. 3820/85/EEC)
1 Capital market, financial services: application of international 
accounting standards
2 European statistical system: common classification of territorial units 
for statistics NUTS
MASTORAKIS Emmanouil (PSE) 
FLESCH Colette (ELDR)
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Industry, external trade, research... **
Conciliation delegation
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Environment, public health, consumers
Development, cooperation
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Legal affairs, internal market
Development, cooperation
Employment, social affairs 
Constitutional Affairs **
Conciliation delegation
Economic, monetary affairs
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Legal affairs, internal market
Regional, transport, tourism **______
KORHOLA Eija-Riitta Anneli (PPE-DE)
BOUWMAN Theodoras J.J. (VERTS/ALE) 
SCHLEICHER Ursula (PPE-DE)
RIES Fr&terique (ELDR)
LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
VATANEN Ari (PPE-DE)
MYLLER Riitta (PSE)
GROSCH Mathieu J.H. (PPE-DE)
INGLEWOOD (PPE-DE)
MIGUELEZ RAMOS Rosa (PSE)________
LANGE Bemd (PSE)
CARRILHO Maria (PSE)
COLLINS Gerard (UEN) 
SWOBODA Johannes (Hannes) (PSE) 
WIELAND Rainer (PPE-DE)
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1
Port services: market access and financing of maritime ports 
Transport policy: rail statistics for passengers, freight and safety 
European research area: activities within the scope of the EC 
framework programme 2002-2006
General government: quarterly non-financial accounts, ESA 95 
categories
Europe's sky: framework for the creation of a single European sky 
and action programme
Environmental protection: combating crime, criminal offences and 
penalties
Energy: rules for the internal market in electricity (repeal, direct 
96/92/EC)
Energy: rules for the internal market in natural gas (repeal, direct. 
98/30/EC)
Energy: internal market in electricity, cross-border exchanges, access 
to network
European financial markets: financial collateral arrangements and 
legal certainty, consequences on the SMEs 
Financial markets and institutions: stability, prudential regulation, 
legal certainty (amend, directives)
Energy policy: energy performance o f the bindings of the Union, 
energy saves and efficiency
Quality o f petrol and diesel fuels: level of sulphur (amend, direct. 
98/70/EC)
Dangerous substances: carcinogens, mutagens or toxic to 
reproduction, c/m/r (23rd amend, direct. 76/769/EEC)
Union citizenship: free movement and residence for citizens and 
their families within the Member Stales' territory 
Fight against fraud: criminal-law protection of die Community's 
financial interests
Capital market: prospectus to be published for securities (overhaul 
direct 80/390/EEC, 89/298/EEC, 2001/34/EC)
Financial markets: insider dealing and market abuse (repeal, direct. 
89/592/EEC)
Tobacco products: advertising and sponsorship (repl. direct._______
Conciliation delegation 
Regional, transport, tourism **
Industry, external trade, research... **
Economic, monetary affairs
Conciliation delegation
Environment, public health, consumers
Industry, external trade, research... **
Industry, external trade, research... **
Industry, external trade, research... **
Economic, monetary affairs
Economic, monetary affairs
Industry, external trade, research... **
Conciliation delegation
Conciliation delegation
Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice
Budgetary control
Economic, monetary affairs
Economic, monetary affairs
Legal affairs, internal market________
JARZEMBOWSKI Georg (PPE-DE) 
CAMIS6N ASENSIO Felipe (PPE-DE)
CAUDRON Gerard (PSE)
RANDZIO-PLATH Christa (PSE)
FAVA Giovanni Claudio (PSE)
OOMEN-RUUTEN Ria G.H.C. (PPE-DE)
TURMES Claude (VERTS/ALE)
RAPKAY Bernhard (PSE)
MOMB AUR Peter Michael (PPE-DE)
PEREZ ROYO Fernando (PSE)
LIPIETZ Alain (VERTS/ALE)
VIDAL-QUADRAS ROCA Alejo (PPE-DE)
HAUTALA Heidi Anneli (VERTS/ALE)
NISTICO’ Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
SANTINI Giacomo (PPE-DE)
THEATO DiemutR. (PPE-DE)
HUHNE Christopher (ELDR)
GOEBBELS Robert (PSE)
MEDINA ORTEGA Manuel (PSE)_______
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98/43/EC)
2 Labour force in the Community: sample survey, follow-up of 
employment and unemployment (amend, regul. 577/98/EC)
2 Road safety: speed limitation devices for commercial motor vehicles 
(amend, direct 92/6/EEC)
* European parliamentary assistants: application of social security 
schemes (amend, regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)
* Agreement EC/Romania: road and combined transport, distribution 
of authorizations (amend, regul. 685/01/EC)
2 Environment: promoting NGO primarily active in the environmetal 
protection (repeal, dec. 97/872/EC)
* Air transport: slots at Community airports and competition (amend, 
regul. 95/93/EEC)
1 Air transport: slots at Community airports and competition (amend, 
regul. 95/93/EEC, art. 10b)
3 Safety and security at work: protection from the risks related to 
exposure to asbestos (amend, direct. 83/477/EEC)
2 Labour market, statistics: labour cost index
3 Food safety: genetically modified food and feed
2 Cross-border payments in euro: reducing bank charges
2 Public health: monitoring of zoonoses and zoonotic agents (amend, 
dec. 90/424/EEC, repeal, direct. 92/117/EEC)
3 Public health: control of salmonella and food-born zoonotic agents 
(amend, direct 64/432/EEC, 72/462/EEC, 90/532/EEC)
2 Public procurement: common vocabulary CPV
3 Genetically modified organisms GMOs: traceability and labelling 
(amend, direct 2001/18/EC)
3 Excisable products: computerised intra-Community movement 
system
* Medical devices incorporating stable derivates of human blood or 
human plasma (amend, direct 93/42/EEC, 2000/70/EC)
2 Science and technology: production and development of Community 
statistics
3 Health : indication of the ingredients in foodstuffs (amend, direct. 
2000/13/EC)_______________________________________________
Employment, social affairs
Regional, transport, tourism **
Employment, social affairs
Regional, transport, tourism **
Environment, public health, consumers
Regional, transport, tourism **
Regional, transport, tourism **
Employment, social affairs 
Economic, monetary affairs 
Environment, public health, consumers 
Economic, monetary affairs
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers 
Legal affairs, internal market
Environment, public health, consumers
Economic, monetary affairs
Environment, public health, consumers
Industry, external trade, research... **
Environment, public health, consumers
BOUWMAN Theodoras J.J. (VERTS/ALE) 
HATZDDAKIS Konstantinos (PPE-DE) 
GDLLIG Marie-Helene (PSE)
JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
STOCKMANN Ulrich (PSE)
CAVERI Luciano (ELDR)
D AMLAO Elisa Maria (PSE)
MAYOL i RAYNAL Miquel (VERTS/ALE) 
SCHEELE Karin (PSE)
PEUS Karla M.H. (PPE-DE)
PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
ZAPPALA' Stefano (PPE-DE)
TRAKATELLIS Antonios (PPE-DE)
KAUPPI Piia-Noora (PPE-DE)
NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
KLASS Christa (PPE-DE)_______________
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Research EC framework programme 2002-2006: results 
dissemination, participation of undertakings and universities 
Electronic interchange of data between administrations IDA II: 
guidelines (amend, dec. 1719/1999/EC)
Electronic interchange of data between administrations IDA II: 
networks interoperability (amend, dec. 1720/1999/EC)
Fertilizers (recast direct 76/116/EEC, 80/876/EEC, 87/94/EEC, 
77/535/EEC)
Trans-european networks: rules for granting financial aid (amend, 
iegul. 2236/95/EC)
Internal market: sales promotions and consumer protection, 
transparency
Transeuropean network of transport: Community guidelines of 
development (amend, dec. 1692/96/EC)
Air transport: common rules for civil aviation security 
Air transport: single European sky, provision of navigation services 
Air trasport: single European sky, organisation and use o f the 
airspace
Air transport: single European sky, interoperability of the traffic 
management network
Road transport: harmonisation of social legislation (repl. regul. 
3820/85/EEC, amend, regul. 3821/85/EEC)
Cooperation for development: decentralised cooperation, extension 
until 31.12.2003 (amend, regul. 1659/98/EC)
European Year o f education through sport 2004
Air pollution, greenhouse gas emission: scheme for allowance trading
(amend, direct 96/61/EC)
Combating AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria: Community contribution 
to the Global Fund
Medicinal products for human and veterinary use: authorisation and
supervision, European Agency for evaluation
Medicinal products for human use: Community code (amend, direct
2001/83/EC)
Veterinary medicinal products: Community code (amend, direct. 
2001/82/EC) _____________  __________________
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Legal affairs, internal market 
Budgets
Legal affairs, internal market
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Conciliation delegation 
Conciliation delegation
Conciliation delegation
Conciliation delegation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Development, cooperation 
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Environment, public health, consumers
Development, cooperation
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
QUISTHOUDT-ROWOHL Godelieve (PPE-DE)
READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
LECHNER Kurt (PPE-DE)
TURCHI Franz (UEN)
BEYSEN Ward (ELDR)
BRADBOURN Philip Charles (PPE-DE)
FOSTER Jacqueline (PPE-DE)
SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
MARKOV Helmuth (GUE/NGL)
CARRILHO Maria (PSE)
PACK Doris (PPE-DE)
MOREIRA DA SILVA Jorge (PPE-DE)
MULLER Rosemarie (PSE)
GROSSETETE Frangoise (PPE-DE)
GROSSE iE'lE Frangoise (PPE-DE)___________________
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Air pollution: C02 emissions, fuel consumption of N1 light 
commercial vehicles (amend, direct. 70/156/EEC, 80/1268/EEC) 
Industrial major-accidents: hazard control, dangerous substances 
(amend, direct 96/82/EC, Seveso II)
Energy: use o f biofuels for road transport
Forests: protection against atmospheric pollution, extension to 2002 
(amend, regul. 3528/86/EEC)
Forests : protection against fire, extension to 2002 (amend, regul. 
2158/92/EEC)
Animal protection: use for experimental and scientific puiposes 
(amend, direct 86/609/EEC)
Community statistics: 2003-2007 programme 
Acoustic pollution: noise-related operating restrictions at 
Community airports
Packaging and packaging waste (amend, direct 94/62/EC) 
Community statistics: income and living conditions in the Union EU- 
SILC
Telecommunications: trans-european networks, guidelines (rev. 
annex I dec. 1336/97/EC)
Air transport: compensation and assistance to air passengers for a 
denied boarding (repeal, regul. 295/91/EEC)
Noise pollution: noise classification o f civil subsonic aircraft, 
calculation o f noise charges
Road transport: ecopoints for heavy vehicles transiting through 
Austria for 2004
Trans-European energy networks: guidelines (repeal, dec. 
1254/96/EC)
Commission, implementing powers: adapting provisions relating to 
committees, procedure art 251 EC Treaty 
Road safety: mirrors, systems for indirect vision on vehicles (amend, 
direct. 70/156/EEC, repeal, direct 71/127/EEC)
Public health: traditional herbal medicinal products (amend, direct 
2001/83/EC)
Air transport: allocation of slots at Community airports (amend. 
regul. 95/93/EEC)___________________________________________
Environment, public health, consumers GOODWILL Robert (PPE-DE)
Conciliation delegation
Industry, external trade, research... **
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers 
Economic, monetary affairs
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Conciliation delegation
Employment, social affairs
Industry, external trade, research... **
Conciliation delegation
Environment, public health, consumers
Conciliation delegation
Industry, external trade, research... **
Constitutional Affairs **
Legal affairs, internal market
Environment, public health, consumers
Regional, transport, tourism **_______
LISI Giorgio (PPE-DE)
AYUSO GONZALEZ Maria del Pilar (PPE-DE)
REDONDO JIMENEZ Encamacion (PPE-DE)
REDONDO JIMENEZ Encamacion (PPE-DE)
JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
JARZEMBOWSKI Georg (PPE-DE)
CORBEY Dorette (PSE)
BOUWMAN Theodoras J.J. (VERTS/ALE)
FLESCH Colette (ELDR)
LISI Giorgio (PPE-DE)
BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD)
COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
CLEGG Nicholas (ELDR)
FRASSONI Monica (VERTS/ALE)
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
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4 Air safety: third countries aircraft using Community airports Conciliation delegation MAES Nelly (VERTS/ALE)
2 Indirect taxation in the internal market: Fiscalis programme 2003- 
2007 Economic, monetary affairs GARCIA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL Jose Manuel (PPE-DE)
2 Agricultural and forestry tractors: EC type-approval (repeal, direct 
74/50/EEC) Legal affairs, internal market GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
4 Environment: liability with regard to the prevention and remedying 
of environmental damage Conciliation delegation MANDERS Toine (ELDR)
* Community's railways: safety, licensing, levying o f charges, 
certification (direct. 95/18/EC, 2001/14/EC). 2nd package Conciliation delegation STERCKX Dirk (ELDR)
* Trans-European railway transport: interoperability (amend, direct 
96/48/EC, 2001/16/EC). 2nd package Conciliation delegation AINARDI Sylviane H. (GUE/NGL)
* European railway area: European Railway Agency for 
interoperability and safety. 2nd package Conciliation delegation SAVARY Gilles (PSE)
* Railway transport: development o f the Community's railways 
(amend, direct 91/440/EEC). 2nd package Conciliation delegation JARZEMBOWSKI Georg (PPE-DE)
1 Dangerous chemicals: export and import, Rotterdam Convention 
provisions Environment, public health, consumers BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD)
1 Customs: action programme Customs 2007,2003-2007 Legal affairs, internal market FOURTOU Janelly (PPE-DE)
2 Freight transport system: improving the environmental performance, 
programme Marco Polo PACT Regional, transport, tourism ** BRADBOURN Philip Charles (PPE-DE)
2 Dangerous substances: carcinogens, mutagens, toxic to reproduction 
c/m/r (25th amend, direct. 76/769/EEC) Environment, public health, consumers SCHORLING Inger (VERTS/ALE)
1 Agricultural statistics: improving and extension until 2007 (amend, 
dec. 96/411/EC) Agriculture JOVE PERES Salvador (GUE/NGL)
3 Biosafety: genetically modified organisms GMOs, Cartagena 
Protocol Environment, public health, consumers SJOSTEDT Jonas (GUE/NGL)
* Patent law: patentability of computer-implemented inventions Legal affairs, internal market McCa r t h y  Arlene (PSE)
1 Developing countries, poverty diseases: combating HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis Development, cooperation WUKMAN Anders (PPE-DE)
1 Health in developing countries: reproductive and sexual rights 
(repeal, regul. 1484/97/EC) Development, cooperation SANDBiEK Ulla Margrethe (EDD)
* Professional qualifications: mutual recognition o f the regulated 
professions to ensure free movement Legal affairs, internal market ZAPPALA' Stefano (PPE-DE)
3 Air transport: protection against unfair pricing practices from 
countries not members of the Community Regional, transport, tourism ** CLEGG Nicholas (ELDR)
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1 Internet: 1999-2002 action plan on promoting a safer use (amend, 
dec. 276/1999/EC), extension to 2004 Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice NEWTON DUNN Bill (ELDR)
* Temporary work: protective framework for workers, relationship 
with the temporary agency Employment, social affairs van den BURG Ieke (PSE)
3 Food safety: additive in feedingstuffs and in drinking water for 
animal nutrition Agriculture KEPPELHOFF-WIECHERT Hedwig (PPE-DE)
1 Safe seas: ro-ro passenger ships, specific stability requirements Regional, transport, tourism ** POIGNANT Bernard (PSE)
1 Safe seas: passenger ships, safety rules and standards (amend, direct 
98/18/EC) Regional, transport, tourism ** RIPOLL Y MARTINEZ DE BEDOYA Carlos (PPE-DE)
* Expiry o f the ECSC Treaty: prolongation of the statistics Industry, external trade, research... **
3 Energy and sustainable development: multiannual programme 
'intelligent energy for Europe", 2003-2006 Industry, external trade, research... ** McNALLY Eryl Margaret (PSE)
2 Civil judicial cooperation: European enforcement order for 
uncontested claims Legal affairs, internal market WUERMELING Joachim (PPE-DE)
* Education, training: programme Socrates, 2nd phase (amend, dec. 
253/2000/EC) Culture, youth, education, media, sport ROCARD Michel (PSE)
2 EMU, statistics: transmission o f the main aggregates national 
accounts, employment data (amend, regul. 2223/96/EC) Economic, monetary affairs LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
1 Insurance undertakings: annual and consolidated accounts and 
standards IAS (amend, direct 78/660,83/349, 91/674/EEC) Legal affairs, internal market THYSSEN Marianne L.P. (PPE-DE)
1 Company law: access to informations, disclosure requirements 
(amend. direct68/151/EEC) Legal affairs, internal market LEHNE Klaus-Heiner (PPE-DE)
3 Information market: re-use and commercial exploitation of public 
sector documents Industry, external trade, research... ** van VELZEN W.G. (PPE-DE)
* Insurance of motor vehicles : civil liability, protection of victims of 
accidents (4th motor directive) Legal affairs, internal market ROTHLEY Willi (PSE)
* Medicine : standards of quality and safety of human tissues and cells Environment, public health, consumers LIESE Peter (PPE-DE)
* Organisation o f working time (direct. 93/104/EC). Codified version Legal affairs, internal market GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Money laundering: prevention by means of customs cooperation Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice SCHMITT Ingo (PPE-DE)
* Cooperation to development: Asian and Latin America countries 
ALA (amend, regul. 2258/96/EC) Development, cooperation SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
3 Products o f animal origin, human consumption: safety, controls 
(amend, direct. 89/662,91/67/EEC). Hygiene package Environment, public health, consumers SCHNELLHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
1 Environment: anti-fouling paints used on ships, prohibition of 
organotin compounds Regional, transport, tourism ** CAVERI Luciano (ELDR)
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Human consumption: nex sweeteners additives, sucralose and salt of 
aspartame (amend, direct 94/35/EC)
Food safety : smoke flavourings used on foods, authorisation 
procedure (direct 88/388, regul. 178/2002/EC)
Forests : protection and monitoring of atmospheric pollution and 
fires, action 2003-2008 Forest Focus
Higher education: co-operation with third countries, programme 
Erasmus Mundus 2004-2008
European Environment Agency: budget and finances, access to 
documents (amend, regul. 1210/90/EEC)
European Food Safety Agency: budget and finances, access to 
documents (amend, regul. 178/2002/EC)
European Aviation Safety Agency: budget and finances, access to 
documents (amend, regul. 1592/2002/EC)
European Maritime Safety Agency: budget and finances, access to 
documents (amend, regul. 1406/2002/EC)
Energy: security of supply, providing heat and electricity by 
cogeneration (amend, direct. 92/42/EEC)
Information society, eEurope: good practices and network security, 
MODINIS programme 2003-2005
Human health, food additives: conditions o f use for E 425 konjac 
(amend, direct. 95/2/EC)
Health and environment: use of nonylphenol, nonylphenol ethoxylate 
and cement (26th amend, direct. 76/769/EEC)
Combating AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis: research partnership 
Europe/developing countries
Environmental protection: free movement of detergents, 
biodegradability and labelling
Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances: trade in drug precursors,
monitoring and surveillance
Energy: petroleum products, security of supply
Credit for consumers: harmonisation of the laws of the member
States (repeal, direct. 87/102/EEC)
Chemical substances: tests, good laboratory practice (direct. 
87/18/EEC). Codified version_________________________________
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Budgets
Budgets
Budgets
Budgets
Industry, external trade, research... **
Industry, external trade, research... **
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
Industry, external trade, research... **
Environment, public health, consumers
Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice 
Industry, external trade, research... **
Legal affairs, internal market
Legal affairs, internal market________
FERREIRA Anne (PSE)
MALLIORI Minerva Melpomeni (PSE)
REDONDO JIMENEZ Encamacion (PPE-DE)
DE S ARNEZ Marielle (PPE-DE)
DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
DELL'ALB A Gianfranco (NI)
DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
GLANTE Norbert (PSE)
READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
LANNOYE Paul A.A.J.G. (VERTS/ALE)
CAUDRON Gerard (PSE)
NOB ILIA Mauro (UEN)
PIRKER Hubert (PPE-DE)
KARLSSON Hans (PSE)
WUERMELING Joachim (PPE-DE)
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)____________
230
1 Good laboratory practice: inspection and verification (direct 
88/320/EEC). Codified version Legal affairs, internal market GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
3 Air transport: insurance for air carriers and aircraft operators Regional, transport, tourism ** NICHOLSON James (PPE-DE)
1 Company law: takeover bids Legal affairs, internal market LEHNE Klaus-Heiner (PPE-DE)
1 Steel industry: annual Community statistics on steel for 2003-2009 Industry, external trade, research... ** WESTENDORP Y CABEZA Carlos (PSE)
* Pollution, public health: quality of bathing water (repeal, direct. 
76/160/EEC) Environment, public health, consumers MAATEN Jules (ELDR)
* Environment: sulphur content o f marine fuels and heavy fueloils 
(amend, direct 1999/32/EC) Environment, public health, consumers de ROO Alexander (VERTS/ALE)
* Environment, ozone layer: halons, chlorofluorocarbons CFCs and 
bromochloromethane (amend, regul. 2037/2000/EC) Environment, public health, consumers JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
3 Investment services and regulated markets (amend, direct 
85/611/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 2000/12/EC) Economic, monetary affairs VILLIERS Theresa (PPE-DE)
1 Foodstuff: additives facilitating the storage and the use of flavourings 
(amend direct. 95/2/EC) Environment, public health, consumers AYUSO GONZALEZ Maria del Pilar (PPE-DE)
2 Air pollution: volatile organic compounds due to organic solvents, 
programme CAFE (amend, direct 1999/13/EC) Environment, public health, consumers LISI Giorgio (PPE-DE)
3 Education and training systems: eLearning programme 2004-2006 for 
integration o f information technologies Culture, youth, education, media, sport MAURO Mario (PPE-DE)
1 Air pollution: compression ignition engines by non-road mobile 
machinery (amend, direct 97/68/EC) Environment, public health, consumers LANGE Bemd (PSE)
* Electrical and electronic equipment: electromagnetic compatibility 
(revision direct. EMC 89/336/EEC) Industry, external trade, research... ** BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
* Transeuropean road network : minimum safety requirements for 
tunnels Regional, transport, tourism ** RACK Reinhard (PPE-DE)
1 Safety at sea: double hull or equivalent design requirements for oil 
tankers (regul. 417/2002,2978/94/EC) Regional, transport, tourism ** PIECYK Wilhelm Ernst (PSE)
1 Shipping: seafarers, minimum level of training (amend, direct 
2001/25/EC) Regional, transport, tourism ** POIGNANT Bernard (PSE)
1 Consumers: financing Community actions 2004-2007, general 
framework Environment, public health, consumers WHITEHEAD Phillip (PSE)
1 Common agricultural policy CAP: economic accounts for agriculture 
EAA, methodology and time limits Agriculture IZQUDERDO ROJO Maria (PSE)
1 Intellectual property: enforcing the rights, measures and procedures Legal affairs, internal market FOURTOU Janelly (PPE-DE)
3 Daphne II programme 2004-2008: combating violence against Women, equal opportunities GRONERLissy (PSE)
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children, young people and women
Air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, monitoring mechanism, 
Kyoto protocol (repeal, dec. 93/389/EEC)
Food safety: feed and food, official controls 
Information society, eEurope 2005: European network and 
information security Agency
Road safety: protection of pedestrians, changes to the front of 
vehicles (amend, direct. 70/156/EEC)
Maritime safety, prevention of pollution caused by ships: penalties 
for infringements
Political parties at European level: statute and financing 
Air transport between the Community and third countries: 
negotiation and implementation of air service agreements 
Securities: issuers trading on a regulated market, transparency 
requirements (amend, direct. 2001/34/EC)
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies TSE: prevention and 
control, transitional measures 1st july 2005 
Labour force in the Community: sample survey on employment and 
unemployment (amend, regul. 577/98/EC)
Pesticide: maximum levels o f residue (repeal, direct. 76/895/EEC, 
86/362/EEC, 86/363/EEC, 90/642/EEC)
Multimodal transport: intermodal loading units, transferred 
containers or swap bodies
Travel services: indirect taxation (VAT), administrative cooperation 
(amend, regul. 218/92/EEC)
Road safety: two-wheel motor vehicles, passenger hand-holds. 
Codified version
Road safety: two-wheel motor vehicles, requirements for stands. 
Codified version
Milk and milk products : statistical surveys (amend, direct. 96/16/EC) 
Audiovisual industry : training programme for professionals, 
MEDIA-Training 2001-2005 (amend, dec. 163/2001/EC)
Audiovisual industry: development, distribution, promotion o f works, 
MEDIA Plus for 2006 (amend, dec. 2000/821/EC)
Animal feed: hygiene requirements and traceability of feed_________
Environment, public health, consumers 
Environment, public health, consumers
Industry, external trade, research... **
Regional, transport, tourism **
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Constitutional Affairs **
Regional, transport, tourism **
Economic, monetary affairs
Environment, public health, consumers
Employment, social affairs
Environment, public health, consumers
Regional, transport, tourism **
Economic, monetary affairs
Legal affairs, internal market
Legal affairs, internal market 
Agriculture
SACCONI Guido (PSE)
PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
PAASELINNA Reino (PSE)
VERMEER Herman (ELDR)
PEX Peter (PPE-DE)
LEINEN Jo (PSE)
SCHMITT Ingo (PPE-DE)
SKINNER Peter William (PSE)
JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
BOUWMAN Theodoras J.J. (VERTS/ALE)
STURDY Robert William (PPE-DE)
STOCKMANN Ulrich (PSE)
TORRES MARQUES Helena (PSE)
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
DAUL Joseph (PPE-DE)
Culture, youth, education, media, sport VATTIMO Gianni (PSE)
Culture, youth, education, media, sport 
Environment, public health, consumers
VELTRONI Walter (PSE) 
KEPPELHOFF-WIECHERT Hedwig (PPE-DE)
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1 Culture 2000: framework programme 2000-2004, extension to 2006 
(amend, dec. 508/2000/EC) Culture, youth, education, media, sport ROCARD Michel (PSE)
2 Trans-European transport network: electronic road toll systems, 
widespread introduction and interoperability Regional, transport, tourism ** SOMMER Renate (PPE-DE)
1 Environment: waste electrical and electronic equipment WEEE, 
financing (amend, direct. 2002/96/EC) Environment public health, consumers FLORENZ Karl-Heinz (PPE-DE)
1 Agricultural statistics: aerial-surveys and remote-sensing techniques 
for 2004-2007 (amend, dec. 1445/2000/EC) Agriculture D AUL Joseph (PPE-DE)
* Transeuropean networks: eTen telecommunications programme, 
funding ceiling (amend, regul. 2236/95/EC) Industry, external trade, research... ** READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
1 Maritime transport: ship and port facility security Regional, transport, tourism ** MIGUELEZ RAMOS Rosa (PSE)
* Electrical industry: Community law on equipment subject to voltage 
limits (direct 73/23/EEC). Codification Legal affairs, internal market GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
2 General government: quarterly financial accounts, ESA 95 categories Economic, monetary affairs LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
* Protection of consumers' interests: Community law on injunctions 
(direct 98/27/EC). Codification Legal affairs, internal market GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Extractive industries: management of waste, juridical framework Environment public health, consumers SJOSTEDT Jonas (GUE/NGL)
3 Equality women and men: grants to organisations active at European 
level, 2004-2005 action programme Women, equal opportunities KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU Rodi (PPE-DE)
3 European youth: grants to bodies active at European level, 2004-2006 
action programme Culture, youth, education, media, sport PRETS Christa (PSE)
3 Education and training : grants to bodies active at European level, 
2004-2006 action programme Culture, youth, education, media, sport PACK Doris (PPE-DE)
2 Culture: grants to bodies active at European level, 2004-2006 action 
programme Culture, youth, education, media, sport IIVARI Ulpu (PSE)
* Environment: persistent organic pollutants (amend, direct. 
79/117/EEC and 96/59/EC), Stockholm Convention 2001 Environment public health, consumers FRAHM Pemille (GUE/NGL)
1 Road safety: motor vehicles, speed limitation devices and systSmes 
(amend, direct 92/24/EEC) Regional, transport, tourism ** COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
1 Asylum and migration: programme for financial and technical 
assistance to third countries, 2004-2008 Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice SANTINI Giacomo (PPE-DE)
1 Statistics on the trading of goods between Member States Intrastat: 
common framework 2005 (repeal, regul. 3330/91/EEC) Economic, monetary affairs LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
* Road safety: seats, anchorages, head restraints and safety belts 
(amend, direct 74/408/EEC, 96/37/EC) Regional, transport, tourism ** KOCH Dieter-Lebrecht (PPE-DE)
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* Road safety: safety belts and restraint systems (amend, direct. 
77/541/EEC, 2000/3/EC)
* Consumer protection: unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices (amend, dir. 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC)
* Road safety: anchorages of safety belts (amend, direct. 76/115/EEC, 
96/38/EC)
1 Social security: employed persons, self-employed persons, and their 
families (amend, regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)
* Waste: supervision and control of shipments, Base Convention 1989 
and OECD Decision 1992 (regul. 259/93/EEC)
* Pan-European eGovernment services and networks: interoperable 
delivery, programme ID ABC 2005-2009, follow-up IDA II
* LIFE III, financial instrument for the environment (amend, regul. 
1655/2000/EC)
1 Fight against fraud: protection of the Community financial interests, 
Hercule action programme 2004-2006
* Car industry: harmonised approval of vehicles, trailers, systems 
(repeal., repl. direct. 70/156/EEC)
1 Development cooperation: decentralized cooperation, 2004-2006 
(exten. and amend, regul. 1659/98/EC)
1 Marine pollution: European Maritime safety Agency (amend, regul. 
1406/2002/EC)
* Consumer protection: cross-border infringements, administrative and 
legal cooperation
* Air quality: heavy metals, arsenic, cadmium, mercury, nickel, 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (direct. 96/62/EC)
* Foodstuffs: nutritrion or health claims used in the labelling (amend, 
direct 2000/13/EC)
* Community customs code: treatments, controls and risk-related 
informations (amend, regul. 2913/92/EC)
* Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters: cross-border 
disputes, non-contractual obligations, Rome II
* Environment: setting o f eco-design requirements for energy-using 
products (amend, direct. 92/42/EEC)
* Air pollution: greenhouse gas emission allowance trading, Kyoto
Regional, transport, tourism **
Legal affairs, internal market
Regional, transport, tourism **
Employment, social affairs
Environment, public health, consumers
Industry, external trade, research... **
Environment, public health, consumers
Budgetary control
Legal affairs, internal market
Development, cooperation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Legal affairs, internal market
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
Legal affairs, internal market
Legal affairs, internal market
Environment, public health, consumers 
Environment, public health, consumers
COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
GfflLARDOTTI Fiorella (PSE)
COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
JENSEN Anne Elisabet (ELDR)
BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD)
READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
BOSCH Herbert (PSE)
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
ZIMMERLING Jurgen (PPE-DE)
MASTORAKIS Emmanouil (PSE)
GEBHARDT Evelyne (PSE)
KRONBERGER Hans (NI)
NOBILIA Mauro (UEN)
FOURTOU Janelly (PPE-DE)
WALLIS Diana (ELDR)
THORS Astrid (ELDR)
de ROO Alexander (VERTS/ALE)
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1
Protocol, linkage directive
Public health: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
ECDC Environment, public health, consumers BOWIS John (PPE-DE)
* Road transport: charging of heavy goods vehicles and infrastructures 
fees (amend, direct 1999/62/CE Euiovignette) Regional, transport, tourism ** COCILOVO Luigi (PPE-DE)
2 Development cooperation: promoting gender equality Women, equal opportunities ZRIHEN Olga (PSE)
1 Maritime tranport and safety: transfer of cargo and passenger ships 
between registers within the Community Regional, transport, tourism ** POIGNANT Bernard (PSE)
* Foodstuff and food ingredients : extraction solvents used in the 
production (direct. 83/344/EEC). Codified version Legal affairs, internal market GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Social security : employed, self employed persons and families 
(amend, regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC) Employment, social affairs GILLIG Marie-Helene (PSE)
* Climate change: fluorinated greenhouse gases, hydrofluorocaibons 
HFCs, perfluorocarbons PFCs, sulphur hexafluoride Environment, public health, consumers GOODWILL Robert (PPE-DE)
* Schengen Convention: access for vehicle registration authorities to 
the Information System SIS Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice COELHO Carlos (PPE-DE)
1 Information society, eEurope: Community statistics Industry, external trade, research... ** BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
* Community statistics: diffusion and creation of the Balanceof 
Payments Committee Industry, external trade, research... ** BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
1 West Bank and Gaza Strip: financial and technical cooperation 
(amend, regul. 1734/94/EC) Industry, external trade, research... ** BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
* Air pollution: compression-ignition or positive-ignition engines, 
natural or liquefied petroleum gas. Recast version Environment, public health, consumers LANGE Bemd (PSE)
* Civil aviation: operation of civil subsonic jet aeroplanes (direct. 
92/14/EEC). Codification Legal affairs, internal market GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Protection of groundwater: prevention and control of pollution Environment, public health, consumers SCHLEICHER Ursula (PPE-DE)
* Vehicles hired without drivers: use for the carriage of goods by road 
(direct. 84/647/EEC). Codified version Legal affairs, internal market GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Air transport: common mles for civil aviation security (amend, regul. 
2320/2002/EC) Regional, transport, tourism ** DHAENE Jan (VERTS/ALE)
* Road safety: frontal protection systems on motor vehicles (amend. 
Direct. 70/156/EEC) Regional, transport, tourism ** HEDKVIST PETERSEN Ewa (PSE)
* Agricultural surveys in 2005 and 2007: structure of holdings o f the 
new Member States (amend, regul. 571/88/EEC) Budgets BOGE Reimer (PPE-DE)
* Environment: access to information and justice, public participation, Environment, public health, consumers KORHOLA Eija-Riitta Anneli (PPE-DE)
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application of the Arhus Convention
Development cooperation, EC/South Africa relations (amend, regul. 
1726/2000/EC)
Environment: public's right o f access to justice
Cooperation to development: democracy, rule of law, human rights
(piorog. regul. 975/1999/EC)
Driving licences: issue, validity, renewal. Recasting (repeal direct 
91/438/EEC)
Road transport, working time: enforcing social legislation (direct. 
2002/15/CE)
Chemicals : REACH system and European Agency (amend, direct 
999/45/EC, regul. on persistent organic pollutants)
Chemicals : classification, labelling, packaging, adaptation to the 
REACH regulation (amend, direct 67/548/EEC)
LIFE III, financial instrument for the environment: extension till 31 
December 2006 (amend, regul. 1655/2000/EC)
Protection o f human health: addition o f nutrients to food 
Financial services: new organisational structure of the committees 
(amend. 8 directives)
Food safety: materials and articles intended to come into contact with 
food (repeal, direct 8/109/EEC)
European capital of culture: criteria for submitting nomination of 
cities, 2009-2019 (amend, direct. 1419/1999/EC)
Cross-border merges between various types of company with share 
capital
Environment: treating and disposing o f batteries and accumulators 
(repeal direct 91/157/EEC, 91/101/EC, 93/86/EEC)
Waste (direct. 75/442/EEC). Codification
Maritime transport: activities o f third countries in the field of cargo
shipping (codif. direct 78/774/EEC)
Maritime transport: International Safety Management Code ISM, 
applic. to ro-ro passenger ferries (regul. 3051/95/EC)
Small and medium-sized enterprises SMEs: multiannual programme 
2001-2005 (amend, dec. 2000/819/EC)
European audiovisual Observatory: Community participation till
Development, cooperation 
Environment, public health, consumers
Development, cooperation
Regional, transport, tourism **
Regional, transport, tourism **
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers
Environment, public health, consumers 
Environment, public health, consumers
Economic, monetary affairs
Environment, public health, consumers
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Legal affairs, internal market
Environment, public health, consumers 
Legal affairs, internal market
Legal affairs, internal market
Regional, transport, tourism **
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
MAES Nelly (VERTS/ALE)
SCHORLING Inger (VERTS/ALE)
FERNANDEZ MARTIN Fernando (PPE-DE)
GROSCH Mathieu J.H. (PPE-DE)
MARKOV Helmuth (GUE/NGL)
SACCONI Guido (PSE)
SACCONI Guido (PSE)
JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
LUND Torben (PSE)
RANDZIO-PLATH Christa (PSE)
THORS Astrid (ELDR)
ROCARD Michel (PSE)
ROTHLEY Willi (PSE)
BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD)
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
RUBIG Paul (PPE-DE)
SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
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31.12.2006 (amend, dec. 1999/784/EC)
EMU statistics: quaterly non-financial accounts by institutional 
sector, common framework for Member States 
Trans-European energy networks: guidelines for the enlargement 
(repeal, dec. 96/391/EC, 1229/2003/EC)
Energy policy: promote the energy efficiency for end-users, energy 
saves
Internal market for electricity: safeguard security o f supplies, 
infrastructure investment
Energy: internal market in natural gas, cross-border exchanges, 
access to the transmission networks
Enlargement: reference amounts of expenditure programmes adopted 
by co-decision (amend, decisions sui generis)
Enlargement: reference amounts of expenditure programmes adopted 
by co-decision (amend, decisions)
Enlargement: reference amounts of expenditure programmes adopted 
by co-decision (amend, regulations)
Education and training: transparency of qualifications and 
competences, single framework Europass 
Excise duties: administrative cooperation and exchange of 
information (amend, direct 77/799/EEC, 92/12/EEC)
Water pollution: dangerous substances discharged in the aquatic 
environment (direct 76/464/EEC). Codified version 
Internal market: freedom of establishment for service providers and 
free movement of services
Water policy, pollution: quality o f waters capable of supporting 
freshwater fish (codif. direct. 78/659/EEC)
Carriage o f goods by road (repeal, direct 62/2005/EEC). Codified 
version
Internet: 2005-2008 action programme on promoting a safer use, 
Safer Internet plus.
European digital content: quality, access to, use and exploitation, 
eContentplus. 2005-2008 programme.
Maritime transport: enhancing port security
Fight against fraud: investigations by the European anti-fraud Office
Economic, monetary affairs 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Budgets 
Budgets 
Budgets
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
Economic, monetary affairs
Legal affairs, internal market
Legal affairs, internal market
Legal affairs, internal market
Legal affairs, internal market
Citizens’ freedoms and rights, justice
Industry, external trade, research... ** 
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Budgetary control_________________
LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
FLESCH Colette (ELDR)
ROTHE Mechtild (PSE) 
CHICHESTER Giles Bryan (PPE-DE) 
SEPPANEN Esko Olavi (GUE/NGL) 
BOGE Reimer (PPE-DE)
BOGE Reimer (PPE-DE)
BOGE Reimer (PPE-DE)
ZISSENER Sabine (PPE-DE) 
RANDZIO-PLATH Christa (PSE) 
MacCORMICK Neil (VERTS/ALE) 
GEBHARDT Evelyne (PSE) 
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE) 
GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
Van VELZEN W.G. (PPE-DE) 
BOSCH Herbert (PSE)_____________
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OLAF (amend, regul. 1073/1999/EC)
Environment and health: polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in 
extender oils and tyres (27th amend, direct. 76/769/EEC)
Cooperation EC/Asian and Latin America countries: aid to uprooted 
people after end 2004 (amend, regul. 2130/2001/EC)
Community statistics: analysis of continuing vocational training in 
enterprises
Enlargement, environment: packaging and packaging waste (amend, 
direct 94/62/EC)
Railway transport of passengers: opening to international competition 
(amend, direct 91/440/EEC). 3rd package 
Railway transport: certification of train crews and drivers. 3rd 
package
Railway transport: international rail passengers' rights and 
obligations. 3rd package
Rail freight services: compensation in case of non-compliance with 
contractual quality requirements. 3rd package 
Motor vehicles : re-usability, recyclability and recovery of 
components (amend, direct. 70/156/CEE)
Civil judicial cooperation: recovery of uncontested claims,European 
order for payment procedure
Statutory audit of annual and consolidated accounts (amend, direct 
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, repeal, direct 84/253/EEC) 
Cinematographic heritage: collection and preservation, 
competitiveness of related industrial activities____________________
Environment, public health, consumers 
Development, cooperation 
Employment, social affairs 
Environment, public health, consumers 
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Regional, transport, tourism ** 
Environment, public health, consumers
Culture, youth, education, media, sport
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Appendix II. Second reading codecision roll-call votes, 
start 5th EP to end 2000
Date Rapporteur
RCV Sponsor
Yes No Abstain Main Policy Issi
16/11/1999 Smet ? (no record in minutes) 455 3 29
16/11/1999 Smet ? (no record in minutes) 341 115 37
16/11/1999 Lange ? (no record in minutes) 291 204 9
16/11/1999 Lange ? (no record in minutes) 229 257 15 Inter-Institutional
16/11/1999 Lange ? (no record in minutes) 274 208 22
16/11/1999 Lange ? (no record in minutes) 235 251 16
16/11/1999 Lange ? (no record in minutes) 274 207 18
16/11/1999 Lange ? (no record in minutes) 274 211 11 Environment
16/11/1999 Lange ? (no record in minutes) 253 238 16 Economics
16/11/1999 Lange ? (no record in minutes) 232 256 16 Economics
02/12/1999 Gonzalez Alvarez V/ALE 416 26 12
02/12/1999 Gonzalez Alvarez V/ALE 251 199 10 Environment
02/12/1999 Gonzalez Alvarez V/ALE 43 412 22 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen V/ALE 263 272 13 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PSE 285 239 10 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen V/ALE 274 261 14 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PSE 264 237 35 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PSE 499 23 30 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PSE 304 222 22 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PSE 302 238 12 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen V/ALE 299 230 26 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PPE-DE/DE 82 449 24 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PSE 533 5 18 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PPE-DE/DE 102 414 32 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PSE 310 223 22 Environment
15/12/1999 Hulthen PPE-DE/DE 83 448 21 Environment
03/02/2000 Florenz V/ALE 329 179 20 Economics
03/02/2000 Florenz V/ALE 188 337 8 Economics
03/02/2000 Florenz V/ALE, PPE-DE-ED 181 334 12 Economics
03/02/2000 Florenz V/ALE, PPE-DE-ED 323 198 11 Environment
03/02/2000 Florenz V/ALE 292 215 16 Environment
03/02/2000 Florenz V/ALE 311 195 12 Environment
03/02/2000 Florenz V/ALE 216 293 13 Environment
16/02/2000 Lienemann EDD 17 422 12 Inter-Institutional
16/02/2000 Lienemann EDD 57 422 4 Inter-Institutional
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 393 145 19
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 374 170 10
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 456 76 18
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 516 23 10
16/02/2000 Lienemann PPE-DE-ED 495 49 12
16/02/2000 Lienemann PPE-DE-ED 289 240 13
16/02/2000 Lienemann PSE 278 269 8
16/02/2000 Lienemann PSE 481 61 11
16/02/2000 Lienemann PSE 457 85 14
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 500 49 7
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 534 3 16
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 267 271 15
16/02/2000 Lienemann UEN 420 90 41
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16/02/2000 Lienemann UEN 356 145 42
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 117 419 12
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 385 122 44
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 405 103 34
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 360 136 47
16/02/2000 Lienemann PSE, V/ALE 451 80 15
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 136 397 20
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 448 80 23
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 363 134 51
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE 291 213 42
16/02/2000 Lienemann V/ALE
UEN, PPE-DE-ED,
331 199 19
14/03/2000 Bouwman ELDR
UEN, PPE-DE-ED,
325 148 14
14/03/2000 Bouwman ELDR 355 120 13
14/03/2000 Bouwman PPE-DE-ED 436 33 17
15/03/2000 Lannoye GUE/NGL 174 335 22 Environment
15/03/2000 Lannoye UEN 177 344 14 Environment
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE 204 317 14 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye UEN 170 341 29 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE 216 305 15 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE, UEN 204 312 27 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE 236 296 15 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye UEN 165 311 18 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE 208 302 33 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE 196 329 19 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE 189 319 41 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE 190 342 14 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Lannoye V/ALE 311 218 11 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 216 300 37 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 245 269 37 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 282 231 39 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 276 233 39 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland V/ALE 331 194 28 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 298 220 33
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 277 233 33
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 253 263 26
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 248 261 36
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 245 268 38
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 281 229 36 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 292 222 37 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 202 309 37 Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 239 229 38 External/Trade
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 205 311 35 External/Trade
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 121 390 33 External/Trade
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 102 418 35 External/Trade
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 233 281 33 External/Trade
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 206 306 39 Environment
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 388 122 45 Environment
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 237 280 35 Environment
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 422 86 42 Environment
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 228 266 40 Environment
15/03/2000 Blockland EDD 261 251 34 Environment
11/04/2000 Kauppi PPE-DE 34 360 3 Inter-Institutional
11/04/2000 Kauppi PPE-DE 238 177 5 Inter-Institutional
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11/04/2000 Kauppi PPE-DE 86 333 6 Inter-Institutional
11/04/2000 Lannoye PPE-DE 429 11 8 Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000 Bowe PSE 454 46 2 Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000 Bowe PSE 502 2 1 Environment
12/04/2000 Bowe PSE, PPE-DE 407 101 2
12/04/2000 Bowe V/ALE 315 198 2
12/04/2000 Bowe PPE-DE 412 100 3
12/04/2000 Bowe PPE-DE 413 96 5 Economics
12/04/2000 Bowe PPE-DE 379 128 8 Economics
12/04/2000 Bowe PSE 415 59 43 Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000 Bowe V/ALE 141 344 30 Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000 Bowe GUE/NGL 283 201 36 Social
12/04/2000 Bowe PSE 449 73 2 Economics
12/04/2000 Bowe V/ALE 278 204 42 Economics
12/04/2000 Bowe PSE 422 100 2 Economics
12/04/2000 Bowe GUE/NGL 300 154 11 Economics
12/04/2000 Bowe PPE-DE 184 307 8
12/04/2000 Bowe V/ALE 314 149 35
12/04/2000 Bowe GUE/NGL 286 203 13 Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000 Bowe V/ALE 284 189 25 Inter-Institutional
13/06/2000 McKen V/ALE 295 193 3
13/06/2000 McKen V/ALE 296 203 6 Environment
13/06/2000 McKen PPE-DE 500 6 4
13/06/2000 McKen PPE-DE 517 1 5 Internal EP
13/06/2000 McKen PPE-DE 512 0 5
13/06/2000 McKen PPE-DE 519 0 3
13/06/2000 McKen PPE-DE 515 6 4
13/06/2000 McKen PPE-DE 498 26 2
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski V/ALE 248 286 14
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski GUE/NGL, V/ALE 400 135 17
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski GUE/NGL, V/ALE 391 138 13
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski ELDR 248 289 16
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski ELDR 239 302 11 Environment
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski GUE/NGL 426 115 11 Environment
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski V/ALE 420 110 14 Environment
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski ELDR, V/ALE 260 286 9 Environment
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski GUE/NGL, V/ALE 380 162 7 Environment
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski GUE/NGL 372 174 14 Environment
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski GUE/NGL, V/ALE 239 293 13 Environment
05/07/2000 Jarzembowski GUE/NGL 343 207 8 Environment
05/07/2000 Swoboda V/ALE 40 502 10 Environment
05/07/2000 Swoboda GUE/NGL 145 393 19 Environment
05/07/2000 Swoboda GUE/NGL 415 123 17 Environment
05/07/2000 Swoboda V/ALE 290 254 12 Environment
05/07/2000 Swoboda GUE/NGL 466 66 16 Environment
05/07/2000 Swoboda V/ALE 287 240 16 Social
06/07/2000
Garcia-Orcoyen
Tormo EPP-ED 487 6 5 External/Trade
06/07/2000
Garcia-Orcoyen
Tormo V/ALE 299 208 3 Inter-Institutional
06/07/2000
Garcia-Orcoyen
Tormo PSE 466 26 7 External/Trade
06/07/2000
Garcia-Orcoyen
Tormo V/ALE 280 218 4 External/Trade
06/07/2000 Garcia-Orcoyen V/ALE 256 242 4 External/Trade
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Tormo
Garcia-Orcoyen
06/07/2000 Tormo
Garcia-Orcoyen
V/ALE 287 216 8 External/Trade
06/07/2000 Tormo V/ALE 290 219 5
06/07/2000 Breyer PSE 313 193 6
06/07/2000 Breyer PSE 309 193 4
06/07/2000 Breyer PSE 306 201 5
06/07/2000 Breyer PSE 296 208 6
12/12/2000 Liese EPP-ED 499 0 14
12/12/2000 Liese EPP-ED, V/ALE 516 0 13
12/12/2000 Liese V/ALE 92 429 9
12/12/2000 Liese EPP-ED, V/ALE 517 1 11 Internal EP
12/12/2000 Liese EPP-ED, V/ALE 508 1 17 Internal EP
13/12/2000 Maaten ELDR, V/ALE, PSE 187 330 15 Internal EP
13/12/2000 Maaten EDD 422 92 27 Internal EP
13/12/2000 Maaten EPP 227 308 15 Internal EP
13/12/2000 Maaten V/ALE 205 327 21 Internal EP
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Appendix III. Correlation tables
Correlation between variables, allocation of reports
Reports adgov nongov nonopp chair position salience dissent ep absolute partysize attendance countrize Eldr green pes small
Reports 1.000
adgov 0.215
***
1.000
nongov -0.052 -0.187
***
1.000
nonopp -0.102
**
-0.235
***
-0.258
***
1.000
chair 0.519
***
0.148
***
-0.069 -0.079
#
1.000
position 0.143
***
0.154
***
0.289
***
-0.225
***
0.017 1.000
salience 0.190
#**
0.082
*
-0.075
*
0.040 0.036 0.168
***
1.000
dissent 0.129
***
0.084
*
0.072
*
0.011 0.108
**
-0.002 -0.015 1.000
ep 0.124
***
0.080 0.238
***
-0.129
***
0.009 0.770
***
-0.091
**
-0.042 1.000
absolutes 0.006 -0.002 -0.134
•**
-0.010 0.036 -0.240
***
-0.058 0.164
***
0.011 1.000
partysize 0.714
***
0.331
***
-0.136
***
-0.236
***
0.303
***
0.149
***
0.295
***
0.160
***
0.082
*
-0.012 1.000
attendance 0.049 -0.220
***
0.285
***
0.330
***
-0.091
**
0.077
*
0.202
***
0.162
***
0.146
***
0.067 -0.010 1.000
countrysize 0.197 
***
0.300
«**
-0.402
***
-0.512
***
0.140
***
-0.013 -0.095
«*
-0.049 0.025 0.034 0.381
**•
-0.570
*«•
1.000
eldr -0.062 -0.158
***
0.210
***
0.023 -0.034 0.273
***
0.080 -0.007 0.219
***
-0.434
***
-0.167
***
0.138
«**
-0.081
*
1.000
green -0.086 -0.019 0.002 0.076 -0.031 -0.048 -0.126
***
0.148
«**
0.235
•«*
0.539
***
-0.149
**•
0.042 -0.055 -0.176
***
1.000
pes 0.138
***
0.199
***
0.200
***
-0.178
***
0.022 0.322
***
0.222
***
0.145
***
0.173
***
-0.110
**
0.267
***
0.090
**
-0.051 -0.198
***
-0.171
***
1.000
small -0.188
***
-0.057 -0.251
***
0.051 -0.095
**
-0.734
***
-0.201
***
-0.180
***
-0.556
***
0.040 -0.153
***
-0.088
**
0.059 -0.284
**•
-0.245
***
-0.275
***
1.000
*** Correlation significant at .01, ** Correlation significant at .05, * Correlation significant at .1
Correlation between variables, completion of legislation
strait reading experience nominate adgov Nongov chair trend incumbent position salience dissent ep country party Attend eldr green pes
reading
experience
Nominate
Adgov
Nongov
Chair
1.00
0.051
0.064
-0.066
-0.007
-0.054
1.00
-0.123 8 
-0.038 
-0.037 
0.161 
**
1.00
-0.228 *** 1.00
-0.179 ***-0.249 ***
0.089 0.120 
*
1.00
-0.112* 1.00
Trend -0.096 0.264*** 0.009 0.024 -0.037 0.127 1.00
incumbent
Position
0.098
0.031
-0.001
0.049
-0.034 0.069 
-0.114 0.255*** 
*
-0.091
0.124
**
0.084
-0.065
-0.067
0.124
**
1.00
0.065 1.00
Salience -0.023 -0.019 0.148 0.207*** 
**
-0.188 *** -0.014 0.123
**
-0.017 0.270
***
1.00
Dissent -0.007 -0.066 0.171 *** -0.068 0.097 0.107* -0.040 -0.127 ** -0.523
**#
-0.218 *•* 1.00
ep 0.059 0.104 8 -0.325 ***0.127 
**
-0.009 -0.087 0.089 0.088 0.809
***
0.014 -0.514
***
1.00
countrysize -0.056 -0.028 0.358*** 0.217*** -0.492 *** 0.065 0.096 0.067 -0.011 0.138
**
0.258
***
0.036 1.00
partysize 0.103 0.009 0.517*** 0.201*** -0.356 *** 0.006 0.084 0.229 *** 0.020 0.276 *** 0.163
***
-0.008 0.712
**•
1.00
attendance 0.37 -0.079 -0.140** -0.090 0.202 *** -0.071 -0.149
**
0.246 *** 0.139
**
0.142
**
-0.131
**
0.123
**
-0.284
***
-0.014 1.00
eldr -.001 0.185 *** -0.029 -0.213 *** 0.300 *** -0.063 -0.041 -0.299 *** 0.154
**
0.075 -0.086 0.205
***
-0.250
***
-0.316
***
0.024 1.00
green -.005 -0.076 -0.533 *** -0.082 0.068 0.060 -0.077 0.012 -0.150
**
-0.279 *** 0.062 0.151
**
-0.162
***
-0.311
***
0.056 -0.105 1.00 
**
pes -0.074 -0.152 ** -0.470 *** 0.535 *** 0.099 -0.066 0.130
**
0.082 0.325
***
0.228 *** 0.005 0.141
**
0.011 0.075 0.087 -0.218 -0.186 1.00 
*** ***
small -0.020 -0.010 -0.235 *** 0.150 
**
-0.112* -0.094 -0.075 0.140
**
-0.316
***
-0.187 *** -0.224
***
-0.149
**
-0.136
**
-0.300
***
-0.47 -0.108 -0.092 -0.191 
« **«
*** Correlation significant at .01, ** Correlation significant at .05, * Correlation significant at .1.
Correlation between variables, second reading voting, all voting decisions
Adgov nongov nonopp position salience dissent ep
Nom­
inate partysize attendance
Country­
size decision edd eldr green gue non pes uen
Adgov 1
nongov -0.234 1
nonopp -0.232 -0.121 1
position 0.267 0.184 -0.140 1
salience 0.163 -0.194 -0.071 0.253 1
dissent -0.016 0.071 -0.060 -0.285 -0.126 1
ep 0.215 0.123 -0.022 0.818 0.001 -0.289 1
nominate -0.300 -0.116 -0.067 0.047 0.229 0.083 -0.195 1
paitysize 0.206 -0.287 -0.302 0.103 0.305 0.245 0.100 0.409 1
attendance -0.109 0.249 0.192 0.204 0.289 0.116 0.203 0.006 0.184 1
countrysize 0.235 -0.480 -0.484 -0.105 0.018 0.160 -0.010 0.164 0.578 -0.345 1
decision 0.043 0.031 0.017 0.044 0.023 0.019 0.059 -0.075 0.000 0.059 -0.031 1
edd -0.101 -0.053 0.110 -0.314 0.058 -0.205 -0.283 -0.060 -0.129 -0.045 -0.010 -0.028 1
eldr -0.148 0.172 0.153 0.162 0.032 -0.067 0.166 -0.023 -0.250 0.029 -0.151 0.033 -0.047 1
green 0.033 0.046 0.148 -0.070 -0.170 0.098 0.172 -0.442 -0.216 0.045 -0.090 0.033 -0.039 -0.081 1
gue -0.030 -0.092 0.017 -0.412 -0.284 -0.023 -0.171 -0.431 -0.233 -0.037 -0.018 0.006 -0.040 -0.083 -0.068 1
non -0.161 -0.084 0.081 -0.265 -0.294 -0.080 -0.139 0.018 -0.178 -0.261 0.050 -0.037 -0.036 -0.076 -0.063 -0.064 1
pes 0.499 0.155 -0.225 0.368 0.201 0.081 0.263 -0.409 0.196 0.111 0.017 0.074 -0.098 -0.203 -0.168 -0.171 -0.156 1
uen -0.015 -0.068 -0.039 -0.185 0.017 -0.120 -0.341 0.039 -0.098 -0.185 -0.049 -0.041 -0.029 -0.061 -0.050 -0.051 -0.047 -0.126 1
All correlations are significant at .01 level except UEN and decision, party-size and decision and attendance and nominate score. The correlation 
only becomes significant for the latter two pairs at the .1 level. The correlation between UEN and decision is not significant even at this level.
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Correlation between variables, second reading voting, non-voting excluded
adgov nongov nonopp position salience dissent ep nominate partysize attendance
Country­
size Decision edd eldr green gue non pes uen
adgov 1
nongov -0.240 1
nonopp -0.236 -0.127 1
position 0.253 0.182 -0.140 1
salience 0.156 -0.208 -0.073 0.245 1
dissent -0.017 0.070 -0.066 -0.318 -0.122 1
ep 0.208 0.118 -0.024 0.815 -0.004 -0.326 1
nominate -0.301 -0.118 -0.065 0.043 0.234 0.086 -0.205 1
partysize 0.208 -0.298 -0.310 0.084 0.309 0.233 0.085 0.411 1
attendance -0.121 0.246 0.187 0.202 0.283 0.106 0.202 0.019 0.177 1
countrysize 0.249 -0.483 -0.483 -0.102 0.026 0.171 -0.004 0.164 0.595 -0.334 1
decision 0.046 0.026 0.011 0.034 0.012 0.010 0.052 -0.083 -0.013 0.038 -0.024 1
edd -0.084 -0.045 0.134 -0.266 0.055 -0.173 -0.239 -0.071 -0.110 -0.013 -0.038 -0.011 1
eldr -0.159 0.168 0.156 0.161 0.032 -0.071 0.165 -0.022 -0.258 0.033 -0.152 0.030 -0.041 1
green 0.031 0.042 0.147 -0.080 -0.182 0.094 0.172 -0.450 -0.224 0.037 -0.088 0.032 -0.034 -0.085 1
gue -0.033 -0.094 0.025 -0.428 -0.282 -0.034 -0.178 -0.425 -0.234 -0.044 -0.019 0.005 -0.033 -0.084 -0.070 1
non -0.151 -0.081 0.075 -0.257 -0.280 -0.077 -0.139 0.028 -0.166 -0.268 0.052 -0.020 -0.029 -0.073 -0.060 -0.059 1
pes 0.497 0.155 -0.232 0.361 0.192 0.078 0.254 -0.412 0.191 0.102 0.019 0.073 -0.083 -0.211 -0.175 -0.172 -0.148 1
uen -0.023 -0.068 -0.036 -0.198 0.021 -0.123 -0.349 0.039 -0.097 -0.197 -0.038 -0.038 -0.024 -0.061 -0.051 -0.050 -0.043 -0.125 1
All correlations are significant at .01 level except UEN and decision and between ep and country-size. The correlation between these two pairs is 
not even significant at the .1 level.
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